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ABSTRACT
A FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT
Sahar Mohamed Ghanem 
Old Dominion University, 2004 
Director; Dr. Hussein Abdel-Wahab
The need for secure group communication is increasingly evident in a wide variety of 
governmental, commercial, and Internet communities. Secure group key management is 
concerned with the methods o f issuing and distributing group keys, and the management 
of those keys over a period o f time. To provide perfect secrecy, a central group key 
manager (GKM) has to perform group rekeying for every join or leave request. Fast 
rekeying is crucial to an application’s performance that has large group size, experiences 
frequent joins and leaves, or where the GKM is hosted by a group member. Examples of 
such applications are interactive military simulation, secure video and audio 
broadcasting, and secure peer-to-peer networks. Traditionally, the rekeying is performed 
periodically for the batch o f requests accumulated during an inter-rekey period. The use 
o f a logical key hierarchy (LKH) by a GKM has been introduced to provide scalable 
rekeying. If the GKM maintains a LKH of degree d  and height h, such that the group size 
n < d \  and the batch size is R requests, a rekeying requires the GKM to regenerate 
O ( R x h )  keys and to perform 0 ( d  x R x  h) keys encryptions for the new keys 
distribution. The LKH approach provided a GKM rekeying cost that scales to the 
logarithm of the group size, however, the number o f encryptions increases with increased 
LKH degree, LKH height, or the batch size. In this dissertation, we introduce a 
framework for scalable and efficient secure group key management that outperforms the 
original LKH approach. The framework has six components as follows. First, we present 
a software model for providing secure group key management that is independent o f the 
application, the security mechanism, and the communication protocol. Second, we focus 
on a LKH-based GKM and introduce a secure key distribution technique, in which a
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rekeying requires the GKM to regenerate 0 { R x h )  keys. Instead of encryption, we 
propose a novel XOR-based key distribution technique, namely XORBP, which performs 
an XOR operation between keys, and uses random byte patterns (BPs) to distribute the 
key material in the rekey message to guard against insider attacks. Our experiments show 
that the XORBP LKH approach substantially reduces a rekeying computation effort by 
more than 90%. Third, we propose two novel LKH batch rekeying protocols. The first 
protocol maintains a balanced LKH (B^-LKH) while the other maintains an unbalanced 
LKH (S-LKH). If a group experiences frequent leaves, keys are deleted form the LKH 
and maintaining a balanced LKH becomes crucial to the rekeying’s process performance. 
In our experiments, the use o f a B'^-LKH by a GKM, compared to a S-LKH, is shown to 
substantially reduce the number o f LKH nodes (i.e., storage), and the number of 
regenerated keys per a rekeying by more than 50%. Moreover, the B^-LKH performance 
is shown to be bounded with increased group dynamics. Fourth, we introduce a 
generalized rekey policy that can be used to provide periodic rekeying as well as other 
versatile rekeying conditions. Fifth, to support distributed group key management, we 
identify four distributed group-rekeying protocols between a set o f peer rekey agents. 
Finally, we discuss a group member and a GKM’s recovery after a short failure time.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Many emerging technologies, such as web technology and low cost high performance 
desktops have provided both the inspiration and the motivation o f a wide range of 
applications, for which securing data transmission is an important requirement. Although 
secure point-to-point communications have been predominant so far, the need for secure 
group communication is increasingly evident in a wide variety o f government, 
commercial, and Internet communities. Secure group communication is becoming the 
basis for a growing number of applications such as war gaming, law enforcement, 
disaster relief, stock quotes distribution, news feeds, software updates, live multi-party 
conferencing, shared work space, distributed interactive simulation, Internet video 
transmission, and on-line video games. Some o f these applications engage in one-to- 
many communication while others involve many-to-many communication. Different 
group applications and different application contexts will need different security services.
In secure group communication, just as in point-to-point communication, the privacy, 
integrity, availability, and authenticity of a group service must be protected. However, a 
group security concerns are considerably more involved than those regarding point-to- 
point communication. In secure group communication, dealing with common issues of 
message authentication and confidentiality becomes much more complex. In addition, 
other concerns arise, such as access control, and dynamic group membership [4], [31]. 
Secure group communication is usually categorized by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) as secure multicast communication. The IP multicast model [18] uses the 
notion o f a group o f members associated with a given group address. A sender simply 
sends a message to this group address and the network replicates the message and 
forwards the copies to group members located throughout the network.
The journal model for this dissertation is the lEEE/ACM  Transactions on Networking.
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Secure group communication has three major core areas: secure group policy, secure 
group data transfer, and secure group key management [29]. A secure group policy 
provides the definition, implementation and maintenance o f policies governing the 
various mechanisms o f group security, such as key dissemination, access control, 
updating (rekeying) of the group shared keys, and the actions taken -when certain keys are 
compromised. Secure group data transfer is concerned with providing secure group traffic 
techniques such as the methods used to ascertain the authenticity of a piece of data and 
the methods used to establish data confidentiality. Secure group key management is 
concerned with the methods o f issuing and distributing group keys and the management 
o f those keys over period o f time, e.g. updating (rekeying) the existing group key(s) 
under certain conditions following the prescribed policies.
In this dissertation, we present our view and efforts in developing software 
framework for providing secure group key management that is efficient, scalable, 
reliable, and independent of the application, the security mechanism, and the 
communication protocol.
1.1 Overview
Before the widespread use o f the computer, information security was provided by 
physical and administrative means. With the introduction of the computer, the need for 
automated tools for protecting files and information stored on the computer became 
evident. The generic name for such tools is computer security. The introduction of 
distributed systems and the use o f networks and communications facilitate carrying data 
between computers. Network security measures are needed to protect data during their 
transmission. There are no clear boundaries between these three forms o f security.
By viewing the function o f the computer system as providing information, there is a 
flow o f information from a source to a destination, and the attacks could be classified as 
passive attacks, or active attacks. Passive attacks are usually called eavesdropping, 
monitoring, or interception, and its goal is to obtain information that is being transmitted. 
The attacks could be the release of message content, or traffic analysis. They are very 
difficult to detect. Thus, network security emphasis is on preventing them rather than 
detecting their occurrence. Active attacks involve modification o f the data stream or the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
creation of a false one. There are four active attack categories. Masquerade 
(impersonating) in which one entity pretends to be a different entity; Replay in which 
passive capture o f a data units is followed by subsequent retransmission to produce an 
unauthorized effect; Modification o f the message (alteration, delay, or reorder); Denial o f  
service that prevents the normal use o f a service. It is difficult to absolutely prevent active 
attacks. The goal of a network security system is to detect them and possibly recover 
from any resulting disruption or delays.
The following are the defined network security services:
• Authentication that assures the recipient that the message is from the source that it 
claims to be.
• Access control to limit and control the access o f information to authorized users.
• Confidentiality (privacy) is the protection o f transmitted data from passive attacks, so 
it is accessible only for authorized users.
• Integrity that assures the recipient that any modification of a transmitted message is 
done only by authorized users.
• Non-repudiation is to prevent neither the sender nor the receiver from denying a 
transmitted message.
• Anonymity when the identity of the sender o f a message is secret.
• Service availability is the detection and recovery from attacks that result in the loss or 
reduction in availability o f elements of a distributed system.
Many emerging technologies, such as low-cost high performance desktop, video and 
audio processing equipment, and high-speed transmission and switching will enable real­
time information exchange among group of participants. A new generation of distributed 
group applications will take advantage o f these technologies and provide many network- 
based services. Many of these applications will require security provisions for session 
management and information transmission. War gaming, stock quotes distribution, news 
feeds, distributed interactive simulation, live multi-party conferencing, and on-line video 
games are just some of these group applications that require multiparty exchange of data, 
voice, and video among a large number of simulated and real participants. Group 
communication has many varying characteristics such as group size, member 
characteristics (i.e., computing power and available bandwidth), membership dynamics.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4
expected group lifetime, number o f senders, and volume and type o f traffic. A group 
security service should address the different requirements o f different group 
characteristics in addition to being scalable, reliable, and independent of security 
objective, technology, and communication protocol [10],
Cryptography techniques can be used to provide authentication, confidentiality, 
sender non-repudiation, and message integrity. The use o f cryptography necessitates the 
distribution of shared group key(s). The nature o f group communication presents a 
challenge when trying to provide secure group key management. Secure group key 
management addresses issues such as how to generate a group key, how to securely 
distribute the group key, how to revoke membership of leaving members, i.e., preventing 
leaving members from access to future group communication (perfect forward secrecy), 
how to prevent joining members from access to past group communication (perfect 
backward secrecy), and how to periodically refresh the group key [65].
Extending point-to-point protocols for distributing a group key is not scalable. For 
example, setting up a group o f symmetric keys with the assistance of a centralized group 
key manager (GKM), where the GKM is used for authenticating and distributing the 
group key to group members. Such protocol will involve encrypting the relevant message 
n times, for a group o f n members, which is not scalable. The primary design goal o f a 
secure group key management is to be scalable and make efficient use of processing, 
bandwidth, and storage requirements for a GKM and a group member.
Secure group key management is a relatively recent field of research that is related to 
two classical problems namely secure broadcast and contributory group key agreement. 
In secure broadcast a sender wishes to broadcast a secret (group key) by a single 
transmission (that is received simultaneously by many receivers) to some subset of his 
receivers. Proposed solutions that are based on the mathematical Chinese Remainder 
Theorem [15] or polynomial interpolation [7] are either o f theoretical interest where their 
security is not studied, or not efficient for large group sizes. Contributory group key 
agreement is usually based on a generalization o f Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement 
protocol to a group [37], [61]. DH allows two individuals to agree on a shared key, even 
though they can only exchange messages in public. Group DH protocols are contributory 
key agreement protocols that generally require sending several messages and the group
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
key is generated and distributed after several rounds. These protocols are suitable for 
small size peer groups, but not suitable for one-to-many type o f applications, or 
applications with heterogeneous environments where group members’ computation 
power and bandwidth varies. Since the rekeying delay is very large, group DH protocols 
are not suitable for highly dynamic or large groups.
Secure group communication is usually categorized by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) as secure IP multicast communication. Hardjono et al [29] propose a 
reference framework and problem areas for secure IP multicast protocol suites and define 
the functional building blocks for such protocol suites. Three problem areas are defined, 
namely, multicast data handling, keying material management, and multicast security 
policies. Multicast data handling covers problems concerning the security-related 
treatments of multicast data by the sender and the receiver that includes multicast data 
encryption, group authentication, source authentication, and data integrity. Management 
o f the keying material (i.e., cryptographic key belonging to a group) is concerned with 
the secure distribution and refreshment of keying material along with their associated 
state and parameters. Multicast security policies cover aspects o f policy in context of 
multicast security that include policy creation, high-level policy translation, and policy 
representation. Secure IP multicast provides security throughout the network layer and 
routing protocols, and might require trust in intermediate routers.
lolus [49] is the first system to address the group key management scalability 
problem by noticing that the security association must be dynamic in case of group 
communication, changing as group membership varies. lolus’s approach to provide 
scalability introduces the notion of a secure distribution tree that is composed o f a 
number of smaller secure multicast subgroups arranged in a hierarchy to create a single 
virtual secure group. Scalability is achieved by having each subgroup relatively 
independent. Each subgroup has its own subgroup keying and there is no global group 
key. Several other proposals adopt a distributed group key management to solve the 
group key management scalability problem, e.g. [21], [64].
Wong et al. [67] present a different approach to improve the scalability of group key 
distribution. Instead of a hierarchy of group security agents, they employ a hierarchy of 
keys namely Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH). It is assumed that there exists a trusted and
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secure GKM responsible for group access control and key management using a LKH. 
The LKH keys are distributed to group members while attempting to localize (as much as 
possible) the effects of a rekeying event. The LKH approach gained a lot of interest, and 
several other techniques have been built on top of it to improve the rekeying 
computation, communication, or storage requirements [20],
1.2 Motivation and Objective
Secure group communication is becoming the basis of a wide variety of applications 
in many government, commercial, and Internet communities. Secure group key 
management is concerned with securely issuing and distributing a shared group key to 
group members. In order to ensure perfect secrecy, the shared group key needs to be 
changed and redistributed (rekeyed) as group members join or leave the group. Rekeying 
when a member joins (leaves) the group, used to provide perfect backward (forward) 
secrecy, prevents the member from accessing previous (future) group communication. 
Usually, there exists a dedicated group manager (GKM) responsible for such group key 
{GK) management issues. In terms of scalability, group rekeying presents a challenging 
problem when trying to revoke a membership such that a leaving group member would 
not have future access to the group communication.
A very fast rekeying is crucial to the performance o f an application that has large 
group size, experiences frequent joins and leaves, or the GKM is hosted by a group 
member because of the required computational effort. For example, a distributed 
interactive military simulation that requires the exchange of communication between 
groups of tens of thousands of participants. A second example, is a content-based publish 
subscribe system such as stock quotes distribution, and secure broadcasting of audio and 
video, where a central server experiences frequent join and leave requests. A third 
example is a secure group of few hundred participants, where the GKM is hosted by a 
group member such as in peer-to-peer networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, or grid 
computing environments.
The simplest protocol is for the GKM to maintain the GK and a shared key with every 
group member. Rekeying for a new member joining the group requires the GKM to 
change the GK, encrypt it with its previous version and send it to old group members, and
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encrypt it with the new member shared key and send it to him. Rekeying to revoke a 
membership (i.e., leaving member) requires the GKM to change the GK, encrypt it 
individually with each shared key and send it to the corresponding member. When 
revoking a membership, the GKM can no longer use the previous GK that is known to the 
leaving (evicted) member. This protocol requires two encryptions to provide perfect 
backward secrecy, but requires n encryptions to provide perfect forward secrecy for a 
group of n members. This protocol is not scalable since it scales linearly with the group 
size.
The logical key hierarchy (LKH) [67] provides a scalable approach and requires the 
GKM to maintain a hierarchy (tree) o f keys of degree d. The root of the hierarchy is GK, 
the leaf nodes are the members shared keys, and the other keys (known as key- 
encrypting-keys KEKs) are used to provide scalable rekeying. Every group member holds 
the keys that fall on the path from his shared key leaf node to the root. If  a new member 
joins the group, his shared key is inserted in the hierarchy and all the keys he will be 
holding are changed and redistributed. If  a group member leaves the group, his shared 
key is deleted from the hierarchy and all the keys he was holding are changed and 
redistributed.
For example, the LKH of degree <7=3, shown in Fig. 1, is maintained by a GKM for 
a group of 9 members (a keys is indexed by the members’ numbers whose holding it). 
Rekeying after inserting K^ (member joins) requires the GKM to change to be 
K̂ _g and the group key Kj_g to be K^_g, and to perform the following 4 encryptions' for 
the new keys distribution: {Kg_g}Kg_^, {Kj_g}Kg, {K,_p}Ki_g, and {Ki_g}Kg. While 
rekeying after removing Kg (member leaves) requires the GKM to change Kj_g to be 
K,_g and the group key K̂ _g to be K _̂̂ , and to perform the following 5 encryptions for 
the new keys distribution: {Kg_^}Kj, {K,_g}Kg, {Ki_g}Kj_3 , and
{Kj_g}K7 _g. In general, for a group of n members and a balanced LKH of degree d, 
rekeying after a member joins would require GKM to perform on the average 2 x log^ n 
encryptions and rekeying after a member leaves would require GKM to perform on the
The notation {M }K  implies that the message M is encrypte<i with the key K.
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average d  x log^ n encryptions. A group member stores log^ n keys and has to perform 




Fig. 1. A Logical Key Hierarchy o f degree J  = 3 for a group of 9 members.
Traditionally, group rekeying is performed periodically for the accumulated join and 
leave requests (i.e., batch of updates) during an inter-rekey period. If  the GKM maintains 
a LKH of degree d  and height h, such that n < d ^ ,  and the batch size is R requests, a 
rekeying requires the GKM to regenerate 0{Ry . h)  keys and to perform 0 { d x R x h )  
keys encryptions for the new keys distribution. The encryption-based LKH approach 
provided a rekeying cost that scales to the logarithm of the group size, however, the 
number of encryptions performed by a GKM increases with increased LKH degree, LKH 
height, or the batch size, and can be more than the simple approach’s number of 
encryptions (i.e, n encryptions).
Many researchers introduced new techniques for group rekeying on top of LKH 
attempting to reduce compuation, communication, or storage cost for a GKM or a group 
members. While Chang et al. [13] achieve reduction in a GKM storage, their approaches 
allow members to collaborate or collude and break the system easily. The use of one-way 
function to reduce communication cost is suggested by Balenson et al. [2], which might 
increase the computation effort and the rekeying delay. The use o f pseudo-random 
function to reduce communication-storage parameters is suggested by Canetti et al. [11],
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which constraints key generation to applying pseudo random function which makes it 
hard to choose the session key form chosen weak keys.
The objective of our work is to provide a framework for secure group key 
management that outperforms the original LKH approach in terms of a rekeying 
computation effort for all application scenarios. The framework has to be secure, 
scalable, efficient, reliable, and independent o f the application, the security mechanism, 
and the communication protocol.
The main component of the framework is the key distribution technique. The main 
drawback of the LKH approach is that rekeying requires the use of encryption/decryption 
that will delay the process. Many real-time applications require very fast rekeying so that 
it is not disraptive to their performance. In addition, the LKH approach has two different 
procedures for rekeying in case of a member joining or leaving the group. Having two 
un-symmetric rekeying protocols makes it more complex for batch processing, where a 
rekeying is performed after a sequence o f requests of members joining and/or leaving the 
group (i.e., batch of updates). As previously noted, the other approaches built on top of 
LKH either increase the computation effort or are more vulnerable than the original LKH 
approach. Our objective is to introduce a key distribution technique, on top o f LKH, that 
requires much less computation effort and symmetric in both rekeying cases. In addition, 
the new technique should be as secure as the original LKH and does not introduce any 
significant increase in the communication or the storage requirements.
While the use of LKH is becoming standard practice as a group key management 
technique, and many researchers assume a balanced LKH (i.e., all leaf nodes are at the 
same level) for their cost estimates. To the best of our knowledge, no LKH maintenance 
algorithms have been proposed for any LKH degree that keeps it balanced all the time. 
Our objective is to provide LKH insertion and deletion algorithms and the associated 
rekeying protocol(s) that maintain the LKH of any degree balanced at all times.
Since the group rekeying latency is large, it is not practical to apply such process after 
each member joins or leaves the group. Instead, a batch rekeying process should be 
applied for a sequence of members joining and/or leaving the group. The rekeying 
process could be triggered periodically or when a certain condition is satisfied such as the
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batch size exceeding a certain limit. Our objective is to extend the developed balanced 
LKH algorithms and protocols for individual updates to a batch of updates.
A central key manager becomes a central point o f both congestion and failure. For a 
scalable reliable framework, our design has to provide both central and distributed secure 
group key management mechanisms. In addition, it is essential to incorporate a recovery 
mechanism for a key manager and a group member after short times of failure. The 
mobile computing paradigm is an example where frequent short disconnection times may 
occur, due to handoffs.
1.3 Contributions
First, we presented a new generic software model for providing secure group 
communication. The model identifies five main components along with main 
functionality and interactions. The identified components are authentication manager, 
group key manager, rekey manager and the corresponding rekey client, group rekey 
channel, and cryptographic utility manager [25]. Then, we extended Java'^'^ Security with 
an application-programming interface (API) that can be used to provide group key 
manager, rekey manager, and rekey client functionality as suggested by our model. Our 
secure group key management framework is independent of the application, the security 
mechanism, and the communication protocol. The group key management framework 
requires addressing the following issue; group key distribution, rekey protocol, batch 
rekeying, distributed group key management, and group key manager recovery. We 
briefly present our approach to resolve the aforementioned issues highlighting our 
contributions.
A Key Distribution Technique
We focused on the rekey manager/rekey client protocol that uses a Logical Key 
Hierarchy (LKH) in order to provide scalable group key distribution. Similar to the 
original LKH, we assume the rekey manager (re)-generates any key independent of all 
other keys including its old version. Then, the rekey manager sends a rekey message to 
all group members. The rekey message is received by the rekey client component, and 
contains a rekey packet for every new key. The rekey client chooses which rekey packets
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to process and update his set of keys according to other guiding message information 
(e.g., the location of the new keys).
The original LKH approach encrypts a new key with either other key or its previous 
version. Instead, we proposed a novel XOR-based key distribution technique namely 
XORBP. The proposed approach uses an XOR operation between keys to reduce the 
computation effort, and uses random byte patterns (BP) to distribute the key material in a 
fixed size rekey packet to protect against insider attacks [24]. Compared to the encryption 
approach, our technique provides symmetric rekey protocols in both cases of group 
member joining and leaving. In addition, our experiments have shown that XORBP can 
achieve more than 90% reduction in the rekey message construction time, compared to 
the encryption-based key distribution technique, for the same LKH degree. For example, 
consider a news broadcast GKM that supports a group of size n = 60,000, where up to 
100 listeners could join in a sec, a listener stays tuned for few minutes, and a one block 
encryption consumes 1 msec. Using the original encryption-based LKH, where d=  4 ,h  = 
8, and R = 1000, the rekey manager’s rekey message construction time requires 32 sec. 
Using the suggested XORBP LKH approach, a rekey message construction time is 
reduced to 3.2 sec.
On the other hand, XORBP increases LKH storage, member storage, and the rekey 
communication cost (message size). Due to the un-symmetry of the encryption protocol, 
increasing the LKH degree with such protocol reduces the join rekey computation cost 
while increases the leave rekey computation cost. Using the symmetric XORBP key 
distribution technique and increasing LKH degree would not have the same constraint. 
The symmetry of XORBP protocol allows the use of a larger degree LKH, which reduces 
LKH storage, member storage, and rekey communication cost compared to a smaller 
degree LKH.
LKH Maintenance and Rekey Protocols
The research literature lacks practical LKH maintenance algorithms as well as 
algorithms for keeping it balanced. Keeping a LKH balanced is crucial to the 
performance of group rekeying especially for highly dynamic groups. We proposed two 
novel protocols for establishing and maintaining a LKH (by a rekey manager) with any
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degree as key nodes are inserted and deleted while group members join and leave the 
group. In addition, we detailed the rekey message format and construction in different 
LKH insertion and deletion scenarios as well as the different rekey client updates to 
maintain a group member set of keys. One protocol adopts a balanced LKH while the 
other adopts an unbalanced LKH that is developed for comparison.
Our protocols are based on the rekey manager assigning a unique member 
identification (individual ID) that will be used as a group member sort and search value. 
Individual identifications are sent in the rekey message to guide its processing, so they 
better be randomly generated (not from any names, IP address, or any other true 
individual identification) to prevent the possibility o f traffic analysis. In our protocols, the 
LKH plays a dual role as a key tree and an easily searchable data structure (using an 
individual ID) for the member individual material (name, IP address, k e y ,... etc).
Our first protocol maintains a LKH as a search tree (S-LKH) using the individual IDs. 
We adapt the search tree algorithms to accommodate the constraint that group individual 
materials are entries in the leaf nodes, while the internal nodes contain key-encrypting- 
key s (KEKs). Our second protocol maintains a LKH as a balanced search tree (B^- 
LKH) that has the same structure as S-LKH but guarantees that the LKH is balanced after 
every node insertion or deletion. B"̂  search trees have an extra constraint that all allocated 
nodes have to be at least half full to reduce the required tree allocated memory (storage). 
On the other hand, B’̂ -LKH maintenance introduces complexity and extra overhead in the 
rekey process.
We have performed empirical experiments to compare the rekey performance of S- 
LKH versus B^-LKH for different group sizes and LKH degrees. For individual rekeying 
(i.e., rekey after every join or leave request) the use of B^-LKH results in an increase in 
the average number of rekey packets and the average number o f encrypted keys 
compared to S-LKH. On the other hand, a B^-LKH has smaller height, and introduces a 
decrease in the maximum number of encrypted keys. The maximum number o f encrypted 
keys identifies the minimum period that has to be elapsed between two rekeyings. 
Furthermore, a B"^-LKH requires much less allocated nodes (i.e., storage) compared to S- 
LKH. The reduction of the number of allocated nodes using B'^-LKH reaches 50% of the 
number o f nodes for the same degree S-LBCH for a highly dynamic group. A complete
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
13
h - \
LKH of degree d  and height h contains {d'' -  \ ) l { d - \ )  nodes ( ' ^ d ' ), and can fit a
1=0
group of size n < d ^ . A  leaf node contains d  individual keys, while an internal node 
contains d  key-encrypting-keys. For the aforementioned example, a GKM for 60,000 
group members and a LKH of degree = 4, the B^-LKH number of allocated nodes is 
estimated to be 42,000, (form our experiment, when d  = A, the B'''-LKH number of 
allocated nodes = 0.7 x n). On the other hand, if  a S-LKH is used, the LKH number of 
allocated nodes could increase to more than 84,000 for a highly dynamic group.
Batch Rekeying
As previously mentioned, individual rekeying is not practical. For example, if the 
inter-arrival time o f group members at the start of a session is very small, a new group 
key might be issued (by the rekey manager) before the previous key version has reached 
(or has been used by) the group members. A simple solution is periodic rekeying that 
suggests rekeying after a fixed period of time that is large enough to avoid the above 
problem. Periodic rekeying will require a rekeying for a batch o f updates (i.e, 
accumulated join and leave requests during this period). Periodic rekeying doesn’t take 
into account the batch size or the request delay. We have extended our protocols to 
support batch processing.
First, we introduced a generalized rekey policy based on three main parameters that 
determine the triggering condition for the rekeying process. The three parameters are 
batch size, maximum request delay (i.e., time between receiving the request and the start 
of rekeying), and the minimum inter-rekey period (i.e., minimum period that has to be 
elapsed between two consecutive rekeyings). The application has the flexibility o f using 
all or some o f the rekey policy parameters as a deciding factor for triggering the rekey 
process. The application type determines what blend of parameters is taken into 
consideration. We detailed the designed rekey policy definition and presented a software 
object design for secure group key management.
Next, we extended S-LKH and B"^-LKH rekey protocols for a batch o f updates. For 
individual rekeying we concluded that the use o f B'^-LKH introduces major LKH storage 
savings and slightly increases the rekey cost. Our experiments for batch of updates show
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that using B^-LKH with large batch size and/or high dynamic groups substantially 
reduces the rekey cost by more than 50% when compared to S-LKH. For example, 
assuming a balanced LKH (B'*'-LKH) the number of regenerated keys in the above 
example is estimated to be 8,000 keys, while if an unbalanced S-LKH is used, the number 
of regenerated keys can increase to more than 16,000 keys (and therefore doubles the 
LKH estimated rekeying times). In addition, our experiments demonstrate that B"^-LKH 
performance is stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while S-LKH performance 
deteriorates as the group dynamics increase. Such S-LKH instability is due to the fact that 
the minimum number of children o f a node is one while B^-LKH nodes need to be at 
least half full.
Distributed Group Key Management
To extend the scalability and the reliability of our model, we introduced four 
cooperating protocols of distributed group key management between peer rekey agents. 
In a group o f peer rekey agents, every agent manages a subset o f the group members and 
participates equally in generating and distributing the group key (known to all group 
members). We show that the protocol with the minimal overhead is that one rekey agent 
at a time generates and distributes the group key to all members. We provide the design 
details o f the LKH maintained at every agent for the different cooperation scenarios.
If  any rekey agent is required to update all group members o f a new group key, a 
naive approach is that every agent maintains (replicates) the group LKH. Instead, we 
proposed the creation o f agents’ LKH (A-LKH) that reduces the replicated LKH size, and 
the number of maintained keys at a group member. Moreover, we discussed two different 
approaches for maintaining A-LKH namely dynamic A-LKH and static A-LKH. The first 
approach, dynamic A-LKH, allows a flexible agent join and leave but has a drawback of 
(sometimes) updating (some) group members when a rekey agent joins or leaves the 
agents’ group. While, in the second approach, static A-LKH, the maximum number of 
rekey agents has to be known before starting the session and updating A-LKH is 
transparent to all group members.
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Group Key Manager Recovery
Finally, we suggested a recovery protocol o f a group key manager (agent) after a 
short time o f failure. Although the group key manager state (e.g., LKH) could be 
recovered by collecting the state stored at all group members (and rekey agents), we 
introduced the use o f a log file to facilitate such recovery in ease of member failures or 
inconsistency. The logging system avoids writing any key or revealing any random 
number generator information. The log file is used to recover the last rekey policy, the 
rekey scheduler state, and the shape of LKH (without keys). The group members 
participate in the recovery phase by sending at least one encrypted recovery message to 
their rekey manager. The recovery message sent by a group member contains his set of 
maintained keys. Noticing that many LKH keys are stored by more than one group 
member (e.g., the group key is maintained by all group members), we introduced a key 
selection technique for group members to reduce the number o f sent keys in a reeovery 
message while allowing the group key manager to retrieve all LKH keys. The proposed 
logging and recovery mechanism is secure and easy to implement. The recovery of a 
group member after short time o f failure can be treated as the member leaving the group 
then joining later. If  no rekeying is initiated between the leave and join requests, the 
group member state is refreshed (i.e., sending him the same set of keys he was holding). 
In this case, refreshing a group member optimizes the rekey process by reducing the 
number of changed keys. Such refreshing requires the group member to provide his 
individual ID and key.
In summary our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) A generic software model for secure group key management that identifies the main 
eomponents and their functionalities and interaetion. Extending Java'^“ security with 
an API that can be used to provide the group key manager, the rekey manager, and 
the rekey client functionality suggested in our model.
2) A simple key distribution technique XORBP that can be used with the Logical Key 
Hierarchy (LKH) approach for group key management. Our experiments show that, 
compared to the original encryption technique for key distribution, XORBP has
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symmetric rekey procedures for join and leave, and can achieve more than 90% 
reduetion in the rekey message construction time [24],
3) Two LKH protocols for group individual rekeying (i.e., after each join or leave 
request) that details the LKH insertion and deletion algorithms, and the rekey 
message format and construction performed by a group rekey manager. In addition, 
the protocols detail the rekey elient updates performed by the eomponent that reeeives 
the rekey message at a group member. Our first protocol adopts an unbalanced LKH 
(S-LKH) while the other adopts a balanced LKH (B"^-LKH). Our experiments show 
that B^-LKH reduces the required LKH storage while slightly increases the individual 
rekeying cost compared to S-LKH. The reduction o f the number o f allocated nodes 
using B^-LICH reaches 50% of the same degree S-LKH for a highly dynamic group 
[25].
4) For batch processing (sequence of join and/or leave requests): first, we formalized a 
definition of a flexible rekey policy that has three main parameters: batch size, 
maximum request delay, and minimum inter-rekey period. Then, we provided a 
simplified view of the software objects used to provide secure group key 
management. Next, we extended the above two protocols (S-LKH and B^-LKH) to 
support batch rekeying. Our experiments for batch of updates show that using a 
balanced LKH (B'^-LKH) with large batch size and/or high dynamie group 
substantially reduces the rekey computation and communication cost by more than 
50% when compared to an unbalanced LKH (S-LKH). In addition, our experiments 
show that B'^-LKH performance is stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while 
S-LKH performance deteriorates as the group dynamics increases.
5) We introduced four cooperating protocols o f distributed group key management 
between a group of peer rekey agents, and detailed the maintained LKH and the 
group rekey overhead for each model. We introduced the use o f agents’ LKH (A- 
LKH) to reduce the size of the replicated LKH maintained at each agent over a naive 
approach (used in two o f the above protocols). In addition, we proposed two 
techniques for A-LKH maintenance, one allows a transparent agent join or leave to 
group members and the other is not transparent (group members might be 
affeeted/notified).
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6) Finally, we proposed a logging and recovery mechanism for the group key manager 
and the rekey manager. The proposed technique is secure and easy to implement. 
Group members participate in the recovery of their group key manager by sending 
one recovery message (in most cases). A key selection technique is proposed for a 
group member to reduce the size and overhead of the recovery message. In addition, 
we discussed the recovery o f a group member after a short time of failure.
1.4 Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents related work 
to secure group communication and secure group key management. Chapter III 
introduces the software model for secure group key management and presents the new 
key distribution technique XORBP. In addition, the experimental results for comparing 
XORBP key distribution technique with the encryption-based technique are presented. In 
Chapter IV, we detail the designed rekey protocols. The first protocol adopts an 
unbalanced LKH (S-LKH) while the second protocol adopts a balanced LKH (B^-LKH). 
We present the rekey message format, the LKH data structure, the LKH maintenance 
algorithms along with the rekey message construction for both protocols, and the rekey 
client update procedures for B^-LKH protocol. Moreover, the experimental results for 
comparing the two protocols for individual rekeying are presented. In chapter V, we 
introduce a rekey policy definition and implementation, and highlight the extension of 
B^-LKH rekey protocol for batch processing. Furthermore, the experimental results for 
comparing S-LKH and B^-LKH protocols for batch rekeying are presented. Chapter VI 
presents the extended model for distributed group key management. In addition, we 
discuss the recovery of a group member after a short time of failure as well as the 
proposed recovery protocol for the group key manager. Finally, chapter VII concludes 
this dissertation summarizing our contributions and presenting ideas for future 
extensions.




In chapter I, we identified the main requirements and issues for providing secure 
group key management. In a general model, there is a group manager responsible for 
generating and distributing a group key to all group members. The group manager is also 
responsible for changing and redistributing (i.e., rekeying) the group key when it deems 
necessary. The group key has to be changed to prevent new (old) group members from 
accessing previous (future) group communication. Secure group key management has to 
be scalable and reliable. A major scalability problem occurs when a rekeying is 
performed to revoke a group membership. A naive solution allows the group manager to 
perform n encryptions to distribute a new group key to a group o f n members.
In this chapter, we present relevant related work to the secure group key management 
problem. First, we present two (classical) problems similar to group key distribution. 
Section 2.1 presents the secure broadcasting problem, while section 2.2 presents the 
contributory group key agreement problem. As previously noted, secure group 
communication is categorized by IETF as secure multicast. Section 2.3 summarizes the 
lEFT group key management standard. In addition, we summarize the recent research 
work for secure group key management. The approaches for solving the scalability 
problem, identified above, can be categorized as physical distributed management 
(section 2.4) and the logical key hierarchy approach (section 2.5). Moreover, section 2.6 
summarizes several related topics to secure group communication such as multicast 
IPsec, group policy, group access control, group data-origin authentication, and rekey 
transport protocols. Finally, section 2.7 summarizes this chapter.
2.1 Secure Broadcasting
Secure broadcast is motivated by the main property of a broadcast channel, that is a 
single transmission from a source station can be received simultaneously by many 
destination stations. Secure broadcast is defined as the sender wishing to broadcast a
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
19
secret to some subset o f his receivers. Meanwhile, the sender does not perform a separate 
encryption either o f the secret or o f a single key with which to protect the secret, for each 
o f the intended recipients.
Secure lock [15] proposes the locking concept and a secure lock implementation 
based on the Chinese remainder Theorem. The proposed scheme is efficient only when 
the number o f users in a group is small, since the time to compute the lock and the length 
o f the lock (hence the transmission) is proportional to the number o f users.
Berkowis [7] provided a generalized model for a predefined scheme for secure 
broadcasting that uses polynomial interpolation for secret sharing. The general model 
assumes each receiver has a unique pseudo-share (secret) with the sender. The sender 
broadcast a set o f shares, while each subscribed receiver adds his pseudo-share, as a 
possible share, to the received shares. If  that pseudo-share is an actual share he recovers 
the secret, and if  it is not he doesn’t recover the secret. Some examination of the security 
o f his scheme is still necessary. Gong [26] tries to add authentication, integrity check, and 
freshness assurance to the message o f a modified version o f the polynomial method.
Fait and Naor [22] introduce theoretical measures for the qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of the encryption schemes designed for broadcast transmissions. The work 
considers a scenario where there is a center and a set of users. The center provides the 
users with pre-arranged keys when they join the system. At some point the center wishes 
to broadcast a message to a dynamically changing privileged subset o f the users. The 
obvious solution is to give every user its own key and transmit an individually encrypted 
message to every member o f the privileged class. This requires a very lengthy 
transmission. The other simple solution is to provide every possible subset of users with a 
key. This requires every user to store a huge number of keys. The authors provide 
solutions, which are efficient in the two measures, transmission length, and storage at the 
user’s end. In addition, the schemes should be computationally efficient. The security 
parameter was defined to be the length of the key. Another defined parameter is the 
number o f users that have to collude so as to break the scheme. For a given parameter k, a 
k-resilient scheme should be resilient to any subset of k  users that collude and any disjoint 
subset o f any size of privileged users.
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2.2 Contributory Group Key Agreement
There are two types o f group key agreement, centralized or contributory. In 
centralized techniques, the entire key generation is performed by a single entity (which 
actually translates into key distribution, not key agreement). On the other hand, in a 
contributory key agreement, each group member makes an independent contribution to 
the group key. The contributory key agreement model is usually based on a 
generalization of Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol to a group [37], [61]. DH 
is a public-key system that allows two individuals to agree on a shared key, even though 
they can only exchange messages in public. Group DH generally require sending several 
messages, exchanges, and the key is generated and distributed after several rounds. These 
protocols are suitable for small size peer groups. While they are not suitable for one-to- 
many (one sender and many receivers) type of applications, applications with a 
heterogeneous environment where member computation power and bandwidth varies. In 
addition, since the rekey latency (delay) is very large, they are not suitable for highly 
dynamic and/or large groups where frequent re-keying is necessary.
2.3 Standardized (IETF) Group Key Management
The Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [35], [36] is an application level 
protocol, independent of the underlying communication protocol. The creation and 
distribution of the group key require assignment of roles. The two primary roles are those 
of key distributor and member. The protocol identifies what functions the individual 
hosts perform in the protocol. The controller initiates the creation of the key, forms the 
key distribution messages, and collects acknowledgement o f key receipt from the 
receiver. The member waits for a distribution message, decrypt, validate, and 
acknowledges the receipt of the new key.
Baugher et al. [6 ] present a group key management architecture for multicast security 
that is based upon the group controller model with a single group owner as the root-of- 
trust. The group owner designates a group controller for member registration and rekey. 
The framework and the architecture allow for a modular and flexible design of group key
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management protocols for variety different settings that are specialized to application 
needs.
Hardjono et al [29] propose a reference framevv^ork and problem areas for secure IP 
multicast protocol suites and define a breakdown to functional building blocks for such 
protocol suites. They define three problem areas; multicast data handling, management of 
the keying material, and multicast security policies. Group key management building 
blocks following the reference framework are described in [28], [33].
2.4 Distributed Group Key Management
Ensemble [57] is a group communication system built at Cornell University, and is a 
descendant from an earlier system named Hours, that is descendant from the Isis system. 
The system allows processes to create process groups in which scalable reliable FIFO- 
ordered multicast and point-to-point communication are supported. A process group 
coherently binds together many processes into one entity. Processes may dynamically 
join and leave a group. Ensemble is a user-level library linked to an application, and is 
divided into many layers each implementing a simple protocol. Stacking together these 
layers, the user may customize the system to suite its needs. All members in a group must 
have the same stack to communicate. Ensemble group communication has inherently 
limited scalability, and scales to 100 members. Rodeh et al. [57] describe the security 
protocols and infrastructure o f Ensemble. A completely distributed and fault-tolerant 
algorithm for the management o f Ensemble group keys (arranged as LKH) is described in 
[56].
lolus [49] is a scalable, general-purpose framework that can be used for either secure 
multicasting or multicast key management. lolus discards the idea of large flat secure 
multicast group and replaces it with the notion of a secure distribution tree that is 
composed of multiple smaller secure multicast subgroups arranged in a hierarchy. 
Together these subgroups form a single virtual secure multicast group. The glue that 
holds the subgroups together consists o f the Group Security Agents (GSAs) that manage 
each subgroup. The GSAs cooperate to invisibly deliver all multicast data securely to
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each o f the subgroups, thereby creating a single secure multicast image for the senders 
and receivers.
Versakey [64] is a middleware framework for secure multicasting. The framework 
presents three closely related schemes for key distribution and management, ranging from 
tightly centralized to completely distributed. The framework also provides a set of 
efficient transitions from one scheme to another. All approaches organize the space of 
keys that will eventually be assigned to group members in a unique way, without actually 
generating the keys before they are needed.
DISEC [21] proposes a distributed key management scheme for many-to-many secure 
group communication. The framework uses one-way function trees for key distribution 
and management. DISEC proposes a localized ID assignment scheme thereby eliminating 
the need for a centralized group controller. Each member generates its own key thereby 
contributing a secret towards the computation o f the root key. In addition, DISEC doesn’t 
have a single point o f control, attack, or failure.
2.5 Logical Key Hierarchy
Wong et al. [67] present a novel solution to the scalability problem of group key 
management. They introduce key graphs and its special type, a key tree, to specify secure 
groups. It is assumed that a tmsted and secure key server is responsible for group access 
control and key management, and the key server uses key graphs for group key 
management. A key graph is a directed acyclic graph with two types o f  nodes, w-nodes 
representing members and A:-nodes representing keys. A member is given key k  if  and 
only if  there is a directed path from w-node u to k-node k  in the graph. In addition, they 
present three rekeying strategies, user oriented, key oriented, and group oriented 
join/leave protocols based on these strategies. The strategies are scalable to large groups 
with frequent joins and leaves. In particular, the average server processing time per 
join/leave increases linearly with the logarithm o f group size. The key tree is widely used 
and known as a logical key hierarchy (LKH).
Representing a binary LKH as a one-way function trees (OFTs) is introduced in [2]. 
In comparison with LKH, OFT algorithm reduces half the number o f bits broadcast by
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the manager per add or evict operation. The OFT has the option o f member contributions 
to the entropy of the common communication key. On the other hand, OFT raises some 
interesting questions about the security o f function iterates, and that of bottom-up one­
way function trees.
Key management using a Boolean function minimization technique, introduced in 
[13], is similar to the LKH scheme in the sense that it uses smart distribution o f keys to 
achieve good scaling. However, instead o f using a fixed hierarchy o f keys, they 
dynamically generate the most suitable key hierarchy by composing different keys. The 
paper focuses explicitly on the problem o f cumulative member removal and proposes a 
scheme that can be used to find the minimum number o f messages required to distribute 
the new keys to the remaining group members. An advantage o f their scheme is that the 
controller has to maintain only 0 (log 2  n ) keys as opposed to 0 (w), where n is the number 
o f members in the group. Due to the minimal number o f auxiliary keys that this key 
management maintains, it may be susceptible to collusion attacks. In a collusion attack, a 
set of members previously removed from the group collude and by combining their sets 
o f keys may be able to obtain the current valid set of keys, thereby being able to continue 
unauthorized receipt of group communication.
Loptsiech et al. [46] describes a key management mechanism for group 
communication sessions that is based on the “Subset-Difference” algorithm. The Subset- 
Difference algorithm is especially suitable for stateless receivers. Its main advantage over 
LKH is that it requires to transmit only 2 x r  keys instead of 2  x r  x log 2  n keys in order 
to revoke r users from a set of n users, regardless o f the coalition size, while maintaining 
a single decryption at the user’s end. In return, it requires every receiver to store 
log 2 (2 xn ) keys instead of logj nkeys. The receiver needs to employ 1 decryption for 
every rekeying event plus log 2  n applications o f a pseudo-random generator. Chen and 
Dondeti [14] study the advantage and applicability of statefull and stateless rekeying 
algorithms to different applications. An analytically comparison is presented o f the 
storage eost and the rekeying cost o f LKH and the Subset-Difference revocation 
algorithm in immediate and batch rekeying scenarios.
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Canetti et al. [11] present a rekeying protocol for wide range o f efficiency 
requirement with respect to several parameters. An upper bound is deduced in the 
tradeoff between storage and communication parameters In addition, lower bounds are 
presented on the tradeoff between communication and user storage. Moreover, the 
proposed scheme is shown to be almost optimal with respect to these lower bounds. The 
security o f their scheme can be reduced to the strength or the security o f  the pseudo­
random function used in the computation. Repeated applications o f a pseudo-random 
function, to the input will make it difficult (for the group controller) to guarantee that the 
root key is not from a weak key space.
Another improved LKH algorithm, LKH+2, is proposed in [55], where a group 
manager can use keys already in the tree to drive new keys. LKH+2 achieves K  x log^ n 
message size for leave operations, where K  is the size o f a key.
Selck et al. [58] present a modification to the LKH scheme where the new approach 
proposes an organization o f the LKH trees with the respect to the members’ compromise 
probabilities instead of keeping a balanced tree, in a spirit similar to data compression 
techniques such as Huffman and Shannon-Fano coding.
2.6 Additional Secure Group Communication Issues
In this section we present the following additional secure group communication 
issues: multicast IPsec, group policy, group data-origin authentication, rekey transport 
protocols, and secure multicast services.
2.6.1 Group/Multicast IP Security (IPsec)
IPsec [41] is designed to provide interoperable, cryptographically based security 
services for IPv4 and IPv 6 . These services are provided at the IP layer, offering 
protection for IP and/or upper layer protocols (e.g. TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc). These 
objectives are met through the use of two traffic security protocols, the Authentication 
Header (AH) [42] and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [43], and through the 
use of cryptographic key management procedures and protocols. These mechanisms are
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designed to be algorithm-independent with a specified standard set o f default algorithms 
to facilitate interoperability in the global Internet.
IPsec security services can be provided between a pair of communicating hosts, 
between a pair of communicating security gateways, or between a security gateway and a 
host. The protection offered is based on requirements defined by a Security Policy 
Database (SPD) established and maintained by a user or system administrator. Packets 
are selected for one o f three processing modes based on IP and transport layer header 
information matched against entries in the SPD. Each packet is either afforded IPsec 
security services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPsec.
Afforded IPsec packets (use o f AH and/or ESP) make use o f Security Associations 
(SAs). SA is a simplex connection that affords security services to the traffic carried by 
it. The Security Association Database (SAD) contains parameters that are associated with 
each active SA to specify the security services to be provided, protocols to be employed, 
and algorithms to be used. The Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol (ISAKMP) [47] defines the procedures and packet formats to establish, 
negotiate, modify and delete security associations (SAs). Theses formats provide a 
consistent framework for transferring key and authentication data which is independent 
of the key generation technique, encrjqition algorithm and authentication mechanism. The 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [32] is an ISAKMP to negotiate, and provide authenticated 
key material for security associations in a protected manner.
Extending IPsec to support secure (multicast) groups is not standardized, however, 
there are several drafts try to extend IPsec to such support. Canetti et al. [9] propose an 
architecture for secure IP multicast that mimics the IPsec architecture, and re-uses exiting 
IPsec mechanisms wherever possible.
The IPsec ESP provides a set o f security services that include data origin 
authentication, which enables an IPsec receiver to validate that a received packet 
originated from a peer-sender in a pair-wise SA. However, for secure IP multicast groups, 
ESP supports only “group authentication” and does not support data-origin 
authentication. Multicast ESP (MESP) [5] is an extension o f the ESP transform for 
multicast data-origin authentication. Canetti et al. [12] propose another MESP transform
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in addition to an Application MESP (AMES?) that is designed to work in the 
application/transport layer.
Similar to ISAKMP, the Group Secure Associate Key Management Protocol 
(GSAKMP) [34] defines the message passing requirements to provide mechanisms to 
disseminate group policy, perform access control decisions during group establishment, 
generate group keys, recover from the compromise o f group members, delegate group 
security functions, and destroy the group. In GSAKMP group responsibilities are 
decomposed into authorized roles. Roles are defined for Group Owner, Group Controller, 
SubGroup Controller, and Member.
2.6.2 Group Policy
Security policy is a statement of the rules enforced by security mechanisms. Policies 
can be described by whom they cover and by what they cover. Group security policy can 
be static or it can be dynamic and tailored to the requirements o f the group.
Hardjono et al. [30] define group security policy expressed in the form o f policy 
token or policy certificate. It describes the elements that make-up an instance o f group 
policy and explains the intended functions o f each element.
The Antigone framework [48] provides an interface for the definition and 
implementation of a wide range o f secure group policies. Policies are implemented by the 
composition and configuration of a defined set o f mechanisms that provide the basic 
services needed for secure groups. Antigone provides mechanisms for providing the 
following functions; authentication, member join, session key and group member 
distribution, application messaging, failure detection, and member leave.
The Dynamic Cryptographic Context Management (DCCM) [19] provides a policy- 
based security for large ( 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  members), dynamically changing groups of 
participants. In DCCM, groups at all levels have policies. These policies are represented, 
negotiated, managed, and an unambiguous set o f mechanisms and configuration (called a 
cryptographic context) is created to make particular interactions possible subject to these 
policies.
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2.6.3 Multicast Group Access Control
Multicast communication provides one-to-many and many-to-many communication 
[18]. There are a number o f available multicast routing protocols that provide the 
efficient transport mechanisms o f multicast by routing packets with one group destination 
address to multiple recipients. A host uses the Internet Group Membership Protocol 
(IGMP) to notify the routing system that it should deliver packets for a particular 
multicast group to this host. Gong and Shacham [27] discuss threats, requirements for 
security, and some trade-offs between scalability and security. They outlined the 
fundamental security issues in building a trusted multicast facility such as protecting 
traffic, controlling participation, and restricting access o f unauthorized users.
IGMP operates in a different portion of the network from the multicast routing 
protocol. IGMP operates between hosts and edge routers. Moffaert and Paridaens [50] 
discuss security aspects in IGMPv3. Coan et al. [16] propose an application-level secure 
multicast technique that addresses some o f the limitations of end-to-end secure multicast. 
The technique has a defense against denial-of-service attacks by using a secure extension 
to IGMP. Ballardie [3] describes how a Core Based Tree (CBT) multicast protocol can 
provide for secure joining o f a CBT group tree.
Gothic [39] is an architecture for providing group (receiver) access control. Gothic is 
composed o f two systems; the group policy management system and the group member 
authorization system.
2.6.4 Group Data-Origin (Source) Authentication
The problem of stream authentication is solved for the case o f one sender and one 
receiver. The sender and receiver agree on a secret key, which is used in conjunction with 
a message authenticating code (MAC) to ensure the authenticity of each packet. In case 
of multiple receivers, however, the problem becomes much harder to solve, because a 
symmetric approach would allow anyone holding a key (that is, any receiver) to forge 
packets. Alternatively, the sender can use digital signatures to sign every packet with its 
private key. This solution provides adequate authentication, but digital signature are 
prohibitively inefficient.
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Wong and Lam [6 8 ] present a chaining technique for signing/verifying multiple 
packets using a single signing/verification operation. Gennaro and Rohatgi [23] present 
two solutions to the problem of authenticating digital streams. The first one is for the case 
of a finite stream, which is entirely know to the sender. The second case is for a 
potentially infinite stream, which is not known in advance to the sender.
TESLA [53] is a secure sender authentication mechanism for multicast data streams. 
It provides authentication of individual data packets, regardless of the packet loss rate. In 
addition, TESLA features low overhead for both the sender and the receiver, and does not 
require per-receiver state at the sender. For TESLA to be secure, the sender and the 
receiver are required to be loosely time synchronized. Loosely time synchronized means 
that the synchronization does not need to be precise, but the receiver musk now an upper 
bound on the dispersion (the maximum clock offset). Perrig et al. [54] propose several 
substantial modifications and improvements to TESLA.
2.6.5 Reliable Group Rekey Transport Protocols
Group re-keying involves two operations -  key encoding and key distribution. The 
key-encoding phase involves generating a set of encrypted keys that have to be 
transmitted to the members of the group. The key distribution phase is concerned with 
packing these encrypted keys into packets and delivering the packets to the members of 
the group in a scalable, reliable, and timely manner. Although reliable multicast transport 
protocols such as RMP [6 6 ] can be used for reliable delivery o f such packets, the reliable 
key delivery problem has some characteristics that can be exploited to design custom 
protocols that are more light-weight in nature. Possible tailored solutions to the reliable 
group key distribution problem are presented in [60] and [70].
2.6.6 Other Secure Multicast Service
The SecureRing [44] group communication protocols provide reliable ordered 
message delivery and group membership services despite faults caused by modifications 
to the programs o f a group member following illicit access to, or capture of, a group 
member (called Byzantine faults).
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Non-repudiation is a proof of delivery that the receiver did indeed receive data when 
they might deny reception. Using the Nark scheme [8 ], each multicast receiver can 
reliably prove whether any fragment o f the data hasn’t been delivered or wasn’t delivered 
in time. Further, each receiver’s data can be subject to an individual watermarked audit 
trail. This provides a deterrent against a receiver giving away or re-selling either the keys 
or the decrypted data.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented relevant related work to the secure group key 
management problem. We presented two classical problems related to the group key 
distribution problem: secure broadcasting and contributory group key agreement. In 
addition, we summarized the lETF’s group key management standard. Furthermore, we 
presented the different approaches for distributed group management. Moreover, we 
summarized the logical key hierarchy (LKU) approach for scalable group key 
distribution, and several variations. Finally, we presented a summary of other related 
topics such as multicast IPsec, group policy, group access control, group data-source 
authentication, and rekey transport protocols.
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CHAPTER III
XORBP: A NOVEL GROUP KEY DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUE
In this chapter, we present the contributed software model for providing (central) 
secure group communication. The model identifies the main software components along 
with their functionalities and interactions. We focus on the details o f the rekey manager 
that generates the shared group key and distributes it to all group members. A rekey 
(change of group key) is necessary when a member joins the group to prevent him from 
accessing group communication sent before he joined (such operation is denoted join  
rekey). A  rekey is also necessary when a member leaves the group to prevent him from 
accessing further group communication (such operation is denoted leave rekey). We 
highlight the two traditional rekey management techniques namely star and logical key 
hierarchy (LKH). The traditional group key management systems used to encrypt a newly 
generated key with other key (such as the key’s previous version or a group member key) 
before distributing it to group members. We demonstrate the drawbacks o f encryption- 
based key distribution techniques (KDT) such as having a non-symmetric join and leave 
rekey costs, and being not scalable when used with star or high degree LKH key 
management. Moreover, we present our novel XOR-based KDT, namely XORBP. The 
proposed approach uses bit XOR operation between keys to reduce the computation 
effort, and random byte patterns (denoted BPs) to distribute the key material in a fixed 
size rekey packet. We demonstrate that XORBP is symmetric in the join and leave rekey 
operations. Furthermore, we empirically study and compare the cost o f the encryption- 
based and XORBP KDTs. Our experiments have shown that XORBP can achieve up to 
87% reduction in the rekey time compared to an encryption-based KDT.
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents a generic 
software model for secure group communication. Section 3.2 discusses star and LKH 
rekey management techniques, and studies the properties of the traditional encryption- 
based KDT. Section 3.3 introduces XORBP the proposed group key distribution 
technique. Section 3.4 demonstrates how XORBP can be used with LKH. Section 3.5 
presents scenarios and comparison of the new key distribution technique versus the
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traditional approaches. Section 3.6 analyses and eompares the cost estimates o f XORBP 
versus the encryption-based KDT. Section 3.7 presents the experimental results 
confirming the analyzed estimates. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section 3.8.
3.1 Secure Group Key Management Components
Fig. 2 illustrates the designed model of the software eomponents for secure group key 
management. The authentication manager is responsible for ensuring the identity o f the 
group members defined according to the group policy. The authentication manager could 
receive a request from a group member to join the group, or could be in charge o f inviting 
the members to join the group. Afterwards, it applies an authentication protocol (using 
long-term keys) to decide whether to accept or reject a member. In addition, it negotiates 
the session parameters, such as the protocols and implementation used, and establishes a 
session individual key with every new member. Moreover, the authentication manager 
could be in charge of ending a member’s participation in the session, according to a 
defined policy, a request from the member himself, or due to detected member 
communication failure.
The authentication manager notifies the group key manager (GKM) o f every member 
removal, and every new member addition along with that member’s individual key. GKM 
applies a group rekey policy, as to when to change the group key {GK). Different policies 
determine whether rekeying is necessary when a member is added and/or removed, or 
whether it is performed periodically. In addition, the rekey policy could determine the 
batch size (number of added and/or removed members), or the rekey period. For example, 
a rekey startup policy configures the group key manager to wait a certain amount of time 
before starting the creation o f the group key to avoid a startup implosion scenario. When 
a rekey is necessary, GKM asks the rekey manager to generate new GK along with the 
rekey message RM to be sent (broadcast) to all group members for such GK update.
In our model, we assume when a new member joins the group he receives an initial 
key message that is sent through his private channel. Afterwards, the rekey manager 
sends (broadcasts) a RM to all group members (including the new member), through a 
group rekey channel that updates GK. When a group member leaves (or is evicted from) 
the group, only one RM is sent to the remaining group members. The group rekey
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channel implementation should guarantee message reliability, integrity, freshness, and 
source authentication. In addition, it should synchronize GK between all group members.
new GKadd/remove a member










Fig. 2. Secure group key management software components.
Note that the authentication manager, the group key manager, and the rekey manager 
could be (all or some) software components running on the same machine, or could be 
software components running on different machines and communicating through network 
channels and protocols.
The rekey client is the group member component that receives RMs and maintains 
GK. Both the rekey manager and the rekey client immediately notify a cryptographic 
utility manager with a change of GK. The cryptographic utility manager is responsible for 
providing different group security services to the application. The cryptographic utility
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manager has an Application Program Interface (API) that is used by the application to 
provide different security services. The cryptographic utility manager could derive 
several group keys (from the shared GK) for different uses, such as group encryption, 
message integrity, and authentication. Note that, the cryptographic utility manager is 
needed at the group manager if  it will act as a group member.
3.2 Traditional Rekey Manager
The tradition approaches for providing central group rekey management either uses a 
star key management or a logical key hierarchy (LKH). Both approaches use encryption- 
based key distribution technique as explained next.
3.2.1 Star Rekey Manager
A star rekey manager for a group o f n members maintains one group key GK, and n 
individual keys one for every group member. Every group member i maintains two keys, 
GK and his own individual key K ..
If  a new member (n + 1) joins the group, the rekey manager changes (regenerates) 
GK to be G K ', and sends a RM that has two encrypted^ keys [{GK }GK,[GK }K „ ^).
The first encryption is the new GK ( G K ') encrypted with the previous group key, and is 
decrypted by old group members to retrieve G K '. The second encryption is GK' 
encrypted with the new member individual key , and is decrypted by the new
member to retrieve G K '.
When member n leaves the group, the rekey manager sends a RM that has {n -1 )
encryptions of the new group key [{Gi^ }K,.,1 < i<  (n -1 )] . Bach individual encryption is
decrypted by the associated group member’s key to retrieve the new group key.
Fig. 3 illustrates an example o f the keys maintained by a star rekey manager for 9 
members. If  a new member joins the group and his individual keyK^ is to be inserted,
GK is regenerated, and a RM that has two encrypted keys [{GK }GK,{GK }Kg{ is
{M}K  denotes the message M  is encrypted with the key K.
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constructed and distributed to group members. If  that member leaves the group, his 
individual key . ^ 9  is deleted, a new group key GK is regenerated, and a RM is 
constructed and distributed to group members. In this case, the RM has 8  encrypted keys 
{ { G K } K , A G K ^ K , , { G K } K , , { G K } K , , { G K } K , , { G K ] K , , { G K } K , , { G K ' ' ) K , ] .
We can conclude this technique does not provide a scalable RM construction cost 
since the cost (time and size) when a member leaves the group increases linearly with the 
group size.
GK
Fig. 3. The keys maintained by a star rekey manager for 9 members.
3.2.2 Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) Approach for a Rekey Manager
A LKH rekey manager maintains one group key GK,  an individual key for every 
group member, and a set of key-encrypting keys (KEKs) used for scalable rekeying. A 
LKH of a specified degree d  is constructed such that GK is the root o f the hierarchy, and 
every individual key represents a leaf node. Fig. 4 illustrates a LKH of degree J  = 3 and 
height A = 2 for 9 members, where the root node represents GK and the leaf nodes 
represent the members’ individual keys.
Every group member holds the set o f keys at the nodes that fall in the path that leads 
to the root, starting from his individual leaf node key. To guarantee perfect backward 
secrecy, if a new member joins the group his individual key is inserted in the hierarchy
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and all the keys on the path from his individual key leaf node to the root are regenerated. 
Similarly, to guarantee perfect forward secrecy, if  a member leaves the group, his 
individual key is deleted from the hierarchy and all the keys he was holding are 
regenerated. In both cases, the rekey manager needs to construct a RM that contains such 
keys update. The constructed RM will contain a rekey packet for every new (regenerated) 
key.
For example, in Fig. 4 if  a new member joins the group and his individual keyATjj is 
to be inserted, two keys need to be regenerated K-̂  and GK. The RM in this case has two 
rekey packets for the two new keys, [{K^}K^,{K'^)K^j] and [{GK }GK,{GK }K'^] . The 
first rekey packet has two encryptions of K ^, the first encryption is decrypted by old 
group members (who maintain K ^) to retreive Kj ,̂ and the second encryption is 
decrypted by the new member’s individual key to retrieve K ^ . Similarly, the second
rekey packet has two encryptions o f GK,  the first encryption is decrypted by all old group 
members to retreive GK' , and the sencod encryption is for the new member (after he gets 
K ^). On the other hand, if  that member leaves the group and his individual key K̂  ̂3  is to 
be deleted, the same two keys need to be regenerated. The RM in this case has the two 
rekey packets [{Kl}Ki„{Kl}K^^]  and [{GK"}K^,{GK"}K2 ,{GK"}K',].  The new keys 
K'{ and GK  can no longer be encrypted with their previous versions since the leaving
member already knows them, instead every new key is encrypted individually by each 
sibiling node key (after deleting the individual key node o f the leaving member).
We can see that when using LKH and inserting K^ 3  the RM has 4 encrypted keys
compared to only 2 in the star rekey manager. On the other hand, when deleting K^ 3 the
RM has 5 encrypted keys compared to 8  in the star rekey manager.




GK KEK individual key
Fig. 4. A LKH of degree = 3 and height A = 3 for a group of 9 members.
3.2.3 Encryption for Key Distribution
The traditional technique for distributing the group key in the above two rekey 
managers (star and LKH) is the use of encryption. The star rekey manager, for a group of 
n members, performs 2  key encryptions when a new member joins the group and 
performs {n - 1) key encryptions when a member leaves the group to construct a RM that 
updates GK. The leave rekey cost, using star rekey manager, increases linearly with the 
group size n increase.
A rekey manager that maintains a LKH of degree d  and height A, for a group o f n 
members, performs (at most) ( 2  x h) key encryptions when a new member joins the 
group and performs (at most) (J  x A - 1 ) key encryptions when a member leaves the 
group. If the LKH is a complete tree for n members then the height h = log^ n . The 
rekey cost is logarithmic in the group size n in both the join and leave cases, which is a 
scalable solution. Although the use of LKH provides a scalable group rekey solution, the 
cost o f join and leave rekeyings are not symmetric. In addition, increasing the degree of 
the hierarchy d  that decreases its height h and leads to a decrease o f the join rekey cost 
while increases the leave rekey cost. For example, for a group o f size n = 512 members, a 
LKH of degree = 2 is of height h =9 (assuming it is constructed as a complete tree), 
while a LKH of degree J  = 8  is of height A = 3. In the first case, d = 2 ,  the join rekey cost
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is 18 encrypted keys and the leave rekey cost is 17 encrypted keys. On the other hand, 
when <7=8 the join rekey cost is 6  encrypted keys (1/3 the first case) and the leave rekey 
cost is 23 encrypted keys (4/3 the first case, and 4 times the join case). Wong et al. 
proved that the optimal LKH degree is 4 when enciyption is used [67].
3.3 XORBP: A Novel Group Key Distribution Technique
Brute force techniques used to guess a key have to search on the average half the key 
space. Unless plain text is provided, the analyst must be able to recognize plain text as 
plain text. If  the message is just plain text in English, then the result pops out 
immediately (although the task o f recognizing English would have to be automated). If  
the message is some more general type o f data, such as a “numerical” data, the problem 
becomes even more difficult to automate.
From the above observation, we can notice that all techniques that encrypt the new 
GK  by any other key (previous GK,  individual key, or KEK) do uimecessary work, and 
the same security can be achieved with much less computation effort. The new proposed 
computation method will use bit XOR operation between two keys instead o f encrypting 
one with the other. The XOR operation is sufficient to protect the key material from 
outsider attacks (members outside the group) but doesn’t protect individual key material 
from insider attacks (members inside the group). Hence, to protect from insider attacks, 
we suggest distributing the key material in random byte patterns (BPs) in a fixed size 
rekey packet.
3.3.1 Why XOR
Assume C -  A ®  B , where A and B are keys of size k  bits^. The XOR operation has 
the following properties:
• Easy computation.
• The output C is always the same size as the two inputs (k bits). This property is not 
valid in addition and subtraction operations (e.g. in TABLE I: 11 + 11 = 110).
' The symbol ©  denotes a logical XOR operation w hile <fe denotes logical A N D  operation.
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Reversible easy computation, i.e. knowing A and C, we can uniquely and easily 
calculate B. Unique reversible computation is not valid in AND and OR operations 
(e.g. in TABLE II; 10 & 11 = 10 & 10 = 10).
All output values are uniformly distributed in the output space. The output matrix size 
is ( 2 * X 2  ̂ = 2 ^*), every output value in the range [0 :( 2 * - 1 )] appears 2 * times (see 
TABLE III). This property is not valid in all other simple operations (AND, OR, 
addition, or subtraction).
Every output value can be generated w ith2^ combinations. That is, knowing C only 
2^ guesses are needed to know A and/or B. This property is not valid in all other 
simple operations.
TABLE I.
A + B, WHERE A AND B ARE 2 BITS LONG
+ 00 01 10 11
00 00 01 10 • 11
01 01 10 11 100
10 10 11 100 101
11 11 100 101 110
TABLE II.
A & B, WHERE A AND B ARE 2 BITS LONG
& 00 01 10 11
00 00 00 00 00
01 00 01 00 01
10 00 00 10 10
11 00 01 10 11
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TABLE III.
A © B, WHERE A AND B ARE 2 BITS LONG
© 00 01 10 11
00 00 01 10 11
01 01 00 11 10
10 10 11 00 01
11 11 10 01 00
The last two properties o f XOR operation makes (A ® B)  as secure as (A}B , to all 
members who don’t know both A and B. Performing XOR operation between the keys 
solves the problem of protecting the key material from outsider attacks. But this operation 
doesn’t protect the key material from insider attacks. For example, if  we have a group of 
two members X and Y, each one has his own individual key that is known only by him 
and by the rekey manager. Let the individual key of X is Kj^ , and the individual key o f Y 
is K y . Assume the rekey manager needs to send them the group key GK. Previous 
methods used to broadcast a rekey packet that contains [{GK}jKj^,{GK}Ky], the group 
key encrypted with every member individual key. Every member reads his own part in 
the packet, and decrypts it to retrieve the group key. Members outside the group can’t 
leam any key material, and members inside the group can’t learn each other keys.
Alternatively, the new method suggests sending a rekey packet that contains 
[GK ® Kj^,GK K y ] . We can see that Y who knows KyC&n retrieve GK easily, but 
also can retrieve , since he can read {GK © K ^ ) and thus {GK © K ^ ) © GK = K ^ . 
Hence, adding a security barrier to insider attacks is essential. The suggested method to 
protect from insider attacks is to distribute the key material in random byte pattern BP in 
the broadcast rekey packet. Every BP is known only by the rekey manager and by the 
individuals similar to K ^  and Ky . Every BP specifies a unique byte numbers in a fixed 
size rekey packet.
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For example if  all keys are o f size 3 bytes, and the rekey packet size is 260 bytes. 
Assuming = {200,120,79} and = {110,205,55}, the suggested technique for 
distributing GK to the two members, is to distribute the 3 bytes o f (GK © K^,) in BP^ 
packet bytes numbered 200, 120, and 79 respectively, and distribue the 3 bytes of 
(GK © Py) in BPy packet bytes numbered 110, 205, and 55 respectively.
3.3.2 Protection from Insider Attacks
If  the key length is k  bits, the key space that is searched by attackers has 2* different 
key values. Let K  -  \ k / S]  be the size of the key in bytes. For a group o f n members, the 
rekey manager that uses encryption (encrypt GK with every member individual key) to 
broadcast GK will send a rekey packet o f size ( n x K )  bytes. The rekey manager that uses 
XOR and BP for distributing GK for n members should broadcast a rekey packet o f size 
( n x  K  + E ) bytes, i.e. the rekey packet contains E  extra bytes.
The worst-case insider attack is that (n - 1) colluding members trying to guess the BP 
(and therefore the key) of the remaining member. A group o f ( n~ \ )  members can 
exclude ( ( n - l ) x  K )  bytes from the packet that contain their own versions o f the key. 
The remaining are (K + E) bytes, and they are trying to select K  ordered bytes. In this 
case E  is estimated so that they have a search space larger than or equal to the search 
space o f the protected key. We can see that there is an E extra bytes increase in the 
message size, and this increase is the price paid for reducing the computation form n 
encryptions to simple XOR operations. The inequality > 2^ is used to estimate the
extra bytes size"*.
Note that if  we distribute the key material GK in the byte patterns BPs instead o f the 
XORed keys (GK ® K^)  and (GK ® K y)  the rekey packet will contain a repeated byte 
patterns of GK and that will make it easier (less permutation) for attackers to make a 
guess. If  GK is distributed in “bit patterns” instead o f bjde patterns that will solve the 
repeated byte patterns problem but will increase the size of the data needed to keep the
P^ = — ^ — ; c ! = c x ( c - l ) x . . . x l  
“ ( b - a ) \
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patterns. For example: I f  we have a key of size K  bytes, and a rekey packet o f size S  
bytes. To decode a “byte” location in the rekey packet s bits are needed such that 
s = I"log2  s'] . To decode a “bit” location in that rekey packet (s + 3) bits are needed. The
data size for a key and byte pattern BP is = + bytes. Using a bit pattern
(there is no need for the key), the data size = K x ( s  + 3) bytes. The data size required 
using byte pattern BP is less than the data size required using bit pattern for all positive 
values of .S’ (Ai x ( 5  + 3) > (jST + x s- /  s]) for all s' > (-16 / 7) ). On the other hand, using
bit patterns might decrease the required extra bytes E  and therefore the message size. If 
bit patterns are to be used, the rekey message extra bytes E  can be estimated by solving 
the inequality > 2 ^.
3.3.3 Extra Bytes Adjustment
The insider attack by one member in which he can exclude his own BP {K bytes), and 
make a guess for any other BP has a search space size equals to phe insider
attack by m members has a search space of size in the worst-case insider
attack by {n - 1) members, the search space size is , in which E  is estimated to 
make the search space size greater than or equal to the search space of the protected key 
to have the same security achieved by encryption.
The extra bytes E  depends only on the key size K, and does not depend on the group 
size n. We can further reduce E  if  the insider attacks are rare, or the cost o f protecting the 
key from insider attacks (represented in £) is greater than the benefits gained from that 
protection. For example, if the keying material is changing frequently, we can assume 
that the lifetime o f the key is shorter than the time required for making a correct guess 
using a reasonable cost machine. We can estimate a reasonable search space size Q from 
the lifetime of the key and calculate the extra bytes E  such thatP^^'^^^ > Q,  where Q is 
the reduced search space size.
In addition, using XOR operation instead o f encryption helps in protecting the 
individual key material from the “known plain text attack'. Known plain text attack, is an 
attack in which plain text and its corresponding cipher text are known by the attacker. It
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has been proven that in some cases this information can reduce the search space for the 
key. Using encryption methods, an insider can build a database from the rekey messages 
RMs that contains pairs of {GK, GK  encrypted by other individual key(s)). This database 
can help him in guessing the other individual key(s). The database can grow quickly if  
the group has frequent joins and leaves and therefore frequent RMs are sent. This type of 
attack does not exist when using XORBP. Using the above observation, if  the known 
plain text attack reduces the search space size from 2^ to Q. Then extra bytes E  is chosen 
such that > Q , where Q is the reduced search space size.
3.4 Logical Key Hierarchy and XORBP
The following is a summary o f the terminology used. The group key is GK. All key 
sizes are K  bytes. The LKH degree is d. The group size (number of members) is n. The 
LKH height h for n members \s h -  [log^ ri\, assuming it is constructed as a complete 
tree.
The key data maintained by a rekey manager is a LKH o f degree d  and height h. 
Using XORBP, each non-root node key (KEK or individual key) is accompanied by a 
byte pattern BP. Each member is assigned a leaf node in the LKH, which contains his 
individual data (key, BP, ...etc). In addition, every member knows his leaf node position 
in the LKH, and holds all the entries o f the LKH in the path from his leaf node up to the 
root.
It is assumed there is only one join or one leave at a time in which GK and all LKH 
entries (keys and BPs) that are held by that member need to be regenerated (batch 
rekeying for a set join and/or leave requests is discussed in chapter V). The rekey 
manager broadcasts a rekey message RM for every join or leave rekey. The RM contains 
a message-identifier, a rekey packet for every new key, and an encoded BP for every new 
BP. The message-identifier is the leaf node position o f the member who caused the rekey 
either because he joined or left the group.
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3.4.1 XORBP Rekey Packet Construction
The rekey message RM contains a rekey packet for every newly generated key, GK or 
KEK. A rekey packet contains the new key distribution information and is targeted to a 
corresponding set of members that should hold that key. No other member in the group or 
outside the group should be able to easily retrieve any key information from the rekey 
packet.
A XORBP rekey packet size is S = d x K  + E  bytes; where d  is LKH degree, K  is the 
key size in bytes, and E  is the estimated extra bytes (section 3.3.3). A XORBP rekey 
packet constructed for a new key at LKH node u contains multiple versions of
XORed with the keys at the LKH sibling nodes o f u. If  u is the key node path starting 
from the root, then uv is a path to a sibiling node o f u. If  the number o f sibilings for node 
u is  e {e is less than or equal to LKH degree d) there exists e sibling nodes determined by 
the path uv, 1 < v < e , where each node contains All sibling nodes o f a node
u will be denoted ( K ^,, )
The rekey packet is constructed for the new such that for every v, the bytes 
in the rekey packet contains (X„ © ). The remaing empty bytes in the rekey packets
contains dummy (randomly generated) bytes.
3.4.2 Encoded Byte Pattern
When generating a new key, its corresponding BP needs to be regenerated too. 
Similar to the key, the newly generated BP needs to be sent in the rekey message RM to 
the group members who should hold it. As previously described, a new key will be 
distributed in a rekey packet o f size S  bytes such that S = d x K  + E , where d  is LKH 
degree, K  is the key size in bytes, and E  is extra bytes. Each sibling node o f the 
distributed key node should have a unique byte pattern BP that specifies unique K  bytes 
in the rekey packet o f S  bytes.
Guaranteeing unique BPs can be implemented by maintaining an array R of Booleans 
of size S  with every key, every entry in R corresponds to a byte in the rekey packet. 
Initially all array entries are set to true, a true value means the byte is free (i.e. not 
assigned to any sibling key node) while a false  value means the byte is already assigned
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and can’t be assigned to any other sibling. When regenerating a BP, the old K  bytes (old 
BP byte numbers) have to be freed (i.e. marked true in R) and then new free K  bytes are 
selected (and marked fa lse  in R). The generation o f a random BP will require the 
generation o f K  random numbers in the range [0;5'-l]. Since the maximum number of 
node siblings is d, this would guarantee at least (K  + E) free bytes for a new BP o f K  
bytes. If  any of the randomly generated byte numbers is not free (locked up in R), the 
nearest free byte is chosen instead.
Similar to a key, a new BP can’t be sent plain in a RM, instead it is encoded so that it 
can be retrieved only by the targeted members (members who maintains its 
corresponding key). The encoding o f a newly generated BP is performed using its 
corresponding newly generated key. The new BP is first represented as a string of bits 
then XORed with the corresponding generated key. The bit representation of BP might be 
of shorter or longer length than the key. If  it is shorter than the key, it is XORed with the 
first same-length bits of the key. If  it is longer than the key, the key bits are repeated fully 
or partially (one or more times) until the exact length is reached.
For example, if  the key size X is 3 bytes (24 bits), and the rekey packet size S  is 260 
bytes. Since S  equals 260, 9 bits are enough to represent a byte number in the range 
[0:259]. A BP can be represented by a string o f length 3x9  = 27 bits that is
approximated to 4 bytes when sent in a RM. For a key
3 rd -byte  2 n d —byte \s t-b y te
K  = 110110111000010010100100, and BP = (200, 79, 120) that can be represented as
I20(9bits) 79(9bits) 200(9bits)
string o f bits = 001111000001001111011001000 , the encoded BP is calculated as
1 20  7 9  2 0 0
___________A___________ __________A__________ ___________A
001111000001001111011001000©
follows: ^ 3  l i o i j ^ l ^ o o c a ^ l ^ j f r ^  _ ggg
\s t-3 b its  3 rd -b y te  2 nd -by te  1st—byte
101 001110110001101001101100
Ath-byte 3 rd-byte  2nd -byte  \s t-b y te
byte is repeated to reach the exact BP bit string size.
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3.4.3 Simple Case: LKH of Height A = 1
A LKH of height h = \ can fit a group o f maximum size n such that n < d  . The RM 
distributed by the rekey manager contains one rekey packet for a newly generated GK per 
every join or leave. The key data maintained by the rekey manager is shown in Fig. 5.
GK
Fig. 5. A LKH of degree d  and height h = \ .
The rekey procedure for a join or a leave o f a member X whose individual key is :
1. Determine, the leaf node position for member X individual data to be inserted/deleted. 
The member position will be used as a message-identifier.
2. If (X is joining) then {Select freeRH^ and send it to member X through his private 
channel along with his leaf node position; Insert the individual leaf node {K^ ,BP^)  
into LKH.} else (Delete the individual leaf node ) from LBCH.}.
3. Generate new GK.
4. Construct a rekey packet for the new GK  u s i n g ( a s  described in section 
3.4.1).
5. Send a rekey message RM that contains the constructed rekey packet to all group 
members.
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3.4.4 Another Simple Case: LKH of Height A = 2
A LKH of height h = 2 can fit a group o f maximum size n, such that d < n < d ^ .  
Using a LKH of height 2, group members can be virtually viewed as arranged in d 
partitions (at most), and every partition contains d members (at most). A LKH of height 2 
maintained by a rekey manager is shown in Fig. 6 . For any partition p , all members at 
that partition hold the same partition key and the same partition BP that are used
in constructing a new GK rekey packet. Moreover, each member X holds his individual 
key and his individual BP that are used in constructing a new partition key
Kp  rekey packet. For every join or leave rekeying, the rekey message RM distributed by
the rekey manager contains two rekey packets one for a newX^ and the other is for a new
GK. In addition, RM contains one encoded new BP BP^.
GK
Fig. 6 . A LKH of degree d  and height h = 2.
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The rekey procedure for a join or a leave o f a member X whose individual key
1. Determine the position, and therefore the partition p, where member X individual leaf 
node will be inserted/deleted. The member position will be used as a message- 
identifier.
2. If (X is joining) then {Select free5P^^ and send it to member X through his private 
channel along with his leaf node position; Insert the individual leaf node ^ , BP^ ̂ ) 
into LKH.} else (Delete the individual leaf node (Kp^,BP^^)  from LKH.}.
3. Generate new partition p  node entries and BP^.
4. Constmct a rekey packet for the new using the individual leaf nodes 
{Kp*,BP^^). (as descibed in section 3.4.1)
5. Encode the new BP^ with the new (as described in section 3.4.2).
6 . Generate new GK.
7. Construct a rekey packet for the new GK using partition nodes (X ,, BP, )
8 . Send a rekey message RM that contains the two rekey packets (from step 4 and 7) and 
the encoded BP (from step 5) to all group members.
Is changing the partition BP^ necessary? Yes it is necessary, and we will show this
by example, assuming everybody knows the rekey procedure. If  member X joins the 
group in partition A then he will hold K^  and BP^. Assume X left the group for a while 
and joined it again in different partition B. Assume K^ is changed to K'^ when X left but 
BP^ is the same, and X (who knows the procedure) is able to memorize BP^. A member 
X can retrieve the new K \  when he joins partition B because he knows GK (member of 
the group), and he can read {GK © ) at the same BP^. I f  X left the group again and
no other member joined or left partition A, X can retrieve the new GK and aecess further 
information by knowing BP^ and K'^ (note that he was a member o f partition B, and K^ 
is changed once he left but K \  is the same).
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3.4.5 General Rekey Procedure by the Rekey Manager
Assume the inserted/deleted leaf node immediate parent position is
illustrated in Fig. 7, where decodes a child node position o f the root node (child at
level h), decodes a child node position o f the node determined by (child at level
(h-l)),  /j decodes a child node position o f the node determined by/j  (child at level 2 )
and is the immediate parent of the leaf node that contains the member data (individual 







Fig. 7. The path to a leaf node in a LKH o f height h.
The rekey procedure for a join or a leave of a member X:
1. Determine the leaf node position o f member X individual data to be inserted/deleted, 
and therefore determine all the LKH nodes entries that need to be regenerated from 
the root node to the leaf node immediate parent. Assuming the position is >
and the LKH entries are GK, (Ky^ ), ...., and
( K , , I ,BP, I I ). The position is used as the RM message-identifier.
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2. If (X is joining) then {Select free individual BP , and send it to member X
along with his position through his private channel. Insert the member individual leaf 
node ( K , , ,  ,BR , , , )  at the first level of LKH.} else {Delete the member
individual leaf node ( X , , ,, ,B P ,, , f rom the first level o f LKH.}
3. For every LKH entry at level i - 2 t o  h {
a. Generate new key K, ,̂  ̂  ̂ , and select new BP BP,̂ ,̂  , .
b. Construct a rekey packet for the new  ̂ , using B P , j t )  nodes at
level (f-1) (as described in 3.4.1).
c. Encode the new BP,̂ ,̂   ̂ , with the new , (as described in 3.4.2).}
4. Generate new GK.
5. Construct a rekey packet for the new GK to all members using level h keys and BPs 
{ K „ B R ) .
6. Send a RM to all members that contains the message-identifier, all constructed rekey 
packets, and all encoded BPs.
Note that, the rekey procedure is almost symmetric for both join and leave cases. 
Note also that all if all LKH new entries are generated at once (step 3.a and step 4), 
constructing the rekey packet and encoding BP for each new entry can be performed in 
parallel (step 3.b-c and step 5).
3.4.6 How Group Members Retrieve the New Keys and the New Byte Patterns
Not all rekey packets and all encoded BPs should be read and processed by all group 
members. Since every members knows his position and the RM includes the 
identification position o f the member who joined/left). Every member can
select the rekey packets and the encoded BPs to process. The RM contains h rekey 
packets and {h-l) encoded BPs.
For every i, where 1 < r < /z, the i* rekey packet and the i* encoded BP contain a new 
key and a new BP for a node at the (z +1)'* level. This data should be retrieved by at 
most members who have their position matches The /z'*rekey packet
contains the new GK, and should be retrieved by all n (at most d  *) members
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3.5 Scenarios and Comparison
In this section, we compare the group rekeying performance when the traditional key 
management approaches (star and encryption-based LKH) are used, and when the 
proposed approach (XORBP LKH) is used. Two examples are used to demonstrate such 
approaches, a group o f members joining a subscription News broadcast server, and a 
group of peer-to-peer machines communicating securely.
We assume the group rekeying is performed periodically by a GKM that will leam 
the join and leave requests right before a rekeying process is initialized. The GKM will 
perform some time-consuming operations, e.g., random number generation and 
encryptions, before a rekeying, if  any, and delay the rest o f the operations, e.g., 
encryptions, until the exact requests are known. The following are the. three approaches 
under consideration.
Approach 1; The traditional star key management approach. The GKM changes 
the group key and encrypts it individually for every group member. This approach 
requires the GKM to regenerate one key and to perform 0(n)  keys encryptions to provide 
perfect forward secrecy for a group o f n members, i.e., the rekeying cost scales linearly 
with the group size. A group member performs 1 decryption to retrieve the group key. In 
this approach, the GKM can regenerate a new group key and encrypt it with the every 
group member individual keys right after a rekeying is committed and before leaming the 
next requests.
Approach 2: Encryption-based LKH. The use o f a LKH by a GKM provides a 
scalable group rekeying that scales to the logarithm o f the group size. If  the LKH degree 
is d, and its height is h ( n < d ^ ) ,  the GKM is required to regenerate 0(h)  keys and to 
perform O ( d x k )  keys encryptions to provide perfect forward secrecy after single leave 
request. However, for a batch of R requests, the GKM is required to regenerate O ( R x h )  
keys and to perform O ( R x d x k )  keys encryptions. A group member is required to 
perform at most h decryptions to retrieve the new group key (more than the required cost 
by the star approach).
Approach 3: XORBP LKH: The new key distribution technique, XORBP, is used 
with the LKH approach to provide a more scalable and efficient group rekeying that
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doesn’t require any encryption/decryption to be performed by the GKM or by any group 
member. Similar to the encryption-based LKH approach, for a batch of R requests, the 
GKM is required to regenerate 0 { R x h )  keys, in addition, the GKM random number 
generation overhead is increased. Since no encryption is used, this approach reduces a 
rekeying time to 10% o f the encryption-based LKH rekeying value, for the same LKH. 
Most o f this time is spent in random number generation. The three approaches offer the 
same security capabilities.
3.5.1 A News Broadcast Server Example
Consider a News broadcast server that encrypts its broadcast using a group key that is 
handed to every newly joined member. Assume that the total number of connected group 
members at any point o f time is 30,000 and the used encryption algorithm requires 1 
msec for a single encryption/decryption. In addition, assume the server changes the group 
key periodically every 30 sec, and the average number o f leave requests is 100 and the 
join requests are 50 in the 30 sec inter-rekey period. Consequently, a newly joined 
member might have to wait at most 30 sec before being able to decrypt the broadcast, and 
a leaving member might be able to decrypt the broadcast for maximum of 30 sec after he 
leaves.
Star key management: The GKM is required to perform 30,000 key encryptions 
which consume 30 sec. A group member only has to perform 1 decryption to extract the 
group key that consumes 1 msec. The GKM can start encrypting a new group key with 
every group member key before a rekeying. When he leams of the requests, he will throw 
away the encryptions performed for the leaving members (100 encryptions) and has to 
perform encryptions for the newly joined members (50 encryptions). The GKM needs the 
whole inter-rekey period to perform the encryptions. The traditional star key management 
has a problem in the following cases: the need to support a larger group size, the use o f a 
more time consuming encryption standard, and the 30 sec maximum request delay is not 
acceptable.
Encryption-based LKH: If  the LKH degree d = 4, height h = 10 due to nodes 
insertion and deletion, and the number o f LKH new keys (rekey sub-tree size) for the 150 
requests is 100 keys. The total number of key encryptions at the server = 100x4x10 = 4
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sec (compared to 30 sec in the star approach). A group member has to perform at most 10 
decryptions that is 10 msec (every 30 sec). A group member decryption cost is increased 
compared to the star approach.
The GKM can perform all random number generation before leaming the exact 
requests. However, most o f the encryptions (if not all) has to be performed after leaming 
the exact join and leave requests. This can be a drawback of LKH if we need to reduce 
the time after leaming the requests and the start o f the rekeying. However, if  the rekeying 
is performed frequently, the total time spent by the GKM performing encryptions is a 
better cost measure.
The rekey cost for LKH with encryption based KDT increases in the following cases:
1) The LKH degree is increased.
2) The number of requests is increased. For example, 1000 new keys need to be 
distributed (instead of 100), in this case, the cost o f LKH is worse than the star 
approach and requires 40 sec of GKM encryption time.
3) The LKH height is increased due to nodes insertion and deletion (i.e., maintaining a 
balanced LKH greatly affect the number o f new keys/encryptions).
XORBP LKH: The rekeyig time is reduced to 10% of the above values that is 400 
msec for the GKM and 1 msec for a group member (every 30 sec). The number of new 
keys for a single request is 0{h). The total number of new keys for the 150 request is 
100 X10 = 1000 keys. The rekeying time doesn’t increase with the LECH degree increase 
and slightly increases with larger number o f requests or an unbalanced LECH since no 
encryption is performed (i.e., more XOR operations are performed). A group member can 
have the minimum cost achieved using the star key management.
Similarly, the GECM can perform random number generation before leaming the 
requests. Compared to the star approach, the GECM can achieve better performance after 
leaming the requests, since in the star approach the GECM has to perform encryptions for 
the newly joined members.
3.5.2 A Secure Peer-to-Peer Network Example
Consider a secure peer-to-peer network for a group o f 1000 members (machines), and 
1 ipsec encryption/decryption standard. If one machine (member) is hosting the GKM
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and there are 50 member join/leave requests every 30 sec. A new group key will be 
issued every 30 sec. The following are the rekeying time costs for the considered 
approaches.
Star key management: the server encryption time = 1 sec; a group member 
decryption time = 1 msec (every 30 sec).
Encryption-based LKH: the server encryption time =
50(requests) x A{d) x A{h) = 800 msec; a group member decryption time = 4 msec.
XORBP LKH: the server time cost = 80 msec; a group member time cost is less than 
1 msec.
We can observe that the increase in the number o f requests in the encryption-based 
LKH approach could lead to a worse performance than the star approach. The group 
member hosting the GKM prefers the minimum overhead approach that doesn’t affect 
(disrupt) the application.
Similarly, performing pre-operations could reduce the time between knowing the 
requests and the actual rekeying in the star approach over the encryption-based LKH 
approach. The encryption-based LKH approach is better than the star approach if  the total 
server (light-weight) time spent performing encryptions are compared. The XORBP LKH 
approach outperforms the other two approaches in both cases.
3.6 Cost Analysis and Estimates
The parameters to the cost equations are the key size K  and its corresponding search 
space size Q (used in estimating the extra bytes E), and the LKH degree d.
3.6.1 How to Select the Key Size
It is usually assumed that group members are sharing a symmetric encryption key. 
Using symmetric cryptography usually achieves faster encryption/decryption than 
asymmetric cryptography. The key size is dependent on the used encryption algorithm. 
The two widely used symmetric key encryption algorithms are “Data Enciyption 
Standard” (DBS) that uses 56 bits key and “International Data Encryption Algorithm” 
(IDEA) that uses 128 bits key [40]. While an IDEA key is encoded in 16 bytes 
(128/8 = 16), a DBS key is encoded in 8 bytes (7 bits in every byte contain part o f the
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key (7x8  = 56) and the 8* bit in every byte is used for parity ebeck). Another widely 
used version of DBS is ealled triple DBS (or DBS-BDB) that uses 3 DBS keys [40].
Assuming the maximum key search space size g  = 2^, the estimated extra bytes E  
for the above three algorithms are as follows:
• For DBS, the extra bytes E  can be estimated from > 2^®(7.2e'^); where E = \ 2 1  
bytes satisfies the ineqality (Pg^  ̂ « 8.9e'^) .
• For IDBA, the extra bytes E  can be estimated from > 2*^*(3.4e^®); where E  = 
264 bytes satisfies the inequality (7]f° « 9.2e^^).
• For triple DBS, the extra bytes E  can be estimated from P^^*^ ^  2’'’*(3.7e^”) , where 
P  =116 bytes satisfies the inequality {P^l^ «  3.9e^'’) .
3.6.2 How to Select the Degree of the Hierarchy
If  it is desired to keep the rekey packet size S  less than 1500 bytes to fit in one UDP 
packet (Bthemet network)^ in which case, a rekey packet can be sent without 
fragmentation. The degree d  can be calculated using the equation S  =̂ d~>^K + E , where 
K  is determined form the used encryption algorithm and E  is the estiamted extra bytes.
Increasing d will decrease h, and therefore will decrease the computation cost at the 
rekey manager and at every group member if XORBP is used as a KDT. On the other 
hand, increasing d  increases the LKH node size as well as the rekey packet size S. 
Moreover, selecting d  such that the byte pattern BP is represented in an exact size of 
bytes will omit adding extra bits (section 3.4.2). The LKH degree d  can take into 
consideration the disk block size if  the LKH will be stored on disk. In such case, it is 
better to keep each node in one disk block for easier access.
3.6.3 Cost Estimation
The following are the cost estimates o f LKH key management approach used with 
XORBP KDT. Assuming the rekey packet size S  = d x K  + E , where d is the LKH 
degree, K  is the key size in bytes, and E  is the estimated extra bytes. Let s = [logj iS] that 
is 5 bits are needed to identify a byte location in a rekey packet. If  the group size is n, and
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LKH height is h {h = [log^ n \ for a balanced LKH); the maximimun group size for the
same height LKH M ax_n  = d^ (assuming the LKH is complete). The analytical cost
estimates is as follows:
• Byte pattern size: BPS = j'i' x K / S ]  bytes.
• LKH root node {GK) size = K bytes.
• LKH non-root node size (NS) that contains a key and BP N S - K  + BPS  bytes.
• A LKH (of degree d  and height h) storage size can be estimated by adding the nodes’
sizes at all levels. The required LKH storage (LKHS) for a group o f size n smaller
than Max_n can be estimated as
T T ^ r r c ,  ”  ^  l i  ^ d x ( M a x  n - l ) x N S . ,  ^LKHS = ----------- x ( K + >  d x N S ) - ------------{K + -------------=---------------) bytes
M ax_n  M ax_n  {d ~^)
• A group member holds the LKH root node entry {GK), and (at most) h non-root nodes
entries. The required group member storage (MS) can be estimated as
MS = K  + h x N S  hylQS.
• The rekey message RM contains (at most) h rekey packets and {h-l) encoded byte 
patterns BPs. The maximum RM size (RMS) can be estimated as 
RMS = h x  S + {h -V)x  BPS  bytes.
• Maximum number o f newly generated keys = h per a rekey.
• Maximum number of newly generated BPs is (/z-1). Therfore, the maximim number 
of randomly generated byte locations^ can be estimated as = { h - \ ) x K  per a rekey.
• If  e. is the number of sibilings at the i* level of a newly generated key node at level {i 
+ 1). The rekey packet for that key contains { e ^ x K )  bytes of key material (XORed 
keys), while the remaing bytes are filled with randomly generated bytes. The total
h
number of the randomly generated bjdes can be estiamted as = ( ^  5  -  e, x X ) per a
j= i
rekey.
• As previously explained in section 3.4.6, for every rekey message RM, there are (at 
most) d  members who will process all h rekey packets, d^ members who will process
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(A-1) rekey packets, members who will process (A-2) rekey packets, d ’' (all 
members) who will process one packet (for GK). The average number of rekey 
packets processed by a group member can be estimated as =
h~\
, (Max n - d )  ,
1 + — -------= 1 + ̂ ^  per a rekey.
M ax_ n M a x _ n x ( d  -V)
In a rekey message RM, there exists an encoded BP that corresponds to every rekey 
paeket except for GK. Similar to the rekey packet, the encoded BP is processed by the 
same group members that process the corresponding rekey packet. From the above 
estimate, the average number o f encoded BPs processed by a group member = 
(Max _ n - d )
M a x _ n x ( d  - I )
per a rekey.
For a LKH with encryption-based KDT, the byte pattern size (BPS) is equal to 0 in 
LKH storage (LKHS) and member storage (MS) estimates as given above. Let Enc_K  be 
the size of an encrypted key in bytes. In such case, the rekey message RM has two 
different sizes; join RMS (jR M S  = 2 x h x E n c _ K )  bytes, and leave RMS 
( IRMS = ( d x h - l ) x  E n c _ K )  bytes. Moreover, when an encryption-based KDT is used 
the only randomly generated numbers are the new keys.
Comparing the cost o f XORBP versus encryption-based KDTs when used with the 
same degree (d) LKH and for the same group size n: from the above analytical cost 
estimates, XORBP introduces an increase in LKH node size and therfore an increase in 
the LKH storage (LKHS) and member storage (MS). In addition, the rekey message size 
(RMS) is subject to increase depending on the encrypted key size. On the other hand, the 
use o f XOR operations between keys, instead of encryption, promises a substantial 
decrease in the rekey message construction time as well as the rekey processing time by a 
group member.
For example, for a group of size n = 4096 that uses DBS encryption, key size K  = S 
bytes, encrypted key size EncJE -  16 bytes, and the (larger) estimated extra bytes E =
 ̂A  byte location is a number in the range [0:5-1], where S  is the rekey packet size.
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127 bytes. Fig. 8, Fig. 9, and Fig. 10 illustrate the analytical cost estimates for XORBP 
(“x” prefix) versus encryption (“e” prefix). The LKH degree is increased by 4 starting 
from 4 to 32. Note that; the same figures are obtained by trying different group sizes. Fig. 
8. illustrates LKH storage (LKHS) and Fig. 9 illustrates member storage (MS) for both 
KDTs. As expected, the use of XORBP increases the storage requirement for the rekey 
manager and the rekey client. We can observe that LICHS and MS are slightly decreasing 
with the degree increase, and xLKHS and xMS are almost double cLKHS and eMS, 
respectively, for the same LKH degree.Fig. 10 illustrates the rekey message size (RMS) 
for the two encryption cases of join (eJRMS) and leave (elRMS) and for XORBP 
(xRMS). We can observe that when using encryption, the join RMS (ejRMS) is slighlty 
decreasing with LKH degree increase, while the leave RMS (elRMS) is linearly 
increasing with LKH degree increase. Similary, increasing LKH degree linearly increases 
elRM construction time (number of encryptions). Such leave rekey cost linear increase 
with LKH degree makes it unfeasible to use larger degree LKH with encryption-based 
KDT. On the other hand, when XORBP is used, xRMS (and therfore the construction 
time) is symmetric for the join and leave cases. As shown in Fig. 10, xRMS is larger than 
elRMS for all LKH degrees, but smaller/comparable to elRMS for larger LKH degrees 
(xRMS has a nonliner relation with LKH degree).
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Fig. 8. Comparison o f estimated LKH storage (LKHS) when used with encryption-hased 





Fig. 9. Comparison of estimated LKH member storage (MS) when used with encryption- 
based versus XORBP KDTs.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of estimated LKH rekey message size (RMS) when used with 
encryption-based versus XORBP KDTs.
3.7 Experimental Results
We have implemented an initial prototype for the secure group key management 
components (section 3.1) extending Java'^“ security [62]. The implementation provides 
both star and LKH rekey managers. In addition, both encryption-based and XORBP 
KDTs are available with the use of LKH rekey manager. Moreover, two LKH 
maintenance algorithms and rekey protocols are available. One protocol adopts an 
unbalanced LKH while the other adopts a balanced LKH. Chapter IV provides the details 
of such algorithms and protocols.
We performed experiments to illustrate and compare the rekey message RM 
construction time in different cases. All experiments ran on the same machine: Sun Ultra- 
250 with processor speed of 400 MHz, main memory o f 2 GB, and operating system 
Solaris 2.8. In the following experiments: a LKH rekey manager uses the unbalanced 
LKH algorithms. The group size is increased from 32 to 2048 in multiple of 2 (unless 
otherwise stated). For each group size, 100 LKHs are constructed by a sequence of
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member additions. For every constructed LKH, 10 readings of RM construction time are 
measured for 5 join rekeyings and 5 leave rekeyings (one join followed by one leave 5 
times). Next, the LKH join/leave RM construction time, for that group size, is considered 
as the average of the 500 readings.
The following experiments study and compare RM construction time as follows: 1) 
star versus LKH approach for group key management; 2) effect o f increasing LKH 
degree when used with encryption-based or XORBP KDT; 3) effect o f increasing the 
encryption time (i.e. more complex encryption standard) on the saving o f RM 
construction time when XORBP KDT is used over the encryption-based KDT; 4) effect 
o f using secure random number generation on XORBP KDT; and 5) comparing the 
estimated and measured rekey costs.
3.7.1 Star Versus LKH Key Management Approaches
The first experiment compares RM construction time for star rekey manager versus 
LKH rekey manager. Both managers are using encryption-based KDT with DBS 
encryption. LKH degree is 4, and the group size increases from 32 to 256 in multiple o f 
2. Fig. 11 illustrates RM construction time for both managers in both the join and leave 
rekey cases. For star rekey manager sJoin and sLeave are the RM construction time in the 
join and leave rekeyings respectively. For LKH rekey manager eJoin(4) and eLeave(4) 
are the RM construction time in the join and leave rekeyings respectively, where . 4 
identifies LKH degree. We can observe that sLeave increases linearly with the group size 
increase and therefore star rekey manager does not provide scalable rekeying. The 
experiment confirms that using star rekey manager is not practical even for small group 
sizes.
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Fig. 11. Comparison o f RM construction time in for star versus LKH key management 
approaches.
3.7.2 Increasing LKH Degree
The second experiment shows the effect o f increasing LKH degree on a LKH rekey 
manager that uses encryption-based versus XORBP KDTs. The encryption algorithm is 
DBS with extra bytes E =  121 bytes. The experiments are performed for LKH of degree 4 
and 16. Fig. 12 illustrates the results when encryption-based KDT is used. We can 
observe that increasing LKH degree decreases the join rekey cost (eJoin(16) is 47% of 
eJoin (4)) while increasing the leave rekey cost (eLeave(16) is 135% of eLevae(4)). Such 
result confirms our analysis that the use of higher degree LKH (more than 4) with 
encryption-based KDT is not practical. Fig. 13 illustrates the results when XORBP KDT 
is used. We can observe that increasing LKH degree decreases both the join and leave 
rekey costs (xJoin(16)/xLevae(16) is 66% of xJoin(4)/xLeave(4)). Such result confirms 
our analysis that increasing LKH degree with XORBP KDT decreases both join and 
leave rekey costs.
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Fig. 12. Effect o f LKH degree increase {d = A versus J  = 16) on RM construction time 
when encryption-based KDT is used.
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Fig. 13. Effect of LKH degree increase (J  = 4 versus = 16) on RM construction time 
when XORBP KDT is used.
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3.7.3 Increasing Key Size
The third experiment shows the RM construction time saving for the same degree 
LKH when XORBP KDT is used versus encrjqrtion-based KDT for different encryption 
standards. LKH degree is 4, and the group size increases form 32 to 4096 in multiple of 
2. Fig. 14 illustrates the results when DBS encryption algorithm is used (extra bytes E  = 
127). We can observe that the use o f XORBP KDT decreases both the join and leave 
rekey costs when compared to encryption-based KDT (xJoin is 23% of eJoin, and xLeave 
is 12% of eLeave). Fig. 15 illustrates the results when triple DBS enciyption algorithm is 
used (extra bytes £ ’=116). Triple DBS key size is 3 times DBS key size and performing a 
triple DBS encryption is more time consuming than DBS. Similarly, the use o f XORBP 
reduces the rekey cost (xJoin is 40% of eJoin, and xLeave is 20 o f % eLeave). Note that 
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 demonstrate XORBP KDT symmetric rekey cost for both join and 
leave rekey cases, and the un-symmetry o f the encryption-based KDT. Comparing RM 
construction time saving when DBS is used versus tripe DBS, we can observe that the 
time saving of XORBP is increased when used with smaller key size encryption protocol. 
When DBS is used xJoin is 23% of eJoin while when triple DBS is used xJoin is 40% of 
eJoin (i.e. when DBS is used join RM construction time saving achieves 77%, while if  
triple DBS is used the saving is reduced to 60%). Similarly, when DBS is used leave RM 
construction time saving achieves 87%, while if triple DBS is used the saving is reduced 
to 80%. Such saving is because larger key size introduces more random number 
generation for larger byte patterns and rekey packets’ filling bytes. Random number 
generation is an expensive operation in terms o f computation time but not as much as 
encryption.
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Fig. 14. Comparison o f RM constmction time when used with DES encryption-based 
versus XORBP KDTs.
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Fig. 15. Comparison of RM construction time when used with triple DES encryption- 
based versus XORBP KDTs.
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3.7.4 Secure Random Number Generation
The use of XORBP introduces extra random number generation (section 3.6.3). The 
key generation in the above experiments is performed using javax.crypto.KeyGenerator 
class, while other random numbers and bytes are generated using java.util.Random  class 
[62]. In addition, the above experiments perform un-optimized random byte generation, 
i.e. when a rekey packet is instantiated it is filled with newly generated random bytes 
then some of those bytes are overwritten with XORed keys (those bytes shouldn’t be 
generated in the first place). Moreover, when encoding a BP, an unnecessary extra 
random byte is usually generated to augment the rest of the unused byte of the encoded 
BP.
Secure random number generation is more expensive than the usual (un-secure) 
random number generation. This experiment is performed using 
java.security.SecureRandom class that uses “SAHIPRNG” algorithm instead of 
java.util.Random  class [62]. The same experiment as in section 3.7.3 for DES is repeated 
with the new random generation class while key generation uses the same 
javax.crypto.KeyGenerator class. The same code that performs un-optimized random 
byte generation is used. From our experiments, it is estimated that SecureRandom 
generation consumes 2.5 times the time of the same Random generation.
The experiment shows RM construction time saving for the same degree LKH when 
XORBP KDT is used versus an encryption-based KDT. LKH degree is 4, and the group 
size increases form 32 to 4096 in multiple of 2. Fig. 16 illustrates the results when DES 
encryption algorithm is used (extra bytes E =  116). Similarly, the use SecureRandom with 
XORBP KDT decreases both the join and leave rekey costs versus encryption-based 
KDT (xJoin is 56% of eJoin, and xLeave is 31% of eLeave). Comparing the saving with 
the results shown in Fig. 14, the join RM construction time saving is reduced from 77% 
using Random to 44% using SecureRandom. The leave RM construction time saving is 
reduced from 87% using Random to 69% using SecureRandom.
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Fig. 16. Comparison o f RM construction time when used with DES encryption-based 
KDT versus XORBP KDT that uses secure random number generation.
3.7.5 Estimated and Measured Costs
This experiment compares the estimated and measured LKH height for different LKH 
degrees and group size n = 4096. The LKH degree is increased from 4 to 32 by step 4 
(i.e., 4, 6, 12, ..., 32), and the rekey manager uses XORBP KDT. For every LKH degree, 
n members are added and the LKH height and the number o f allocated nodes are 
recorded. As previously mentioned, the experiments in this chapter adopt unbalanced 
LKH maintenance algorithms. The average of 500 readings is plotted.
Fig. 17 shows that the measured LKH height is usually larger than the estimated 
height for smaller LBLH degrees, and almost the same for larger LKH degrees. Fig. 18 and 
Fig. 19 illustrate the difference between the required member storage (MS) and rekey 
message size (RMS) respectively using the measured and estimated LKH heights. Similar 
to the height, usually the measured MS and RMS have slight increase from the estimated 
values. Fig. 20 illustrates the difference between the required LKH storage (LKHS) o f the 
measured and estimated values. Unlike MS and RMS, there is in the average 60%
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increase in the measured LKHS over the estimated LKHS. Such increase is due to the use 
of unbalanced LKH maintenance algorithms. Such increase is expected to get higher with 
either a group size or group dynamics increases. Group dynamics determines the join and 
leave patterns.
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Fig. 17. Comparison of measured and estimated LKH height for a group of size n -  4096.
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Fig. 18. Comparison o f measured and estimated member storage (MS) for a group of size 
n = 4096.
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Fig. 19. Comparison of measured and estimated rekey message size (RMS) for a group of 
size.n = 4096.
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Fig. 20. Comparison o f measured and estimated LKH storage (LKHS) for a group of size 
n = 4096.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a software model for secure group key management, 
where the main components along with their functionalities and interactions were 
identified. Concentrating on secure group key management, we highlighted two 
traditional rekey manager approaches for group rekeying, namely star and logical key 
hierarchy (LKH). The star key management approach is a simple approach that doesn’t 
provide scalable leave rekeying since the leave rekey cost increases linearly with the 
group size. The LKH approach provided a scalable join and leave rekeying. Using the 
LKH approach, both join and leave rekeyings scales linearly with the logarithm o f the 
group size. On the other hand, the LKH approach has un-symmetric rekeying procedures 
for join and leave cases and doesn’t scale well with LKH degree increase. The original 
LKH key distribution technique (KDT) for a newly generated key in a rekey message is 
to encrypt a new key either with another key or with its previous version (encryption- 
based KDT).
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We introduced XORBP, a new KDT that can be used with the LKH approach. 
XORBP performs a simple XOR operation between keys instead of encryption and 
distributes the key material in random byte patterns (BPs) in a fixed size rekey packet for 
every new key. The rekey message contains a rekey packet for every new key that is 
targeted to a set o f group members that should hold that key. The use of XORBP 
provided symmetric rekey procedures for join and leave rekeyings. In addition, it 
substantially reduces the rekey time. On the other hand, the use of XORBP increases the 
required LKH storage, member storage, and the rekey message size. In addition, XORBP 
introduces extra random number generation when compared with encryption-based KDT.
We derived analytical cost estimates of XORBP KDT, and performed empirical 
experiments to compare its performance versus encryption-based KDT. Our experiments 
show that, increasing LKH degree when used with encryption-based KDT increases the 
un-symmetry of join and leave rekey costs, which makes the use o f an LKH degree 
greater than 4 not practical. Using XORBP as KDT and increasing LKH degree allows 
the decrease of join and leave rekey costs. Using XORBP KDT versus encryption-based 
KDT, with the same degree LKH, can achieve 90% savings in the rekey message 
construction time. Using XORBP KDT with higher degree LKH (compared to lower 
degree LKH) provides extra savings in all cost metrics: storage, time, and 
communication. Finally, our experiments, using unbalanced LKH maintenance 
algorithms, show that there exists a slight increase in the measured LKH height, member 
storage, and rekey message size over the estimated values. On the other hand, the 
experiments show that the measured LKH storage for small group size has a 60% 
increase over the estimated value. Such undesirable increase motivates us to develop 
balanced LKH maintenance algorithms and protocols as explained in chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV 
LOGICAL KEY HIERARCHY REKEY PROTOCOLS
As previously mentioned in chapter III, for secure group key management, there 
exists a (central) rekey manager that maintains a logical key hierarchy (LKH) for scalable 
rekeying (change of group key, GK, due to either new group member addition or group 
member removal). The rekey manager sends a rekey message (RM) to all group members 
for every group rekeying. The rekey message contains a rekey packet for every new LKH 
key. The rekey client is the group member component that maintains a set of LKH keys 
(including GK), and receives and process RMs for such keys update.
In this chapter, we propose two techniques for a rekey manager to maintain a LKH, 
and the associated rekey protocols. One technique adopts an unbalanced LKH (denoted 
S-LKH) while the other adopts a balanced LKH (denoted B'^-LKH). We detail the LKH 
node structure, and the RM format and construction for all scenarios of LKH node 
insertion and deletion. In addition, we present the rekey client processing for different 
RM types. We performed empirical experiments to compare the rekey performance of S- 
LBH protocol versus B'^-LKH protocol for different group sizes and LKH degrees. The 
B'^-LKH protocol causes a small increase in the average number o f rekey packets, and the 
average number o f encrypted keys in a RM when compared to the S-LKH protocol. 
However, in chapter V we show that introducing hatch rekeying (rekeying for several 
members addition and/or removal) results in a reduction in the B^-LKH case. On the 
other hand, the use of B'^-LKH decreases LKH height and the maximum number of 
encrypted keys in a RM when compared to S-LKH. The expected maximum rekey time is 
used in adjusting the minimum inter-rekey period that has to be elapsed between two 
consecutive rekeyings. Moreover, the use of B'^-LKH reduces the number of allocated 
nodes for a LKH (up to 50% reduction) when compared to S-LKH.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents motivation and overview of 
the new techniques and protocols. Section 4.2 presents S-LKH node structure, RM 
format, and S-LKH maintenance algorithms along with RM construction. Section 4.3
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
72
presents B^-LKH maintenance algorithms along with RM construction, and algorithms 
analysis. Section 4.4 details B'^-LKH rekey client processing when receiving a RM to 
update the maintained set o f keys. Section 4.5 presents performance evaluation 
experiments and results. Finally, section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.1 Motivation and Overview
A LKH is maintained by a rekey manager to provide scalable rekeying. A balanced 
LKH is a key tree where all leaf nodes are at the same distance (level) from the root. 
Keeping a LKH balanced is very important to the performance o f group rekeying 
especially for highly dynamic groups (many joins and leaves). Several researchers 
assume a balanced LKH when estimating and analyzing the cost of group rekeying [11], 
[67]. Keeping a LKH balanced is a crucial issue. However, the literature lacks practical 
LKH maintenance algorithms as well as algorithms for keeping a LKH of any degree 
balanced all the time [51] [52]. As concluded in chapter III, when an unbalanced LKH is 
used, there is always an increase in the measured LKH height over the estimated value. 
The increase in LKH height leads to a small increase in member storage, and rekey 
message size over the estimated values. Nevertheless, there is a substantial increase in the 
allocated LKH storage over the estimated value (the increase achieves 60% as shown in 
section 3.7.5).
The proposed LKH maintenance algorithms require the rekey manager to assign a 
unique identification for every group member, namely individual ID. For example, an 
individual ID could be a randomly generated number. Individual IDs are used in 
constructing the LKH and are sent in a RM to guide its processing (by a rekey client). 
Using LKH keys or true member identification (such as name or IP address) as IDs 
makes the rekey protocol vulnerable to traffic analysis. Since individual IDs are part o f a 
RM, true IDs can be used to reveal the LKH structure and group members information.
Our proposed LKH maintenance techniques provide a dual LKH purpose, as a key 
tree and as an easily searchable data structure for individual material (ID, key, ...etc). 
The first proposed technique maintains a LKH as a search tree [63], denoted S-LKH, 
using individual IDs as searched values. A search tree is not balanced and is used to 
provide sort and search algorithms for a set of searched values. In a search tree, any value
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is located only once at any tree node (internal or leaf). We adapt the traditional search 
tree algorithms to accommodate the constraint that a group member individual material 
(ID, key, ...etc) is always an entry in a leaf node. The S-LKH internal nodes contain key- 
encrypting-keys (KEKs). We detail S-LKiH node structure and maintenance algorithms 
that show how a S-LKH grows (shrinks) when an individual entry is inserted (deleted) 
into a leaf node. In addition, the algorithms show how a RM is constructed for different 
insertion and deletion scenarios. The S-LKH maintenance algorithms are applicable for 
any LKH of degree d>2 .
The second proposed technique maintains LKH as a balanced search tree [63], 
denoted B^-LKH, that has the same structure as S-LKH but guarantees that a LKH is 
balanced after every node insertion or deletion. B"̂  search trees have an extra constraint 
that all allocated nodes have to be at least half full to reduce the required LKH storage 
(allocated memory space). B^-LKH maintenance introduces complexity and extra 
overhead in RM construction and in the rekey client processing. We detail B"^-LKH 
maintenance algorithms along with RM construction for different insertion and deletion 
cases. In addition, we detail the rekey client RM processing (for key updates) for 
different RM types.
4.2 S-LKH: A LKH as a Search Tree
In a binary search tree, each node N contains a single search value v and points to two 
sub-trees (children). The left sub-tree (child) contains all the search values in the tree 
rooted at N that are less than or equal to v, and the right sub-tree (child) contains all the 
search values in the tree rooted at N that are greater than v. A multi-way search tree of 
degree J  is a general tree in which each node has d  or fewer children (sub-trees) and 
contains one fewer search values than it has children. That is, if  a node has four children, 
it contains three search values. The search tree is constructed such that the search values 
are sorted in an ascending order in each node. In addition, the searched values are sorted 
across all nodes.
A rekey manager that maintains LKH as a S-LKH is required to provide a unique 
individual identification, ID, for every new member. S-LKH is constructed as a search 
tree for those individual IDs. An individual ID can be a newly generated random number.
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Using LKH keys as sort/search values will reduce an insider attack search space. For 
example, colluding group members can specify a smaller search space for LKH keys by 
revealing their keys and positions to each other. Individual IDs are sent in a RM to guide 
the rekey client processing. Using true member identification such as name or IP address 
as an individual ID makes the protocol vulnerable to traffic analysis. Generating IDs as 
random numbers prevents both the insider attack and the traffic analysis problems.
Similar to a search tree, a S-LKH internal node has at least one child, while a S-LKH 
leaf node has no children. The proposed S-LKH maintenance algorithms adapt the 
traditional search tree algorithms to the constraint that an individual material (ID, key, 
...etc) is always an entry in a leaf node. Consequently all searched IDs are entries in leaf 
nodes while the internal nodes contain replicas of certain IDs that are used as an index to 
guide the search for leaf entries’ IDs.
4.2.1 S-LKH Node Structure
In a S-LKH of degree d, the node size e is the number of entries in a node such that 
l < e < ( 7 .  The leaf node structures is where the pair
(K. , IDj) is an individual entry that contains an indiviudal key K.  and an indiviudal ID
/D,.among other individual information such as name, IP address,..etc (not shown). The
individual IDs are the sorted/searched values used in constructing S-LKH and are unique 
through all leaf nodes. The internal node structure is 
[(K ,,Pj) ,/D j, { K j , P2 ),...,/D^_i, (K^ ,P J ] , where the pair (K.,P.)  is a child node entry in 
which K- is a KEK and Pi is a pointer to the (internal or leaf) child node. The internal 
nodes’ IDs are replicas of certain leaf IDs and are choosen to guide the search.
A leaf node entry insertion requires a pair (K,.,/D,.) of the individul key and ID in
addition to other individual material (not illustrated). While, an internal node entry 
insertion requires an ID, except for the first insertion, and a child node. An internal node 
entry is created to contain the pair (K,.,P^.), where K,. is a newly generated KEK and
is a pointer to the child node. Internal node IDs are inserted between childem entries as 
shown in the internal node structure above. A S-LKH is constructed such that for every 
internal node, the first entry P, points to a child node whose every IDi entry IDi < ID^,
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the last entry points to a child node whose every ID. entry ID^_  ̂ < ID ., and every
other Pj points to a child node whose every ID. entry IDj_^ < ID. < I D . . In addition, all
entries o f a leaf node are sorted in ascending order by their IDs. Fig. 21 illustrates a S- 
LKH structure maintained by a rekey manager. The rekey manager maintains two 
entities: the group key GK and root the pointer to the S-LKH root node.
G K
(K ,, PO, ID , (K j, L ) , ID j,..., IDe.,, (K=,Pe)root
Fig. 21. A S-LKH structure.
A S-LKH provides dual purpose as a key tree and as an easily searched data structure 
for individual material. A S-LKH has two views, the key view  that shows the 
corresponding key tree (LKH), and the search view that shows the search tree for 
individual IDs. For example. Fig. 22(a) is a S-LKH of degree d  = 2 and height /z = 3 for a 
group o f size n = 5; Fig. 22(b) is the S-LKH key view, and Fig. 22(c) is the S-LKH 
search view.
When S-LKH is used with XORBP key distribution technique (KDT) (chapter III), 
every key entry in an internal node or in a leaf node is associated with a byte pattern 
(BP). The BP will be allocated (generated) when the entry is first inserted. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we assume the use of encryption-based KDT, and explain the 
changes, if  any, when XORBP is used.
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(K,, Pi), 900, (Kz, P2)
(K,.,,P,.,), 400, (K,.2, P1.2)
GK
(K,.,.,. 120), (K,.,1,2, 205) (K2,,.,,1120),(K2„,.2, 1205))
(a) The S-LKH nodes.
GK
-2.1.2
(b) The S-LKH key view.
900
400
900 1120 1205120 205
(c) The S-LKH search view.
Fig. 22. A S-LKH o f degree d  = 2 and height A = 3 for a group o f size n - 5 .
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4.2.2 S-LKH Rekey Message Format
Fig. 23 depicts the rekey message RM format used by a S-LKH rekey manager. Fig. 
23(a) illustrates the initial key message sent to a group member before receiving any RMs 
and is used to initialize his state (ID, position, LKH height, and LKH degree). Where ID 
is the member unique identifleation assigned by the rekey manager, and position is an 
encoded LKH position of the individual leaf entry. The individual BP  is sent only if 
XORBP is used as a KDT. Fig. 23(b) illustrates the RM format, which is sent to all group 
members for every rekeying, where SEQ  is a sequential number that indicates RM 
number starting from I for the first message, type is the message type that could be ADD 
if the rekey is due to new member addition or REMOVE if  the rekey is due to group 
member removal (other types will be introduced later when the algorithms are presented), 
position is the encoded LKH position o f inserted/deleted leaf node entry, level specifies 
the distance between the root node and the effected leaf node, ID is the inserted/deleted 
leaf entry ID, and a RekeyPacket is constructed for every new key.
If  an encryption-base KDT is used, the RekeyPacket, shown in Fig. 23(c), contains 
several encryptions of a new key (encKey). Each encKey is targeted to a different set of 
group members. On the other hand, if  a XORBP KDT is used, the RekeyPacket, shown in 
Fig. 23(d), contains a fixed length o f bytes (size is S'bytes as estimated in section 3.3.3) 
and an encoded BP encodedBP for the assoeiated BP as explained in section 3.4.2. Note 
that, GK is not associated with a BP and a rekey packet for GK doesn’t contain an 
encoded BP.
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ID Position LKH height LKH degree Individual BP
(a) Individual (initial) key message.
SEQ Type Position Level ID
RekeyPacket),RekeyPacket2, ...
(b) Rekey Message (RM).
encKeyi, encKey2, ...
(c) Encryption rekey packet.
S  bytes encodedBP
(d) XORBP rekey packet.
Fig. 23. The format of messages used by a S-LKH rekey manager.
4.2.3 Rekey Packet Construction
For an internal node entry {K^ , P^ ) m  an internal node N, there are two types of 
constructed rekey packets for a newly generated K \ . The first type is addRekey packet 
that is constructed after an insertion of an entry to the intemaFleaf node A, where node A 
is the child of N pointed to by (node A for GK is root node). The second type is
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rmvRekey packet that is constructed after the deletion of an entry from node A. The rekey 
packets are constructed by calling the methods addRekey(A) and rmvRekey{A) provided 
by every internal node N (and by GK). Note that the inserted/deleted entry could be 
directly in node A or indirectly in the path o f one o f its children.
If  an encryption-based KDT is used, the addRekey packet contains two encryptions of 
K \ {{K\ )K^  , [K \ }Kg ] where Kg is the new entry key in node A. The rmvRekey packet 
contains e enctryptions of K^ where e is the number of entries in node A
Note that for the first time a newly created key is distributed, a rmvRekey has to be 
constructed since no previous version of the key exists. In addition, if  an operation 
performs both insertion and deletion to node A, a rmvRekey packet has to be constructed 
for K \  (the key previous version can not be used since some entries are deleted).
If XORBP KDT is used, an internal node entry (X ^,5P^,P^) contains a BP that has 
to be regenerated along with the key K ^ . Both addRekey and rmbRekey packets 
construction is symmetric and uses node A entries as described in section 3.4.1. Every 
XORBP rekey packets, except for GK, contains an encodedBP for BP^ using K^ as 
descibed in section 3.4.2.
4.2.4 S-LKH Algorithm for New Group Member Addition
Fig. 24 is the S-LKH new member addition algorithm, AddMember, where the new 
group member has a unique identification memberlD  and an individual key memberKey. 
The algorithm details how the S-LKH of degree d  rooted at node root is growing while 
adding the new member entry as well as how the individual key message initMsg and the 
RM rekeyMsg are constructed for the different addition cases (RM type). There are three 
possible RM {rekeyMsg) types ADD, SPLIT, and INCREASE as will be explained next.
Initially, the S-LKH rooted at root node is searched by memberlD for the appropriate 
position in a leaf node N for the new member entry. The lookup method searches the S- 
LKH rooted at root node guided by memberlD  and returns the appropriate position for 
the individual entry to be inserted, in addition, it returns all visited nodes in nodeStack, 
(where the first pushed node is root and the last pushed node is the leaf node that should
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contain the new individual entry). Then, the new entry is inserted where there are three 
cases. The first case occurs if  the leaf node N has space for the new entry (number of 
entries less than d), a simple insert is performed and rekeyMsg type is set to ADD^. Note 
that, if  XORBP KDT is used the individualBP filed in initMsg message is assigned after 
the leaf node insertion is performed (Fig. 23 (a)).
The other two cases occur if  the leaf node N is full (has d  entries). I f  N is full, a new 
leaf node newNode is allocated and N entries (including the new one) are split equally 
between the two nodes (N and newNode). If the number of entries (c/ + 1) doesn’t split 
equally between the two nodes (odd number), we keep one more entry in N than 
newNode. The newNode is to be the right neighbor o f N. The splitlnsert method returns 
an ID that is the maximum ID value in node N after the split. An internal node entry 
(KEK and pointer) that points to newNode should be inserted in the parent o f N (to the 
right of N entry). There are two cases for that insertion according to whether the parent 
node is flill or not.
The second addition case occurs when the parent o f N has space for a new entry, the 
newNode entry is inserted and rekeyMsg type is set to SPLIT. The third addition case 
occurs if the parent o f N is full, a new internal node newParent is allocated to be the 
parent for the two children N and newNode. The pointer at the parent node that was 
pointing to N should be replaced to point to newParent instead and rekeyMsg type is set 
to INCREASE. The last case leads to an inerease of S-LKH height only if  the distance 
between root and N (denoted level in the algorithm) equals to Qi-l). Note that, the 
underlined code highlights the assignment of the constructed rekey packets to rekeyMsg 
fields. Also note that, rmvRekey packets are constructed for the newly created KEKs and 
for KEKs that experience deletion in the associated node.
The number o f rekey packets in rekeyMsg is {level+l), (level+2), and (level+3) in the 
cases of ADD, SPLIT, and INCREASE, respectively. The first two packets in the cases 
of SPLIT & INCREASE are rmvRekey packets while all other packets are addRekey 
packets. Please see appendix A for examples of the different new group member addition 
cases.
^  denotes an assignment to multiple fields in a message.
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Method AddMember(memberID, memberKey)
Globals: root, h, d, GK;
Returns: initMsg, rekeyMsg;
if (h equals 0) then { root = AllocateNew LeafNodeQ; h = 1; }
(position, nodeStack) = root.lookup (memberlD); 
level = nodeStack.sizeO -1 ; N = nodeStack.pop(); 
initMsg <- (memberlD, position, h, d); 
rekeyMsg G- (position, memberlD, level);
if (N.size() < d) then { N.insert (memberKey, memberlD); rekeyMsg.type = A D D ;} 
else { newNode = AllocateNew LeafNode();
ID = N.splitInsert(memberKey, memberlD, newNode); 
parent = nodeStack.pop(); 
if ((level > 0) and (parent. size() < d)) 
then { parent.insert(ID, newNode); decrement level; 
rekeyMsg.type = SPLIT;
rekeyMsg<- (parent.rmvRekev(NL parent.rmvRekev(newNode)) ;}
else
{ newParent = AllocateNew InternalNode(); 
newParent.insert(null, N); newParent.insert(ID, newNode); 
rekeyMsg.type = INCREASE;
rekevM sg^(newParent.rmvRekey(N), newParent.rmvRekey(newNode)); 
if (level equals (h-1)) then increment h; 
if (level equals 0) then root = newParent; 
else parent.replace(N, newParent); }
}
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO; 
rekeyMsg <-N.addRekey(prevN); } 
rekeyMsg ^  GK.addRekev(root); 
return initMsg, rekeyMsg;
Fig. 24. The S-LKH new group member addition and RM construction algorithm.
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4.2.5 S-LKH Algorithm for Group Member Removal
Fig. 25 is the S-LKH group member removal algorithm, RemoveMember, that details 
how the S-LKH rooted at node root is shrinking after the removal of a group member 
entry as well as how the RM {rekeyMsg) is constructed for the different removal cases 
(RM type). There are two possible RM rekeyMsg types REMOVE, and DECREASE. The 
removed member is identified by his unique memberlD.
Initially, the S-LKH rooted at node root is searched by memberlD  to determine the 
position of the leaf entry at node N to be deleted. The first removal case occurs when the 
leaf node N, after the deletion, contains one or more entries, the rekeyMsg type is set to 
REMOVE. The second case occurs when node N, after the deletion, has no more entries. 
In this case, node N entry (KEK and pointer) has to be deleted from its parent node. If  the 
parent after the deletion has no more entries, its entry has to be deleted from its parent, 
and so on. The deletion could propagate to upper nodes and stops when it reaches the first 
non-empty node. The rekeyMsg type is this case is set to DECREASE and could lead to 
the decrease of LKH height h if  it the deleted leaf node is the only node that has distance 
equals to {h-\) from the root. The height h might be decreased by more than one if  more 
nodes are deleted. The number o f rekey packets in rekeyMsg is {level + 1 ) .  Please see 
appendix A for examples o f the different group member removal cases.
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Method RemoveMember(memberlD)
Globals: root, h, d, GK;
Returns: rekeyMsg;
(position, nodeStack) = root.lookup (memberlD); 
rekeyMsg (position, memberlD); 
level = nodeStack.sizeO -1 ;
N = nodeStack.popO; N.delete(memberlD); 
if (N.sizeO > 0) then rekeyMsg.type = REMOVE; 
else { while (N.size() equlas 0)
if  (level equals 0) then { decrement level; free root; h = 0; breakWhile; } 
else { decrement level; prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO; 
N.delete(prevN); } 
h = root.getHeight(); 
rekeyMsg.type = DECREASE;
}
rekeyMsg.level = level; 
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO; 
rekeyMsg <~N . rmvRekevtprevNl: } 
if (root does-not-equal null) then rekeyMsg GK.rmvRekev(root); 
return rekeyMsg;
Fig. 25. The S-LKEl group member removal and RM construction algorithm.
4.3 B^-LKH: A LKH as a Search Tree
A B^-LKH rekey manager maintains a balanced LKH adapting search tree 
insertion and deletion algorithms [63], [38]. A B^-LKH is a S-LKH that has the same 
node structure shown in Fig. 21. A B^ search tree of degree d is subject to two 
constraints, the first is all its leaf nodes are on the same level (i.e. balanced), and the 
second is all allocated nodes except the root are at least half full. The root node size is at 
least 2, while all other nodes’ sizes are at least \ d l 2 \  that will be denoted Min_d.
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Maintaing a B -LKH introduces complexity and extra overhead in RM construction as 
well as in the rekey client processing. B^-LKH algorithms are suitable for any LKH of 
degree d  greater than or equal to 4. When d  equals 2 or 3 M injd  is 1 (and so is S-LKH) 
and using B"^-LKH algorithms introduces exta overhead versus S-LKH.
4.3.1 B^-LKH Rekey Message Format
The initial key message and many fields in RM are similar to the messages explained 
in section 4.2.2 for S-LKH protococl. Fig. 26 illustrates the changes to the messages 
format used by a B’̂ -LKH rekey manager. Fig. 26(a) is RM format that contains several 
IDs, and several boolean (bit) values isRght, where isRght is a Boolean value that 
indicates either “is right” or “is left” that is used with some message types as will be 
explained later when introducing the B^-LKH RemoveMember algorithm. Fig. 26(b) is a 
XORBP rekey packet that contains several xoredBPs. A xoredBP is eonstructed with two 
same (bit) length BPs XORed, and is used with some message types as will be expaliend 
later when introucing the B"^-LKH RemoveMember algorithm.
SEQ Type Position Level
ID i,ID 2, . . . isRght], isRghtz, ...
RekeyPacket], RekeyPacket2, ...
(a) Rekey Message (RM).
S Bytes encodedBP
xoredBP], xoredBP2 , . ..
(b) XORBP rekey packet.
Fig. 26. The format o f messages used by a B^-LKH rekey manager.
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4.3.2 B -LKH Rekey Packet Construction
B"^-LKH algorithms use the same rekey packet constmction introduced in section
4.2.3 for S-LKH protocol. In addition, there are two remove related operations to uphold 
the second search tree constraint that all nodes are at least half full. The first operation 
is shift, in which one entry is shifted from a node to one of its neighboring nodes. The 
second operation is merge, in which all entries in an underflow node (its size becomes 
less than Min_d) are merged (moved) to one of its neighboring nodes and the empty node 
is deleted.
A new rekey packet constmction is needed for the merge operation and is called 
mrgRekey{A, isRight), where isRight is a boolean value if  “trwe” that means A is the right 
neighbor of the deleted node and if  “false"  that means A is the left neighbor of the 
deleted node. Similar to addRekey and rmvRekey packet constmction methods, mrgRekey 
is provided by the internal node N that contains the entry for its child node A.
The encrj^tion-based rekey packet for the new K ^  contains Min_d encrypted key
{{K\ ] K^ , {K\ ]K^ , l <i  < Min _d'\ where K. is a merged entry key, and isRight
determines which keys are merged. If  isRight equals to true, the first Min_d entries are 
merged from the left neigbor node, and if equals to false  the last Min_d entries are 
merged from the right neighbor node.
The XORBP rekey packets are constmcted the same way for all packet types 
{addRekey, rmvRekey and mrgRekey). I f  XORBP is used as a KDT technique the 
shifted/merged entries’ BP is subject to change due to the possible occupation o f the 
assigned bytes. When an entry is shifted/merged a new BP is allocated. The new bit 
represented BP has to be sent in the rekey packet XORed with its bit represented previous 
value as a xoredBP illustrated in section 4.3.1. The rekey packet contains one xoredBP if 
there is a shifted entry to node A, and contains {M injd  - 1) xoredBPs if  there are {Min_d - 
1) merged entries to node A.
4.3.3 B^-LKH Algorithm for New Group Member Addition
Adding a new group member leads to the insertion of a new entry in a leaf node, and 
might lead to insertions in one or more internal nodes. First we will present the different
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insert operations in a leaf node and in an internal node, followed by the member’s 
addition and RM construction algorithm (AddMember).
For a leaf node there exists two possible insert operations namely insert and 
splitlnsert. Fig. 27 is an example that illustrates a leaf node N in a LKH of degree <7 = 4 
(Min_d = 2) after the two insert operations. Every leaf entry represents a member 
individual key and his unique ID. Fig. 27(a) shows the original leaf node N that has 3 
entries. Fig. 27(b) shows the leaf node N after insert (Kd, 390) is performed (N contains 
maximum number of entries 4). Fig. 27(c) shows the leaf node N after splitlnsert (Kg, 
280) is performed. A new empty leaf node newNode is allocated and passed to this 
method call, and an ID is returned that will be inserted in an internal node in the upper 
level. Note that the entries are sorted by their IDs, and the last ID in N is returned after 
moving half of its entries to newNode. The two leaf nodes contain at least entries.
(K a , 340), (K b , 410), (K c , 470)
(a) Original leaf node N.
(K a, 340), (K d, 3 9 0 ) ,  (K b, 410), (Kc, 470)
(b) Leaf node N after insert (K d, 390)
N I 390 i newNode
(K e, 280), (K a, 340), (K^, 390) (K b, 410), (Kc, 470)
(c) Leaf nodes N and newNode, and the returned ID after splitlnsert (Ke, 280).
Fig. 27. An example of different leaf node insertions in a B^-LKH of degree <7 = 4.
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For an internal node, there are three possible insert operations namely firstln sert, 
insert, and splitlinsert. Fig. 28 is an example that illustrates the three insert operations in 
an internal node N in a LKH of degree d  = A. The internal node insert operations are 
passed a child node (A, B, C, D, or E) and a pointer to these nodes is created in the entry. 
In addition, a newly created KEK is generated for every child node. The firstlnsert 
operation, when the node is empty, is passed two child nodes. Fig. 28(a) shows the 
internal node N after firstInsert{A, 390, B) is performed. Fig. 28 (b) shows the intemal 
node N after the insert{500, C) is performed, then insert(200, D) is performed, that makes 
the node full (has 4 entries). Fig. 28(c) shows the intemal node N after splitInsert(AlO, E) 
is performed, where a new intemal node newNode is passed to this method call and an ID 
is retumed.
I (K a , P a) ,  3 9 0 , ( K b , P b)  j
(a) Intemal node N after firstlnsert (A, 390, B).
(K a , Pa), 200, (K d , Pd), 390, (K b , ? b ) ,  500, (K c , Pc)
(b) Intemal node N after insert (500, C), then insert (200, D).
N i 410 I newNode
(K a, Pa), 200, (K d, P d), 390, (K b, ? b) (K e , P e ), 500, (K c , ? c )
(c) Intemal nodes N and newNode, and the retumed ID after splitlnsert (410, E).
Fig. 28. An example of different internal node insertions in a B^-LKH of degree d  = A.
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Fig. 29 is the B^-LKH member addition and RM construction algorithm, AddMember, 
that details how the B^-LKH rooted at node root is growing while adding new members 
entries as well as how the individual key message initMsg and RM rekeyMsg are 
eonstructed for different addition cases (RM type). There are three possible RM 
{rekeyMsg) types ADD, SPLIT, and INCREASE as will be explained next. The added 
member has a unique ID memberlD  and an individual key memberKey.
Initially, the B^-LKH rooted at node root is searched by memberlD for the 
appropriate position in a leaf node N for the new member entry. The first addition case 
occurs when the leaf node N has space for the new entry, a simple insertion is performed, 
and rekeyMsg type is set to ADD. The other two addition cases occur if  the leaf node is 
full. If  the leaf node is full a new leaf node newNode is allocated and the entries o f N are 
split between the two nodes (N and newNode). An intemal entry (KEK and pointer) has 
to be inserted for newNode at the parent of N and to its right. If  the parent of N is not full 
a simple intemal node insertion is performed. While if  the parent node is full a new 
intemal node is allocated and the entries of that parent are split between it and the new 
allocated node, and so on the split could propagate to upper levels. Note that, after 
splitlnsert method is called the parent of nodes prevN  and prevNew  (denoted prvNprnt 
and prvNwPrnt, respectively) could be either N  or newNode, and are assigned by that 
method call.
The second addition case occur when the split propagates until it reaches an internal 
node that has space for the new entry and the rekeyMsg type is set to SPLIT. The third 
addition case occurs when the split propagates to the root node leading to an increase of 
LKH height, and the rekeyMsg type is set to INCREASE. Please see appendix A for 
examples o f the different new group member addition cases.
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Method AddMember(memberID, memberKey)
Globals: root, h, d, GK;
Returns: intMsg, rekeyMsg;
if (h equals 0) then { root = AllocateNew LeafNode(); h = 1;}
(position, nodeStack) = root.lookup (memberlD); level = h -1 ; N = nodeStack.popO; 
initMsg ^  (memberlD, position, h, d); rekeyMsg <r (position, memberlD); 
if (N.sizeO < d) then { N.insert (memberKey, memberlD); rekeyMsg.type = A D D ;} 
else { done = false; newNode = AllocateNew LeafNode();
ID = N.splitInsert(memberKey, memberlD, newNode); 
while (level > 0)
{ decrement level; prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO; 
if (N.sizeO ^  d) 
then { N.insert(ID, newNode); rekeyMsg.type = SPLIT;
rekeyMsg ^  (level, ID, N.rmvRekev(prevN), N.rmvRekev(newNode)); 
done = true; breakW hile;} 
else { prevNew = newNode; newNode = new IntemalNode(); 
rekeyMsg ^ (ID );
(ID, prevNpmt, prevNewPmt) = N.splitInsert(ID, prevNew, newNode); 
rekeyMsg ^  prevNpmt.rmvRekev(prevN); 
rekeyMsg prevNewPmt.rmvRekev(nrevNew); }
}
if (not done )
then { root = AllocateNew IntemalNode(); root.firstInsert(N, ID, newNode); 
rekeyMsg.type = INCREASE; increment h; 
rekeyMsg ^  (ID, root.rmvRekev(NL root.imvRekevrnewNodeE: }
}
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO; 
rekeyMsg N.addRekev(prevN); } 
rekeyMsg ^  GK.addRekey(root); 
return initMsg, rekeyMsg;
Fig. 29. The B'^-LKH new group member addition and RM constmction algorithm.
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4.3.4 B^-LKH Algorithm for Group Member Removal
Removing a group member leads to the deletion o f his entry from a leaf node and 
possibly the deletion of one or more intemal node entries. The deletion o f an entry could 
be simple that does not lead to the violation of not being half full or it could need extra 
overhead to uphold the constraint that all nodes are at least half full. Keeping the B^- 
LKH balanced and keeping the nodes half full need two possible remove-related 
operations shift and merge, both operations apply to two neighboring siblings (of the 
same parent) nodes, N and its right or left neighbor Nghbr. The best neighbor for a node 
N (if the two exists) is the one with greater size (i.e. has more entries). I f  the two sibling 
neighbors have the same size, the right one is chosen. Note that, the first child of a node 
has only a right sibling, while the last child of a node has only a left sibling and the only 
neighbor is the best neighbor. The best neighbor is chosen from the two possible 
neighbors (if exists) o f a node N, that have the same anchor, such that it has enough 
entries to avoid the more expensive merge operation. The original B^ search tree 
algorithms impose no restriction on choosing a neighbor that has the same anchor and we 
avoided such choice because of its potential and complex change to the tree, and hence 
increased cost of the rekey operations [38]. For example if  the best neighbor to a node 
doesn’t have the same parent, two parent entries for the two nodes need to be rekeyed 
(regeneration of the key).
If  the deletion of an entry at node N causes an underflow, i.e. its size becomes {Min_d 
-1), a shift or merge operation is essential to keep it at least half full. The shift operation 
moves an entry from Nghbr to N, where Nghbfs  size is more than Min_d. The merge 
operation moves all entries of N to Nghbr and deletes node N, where Nghbr’s size is 
exactly Min_d.
Fig. 30 and Fig. 31 are examples that depict the possible shift operations from right 
and left neighbors, respectively, in a B^-LKH of degree d = A. The minimum number of 
entries in a node is 2. The examples illustrate the nodes before and after the operation in 
the two cases o f the nodes (N and Nghbr) being leaf or intemal nodes. In addition, the 
examples illustrate how the ID is adjusted in the anchor node. The shift method call is 
provided by the anchor node and retums an ID that will be sent in the RM.
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Anchor




i (Kb, Pb), IDb, (Kc, Pc), IDc, (Kd, Pd)
(Ka, IDa) (Kb, IDb), (Kc, IDc), (Kd, IDd)
(a) Node N before shift from right neighbor Nghbr.
Anchor
i • • ■ ( Kn, Pn ), IDb, (KNghbr, PNghbr ) • • •
N
(Ka,P a) ,I D x, ( K b,P b)
Nghbr 
I (Kc, Pc), IDc, (Kd, Pd)
(Ka, IDa), (Kb, IDb) (Kc,IDc),(Kd,IDd)
(b) Node N after shift from right neighbor Nghbr (IDb is returned).
Fig. 30. An example of B^-LKH internal/leaf node x i ^ i  shift operation.
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Anchor
i ... ( KNghbtj PNghbr ); IDx> (Kn, Pn) • ■ ■
Nghbr
I (K b, Pb), ID b, (K c, P c), ID c, (K d, P d)
N
I (K a, P a)
(K b, ID b), (K q, ID c), (K d, ID d) (K a, ID a)
(a) Node N before shift from left neighbor Nghbr.
Anchor
i ... ( KNghbr, PNghbr), ID c, (K n, Pn) ■ ■ •
Nglibr \  N
(K b, P b), ID b, (K c, P c) (K d , P d ), ID x , (K a, Pa)
(K b, ID b), (K c, ID c) (K d , ID d ), (K a, ID a)
(b) Node N after shift from left neighbor Nghbr (IDc is returned).
Fig. 31. An example ofB^-LKH internal/leaf node left .s’/zi/i operation.
Fig. 32, and Fig. 33 are examples that depict the possible merge operations from right 
and left neighbors respectively in a B”̂ -LKH of degree = 4. The minimum number o f 
entries in a node is 2. The examples illustrate the nodes before and after the operation in 
the two cases of the nodes (N and Nghbr) being leaf or intemal nodes. In addition, the 
examples illustrate how the anchor node is adjusted. The merge method call is provided 
by the anchor node and retums the deleted ID that will be sent in the RM.
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Anchor
i • • -(K-N, Pn )> IDx > (KNghbr> PNghbr)- • •
(K a, P a) I
Nghbr 
(K b, P b), ID b, (K c, P c)
(K a, ID a) (K b, ID b), (Kc , ID c)
(b) Node N before merge with right 
neighbor Nghbr.
Anchor 
I (KNghbn PNghbr)-•• I
Nghbr \
(K a , P a ) ,  ID x , (K b, P b), ID b, (Kc, Pc)
(K a , ID a ) , (Kb, ID b), (K c, ID c)
(a) Node N after merge with right 
neighbor Nghbr (IDx is returned).
Fig. 32. An example of B^-LKH intemal/leaf node right merge operation.
Anchor
i ... (KNghbr, PNghbr), ID x ,(K n, Pn ) - - -
Nghbr 
(Kb, Pb), IDb, (Kc, Pc) I
N
(K a, P a)
(K b, ID b), (K c, ID c) (K a, ID a)





(K b, Pb), ID b, (K c, P c), ID x , (K a , ? a )
(K b, ID b), (Kc, ID c), (K a , ID a )
(a) Node N after merge with right left 
Nghbr (IDx is returned).
Fig. 33. An example o f B'^-LKH intemal/leaf node left merge operation.
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Fig. 34. illustrates the B’̂ -LKH group member removal and RM construction 
algorithm, RemoveMember, that details how a B^-LKH is shrinking wile removing a 
group member entry. The removed member is identified by his unique ID memberlD. 
Initially, the B^-LKH rooted at node root is searched by memberlD for the position o f the 
deleted entry in the leaf node N. While searching for the entry the lookup method looks 
for the best neighbor o f each node and pushes it in nodeStack as well as a flag is pushed 
in isRghtStack that determines if it is the right or the left neighbor. The deletion of an 
entry form a leaf node could introduce further deletions in upper level nodes that could 
propagate up to root or stops at lower level. The deletion o f a member entry has four 
different cases, i.e. four different RM types, and those are REMOVE, MERGE, SHIFT, 
and DECREASE.
After the entry is deleted from leaf node N, node N is checked to see if  it is at least 
half full or not. If  node N contains at least Min_d entries rekeyMsg type is set to 
REMOVE. If  node N underflows the best neighbor Ngbgr (that is popped from the stack) 
is checked to see if  we could shift an entry from it (has more than Min_d entries) or a 
merge is essential (has exactly Min_d entries). If  shift is possible, an entry is shifted form 
Nghbr to N, the deletion propagation stops, and rekeyMsg type is set to SHIFT. I f  Nghbr 
has exactly Min_d entries then the entries of node N are merged (moved) to Nghbr node. 
In this case, the intemal node entry at the parent node {anchor) that was pointing to node 
N has to be deleted. If  the anchor (parent) didn’t underflow after that deletion the merge 
stops and rekeyMsg type is set to MERGE. If  the anchor underflows its neighbor is 
checked for shift or merge operation, and so the deletion could propagate to upper level 
nodes. If  the deletion propagates to root node and merged its only two children nodes, 
B'^-LKH height is reduced by 1 and rekeyMsg type is set to DECREASE. Please see 
appendix A for examples of the different group member removal cases.
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Method RemoveMember(memberlD)
Globals: root, h, d, Min_d, GK;
Returns: rekeyMsg;
(position, nodeStack, isRghtStack) = lookup (memberlD); 
rekeyMsg G  (position, memberlD); level = h -1 ; N = nodeStack.popO;
N. delete(memberlD);
if ((N.sizeO > Min_d) or ((N equals root) and (N.size() > 0))) 
then rekeyMsg.type = REMOVE; 
else
{ done = false; 
while (level > 0)
{ decrement level; anchor = nodeStack.popO; isRght = isRghtStack.popO;
Nghbr = anchor.getNghbr(N, isRght); 
if (Nghbr.sizeO > Min__d) 
then
{ ID = anchor.shift(N, Nghbr); rekeyMsg.type = SHIFT;
rekeyM sg^ (level, ID, isRght, anchor.rmvRekev(N), anchor.rmvRekev(Nghbr));
done = true; breakWhile; } 
else
{ ID = anchor.merge(N, Nghbr); N = anchor; 
rekeyMsg<-(ID, isRght, anchor.mrgRekev(Nghbr. isRght)); 
if ((N.sizeO > Min_d) or ((N equals root) and (N.size() > 1))) 




if (not done )
then { if (N equals root) then free root; else root = N.childAt(O); 
rekeyMsg.type = DECREASE; decrement h; }
}
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO; 
rekeyMsg G  N.rmvRekev(prevN): } 
if (rekeyMsg.typeO does-not-equal DECREASE) 
then rekeyMsg <r GK.rmvRekevfroot); 
return rekeyMsg;
Fig. 34. The B^-LKH group member removal and RM construction algorithm.
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4.3.5 Algorithms Analysis
Analyzing AddMember and RemoveMember algorithms for a B^-LKH of height h, 
TABLE IV illustrates RM ’s (shown in Fig. 26) different field sizes for all group member 
addition and removal cases (RM type), where RM level equals L. TABLE V illustrates 
the different rekey packet sizes when encryption-based or XORBP KDT is used, where 
Enc_K  is the encrypted key size in bytes, and S  is the XORBP rekey packet size. As 
previously mentioned, for a B^-LKH of degree d, Min_d is the minimum number o f non­
root node entries that is equal to Li/ / 2 j .
TABLE IV





Number o f  
addRekey 
packets (nA)
Number o f  
rmvRekey 
packets (nR)
Number o f  
mrgRekey 
packets (nM)
ADD 1 0 h 0 0
SPLIT k - L 0 L + \ 2 x ( h - L - \ ) 0
INCREASE h + \ 0 1 2 x h 0
REMOVE 1 0 0 h 0
MERGE h - L h - L - \ 0 L +  \ h - L - \
SHIFT h - L h - L - \ 0 L +  3 h - L - 2
DECREASE h h - \ 0 0 h - 1
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TABLE V
REKEY PACKET SIZE FOR ENCRYPTION-BASED AND XORBP KDTS
Encryption-based XORBP
addRekey packet size 2 X Ena _ K S
rmvRekey packet size e x E n c  _ K
w h ereM in _ d < e < d  ( e i s  the 
number o f  children for that key  
entry node)
S
mrgRekey packet size Min _ d  X E n c_ K S
Number o f  keys generated nA +  nR + nM nA +  nR +  nM
Number o f  encoded BPs (A  BP is 
K  numbers in the range [0:5 -1])
0 nA +  nR +  nM  - 1
Number o f  xored  BPs 0 nM  X { M in _ d - V )  for MERGE 
and DECREASE  
nM  X { M in _ d  - \ )  + I  for SHIFT 
0 otherwise
4.4 B'^-LKH Rekey Client Processing
The rekey client is the software component at every group member that receives RMs 
and updates the client maintained set of keys. The rekey client initially receives initMsg 
that initializes the variables ID, position, h, d, and Min_d (calculated from d). The 
position is represented as an array of size h, where position{Qi\ identifies the child node 
number of LKH root node. In addition, the rekey client maintains a list o f keys key List of 
size {h + 1), where its first element (entry number 0) is his individual key and its last 
element (entry number h) is GK. When the client receives initMsg he inserts his 
individual key in a newly created keyList. Then the client keeps receiving rekeyMsg to 
update his keys.
Updating keyList[\\ from a rekey packet depends on whether the KDT is encryption- 
based or XORBP. If  an encryption-based KDT is used, selecting the key encKey to be
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decrypted depends on the rekey packet type {addRekey, rmvRekey, or mrgRekey) and 
positional). The selected encKey is decrypted either with its previous version, or with 
keyList\i-\). On the other hand if  XORJBP is used, updating keyList\i\ is symmetric for all 
packet types and uses keyListli-l) and its associated BP to get the new version o f the key. 
For every updated key, except GK, the associated BP is updated from the encodedBP in 
the same rekey packet. The individual BP that is associated to the individual key 
{keyList[G\) is sent in the initialization message initMsg.
When the rekey client receives rekeyMsg he compares his position with 
rekeyMsg.position to decide on the starting matching level {match) where he should start 
updating his keyList. For example, if the member individual is in the leaf node that has 
the inserted/deleted entry match will be 2. If the member individual entry is in a leaf node 
that has the same parent o f the directly affected leaf node match will be 3, and so on. If 
position has no intersection with rekeyMsg position then match is set to {h + \). The 
following code fragment illustrates how to adjust match. Note that, match equals 1 only 
at the new individual (i.e., his rekey client software component).
match = -1; 
for (i = 0 to (h-1))
if {position)}) equals rekeyMsg.position\\^ 
then match = i; 
else breakFor; 
match = h -  match', 
if {match equals 1) then match = 2;
After deciding on match, the update procedure is triggered by rekeyMsg.type and 
executed to update keyList. There are six different update procedures according to 
rekeyMsg type. The following is the Simple update procedure called when rekeyMsg.Type 
equals ADD or REMOVE. A group member whose match equals 2 and his ID is greater 
than the inserted/deleted ID experiences a change in his individual leaf node position. 
This individual leaf position is incremented by 1 if  a new individual entry is inserted and 
is decremented by 1 if an individual entry is deleted. In addition, a group member updates
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his keyList from the corresponding rekey packets according to his match. A group 
member whose match equals 2 updates all h keys, while a group member whose match 
equals (A + 1) updates only one key {GK). Please see Appendix B for detailed rekey 
client update procedures and an example.
if {{match equals 2) and {ID > rekeyMsg.ID\Oyj) 
then if {rekeyMsg.type equals ADD) 
then increm entposition{h-\\, 
else decrem entposition[h-l\, 
for (i = {match - 2) to (A -  1))
keyList.update(i + 1, rekeyMsg.packet[i])',
4.5 Experim ental Results
We have implemented the rekey manager and the rekey client in Java'^“[[62]. Both S- 
LKH and B^-LKH protocols are available for use with an encryption-based or XORBP 
KDT. In the following experiments, we compare the performance of an unbalanced LKH 
(S-LKH) versus a balanced LKH (B'^-LKH). First, an experiment is performed to study 
the frequency o f the different rekey message (RM) types in both add and remove 
rekeyings. Second, the simulated group dynamics in the experiments is explained. Third, 
an experiment is performed to compare S-LKH and B'^-LKH rekey costs. Fourth, an 
experiment is performed to study the effect o f LKH degree and group dynamics on S- 
LKH and B’* -̂LKH rekey costs and storage.
4.5.1 Frequency of Different Addition and Removal Cases
This experiment illustrates the frequency o f different RM types in the addition and 
the removal rekey cases for both S-LKH and B’̂ -LKH protocols. The LKH degree d  is 
increased from 2 to 10. For every LKH degree, the group size n increases from 32 to 
2048 in multiples of 2. For every d and «, 10 LKHs are constructed by a sequence o f n 
member additions then n member removals. A new unique random ID is generated for 
every new member. The removed member is randomly chosen from the existing
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members. For every constructed LKH, the frequency o f different RM types is recorded. 
We have noticed that the frequency o f each RM type depends on LKH degree and 
doesn’t depend on the group size.
Fig. 35 and Fig. 36 illustrate the frequency of different RM types for S-LKH protocol 
in the addition and removal rekey cases, respectively. We can observe that the frequency 
of the simplest rekey cases (ADD & REMOVE) increases with LKH degree increase, and 
are occurring more than 80% of the time for a LKH degree greater than 8.
Fig. 37 and Fig. 38 illustrate the frequency of different RM types for B^-LKH 
protocol in the addition and removal rekey cases, respectively. Similarly, we can observe 
that the simplest rekey cases are occurring more than 80% of the time for a LKH degree 
greater than 8. In addition, the most expensive rekey cases (INCREASE & DECREASE) 
are occurring less than 1% of the time for any LKH degree.
■©— a d d  SPLIT -£r-IN C R E A SE
100
0 2 4 6
LKH degree
8 10 12
Fig. 35. Frequency o f add RM type for the S-LKH protocol.
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LKH  degree
Fig. 36. Frequency of remove RM type for the S-LKH protocol.
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Fig. 37. Frequency of add RM type for the B'^-LKH protocol.
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Fig. 38. Frequency o f remove RM for the B'^-LKH protocol.
4.5.2 G roup Dynamics
To simulate group dynamics, a LKH is constructed by a sequence of aN  member 
additions followed by a sequence of rN  member removal. The group size n = aN  - r N , 
and the group dynamic ratio gdr is defined to be gdr = rN / a N . If  the group is static 
(i.e., no member is removed) gdr = 0. For gdr = 0.4, the group size is 60% of the added 
members (i.e., n = 60% aN). To have a group of size n > 0, gdr value has to be in the 
range [0,1 [.
When an encryption-based KDT is used, the rekey message cost is measured as the 
total number o f encrypted keys in a RM (in all rekey packets). On the other hand, when 
XORBP KDT is used, the rekey message cost is measured as the number o f rekey packets 
in a RM.
In the following experiments, we compare the rekey performance of S-LKH versus 
B^-LKH for the same LKH degree, group size, and group dynamic ratio. For every 
protocol, and the parameters {d, n, gdr), we construct 100 LKHs. For every constructed 
LKH, its height and the number o f allocated nodes (LKH storage) are recorded. Then, 10
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readings for rekey message cost in both add and remove rekey cases (i.e., a remove 
member followed by add member 10 times) are recorded. The plotted number of 
allocated nodes is the average of 100 readings, and the plotted rekey message cost is the 
average of 1000 reading.
4.5.3 S-LKH and B^-LKH Rekey Cost
This experiment compares the behavior o f add and remove rekey costs for S-LKH 
versus B^-LKH protocols in terms o f number of rekey packets and number o f encrypted 
keys. The experiment is performed for LKH degree d = A, group size n = 8192, and gdr = 
0.4.
Fig. 39 and Fig. 40 illustrate, for both protocols, the frequency o f the different values 
obtained for the number o f rekey packets in a RM in add and remove rekeyings, 
respectively. We can observe the symmetry between the two figures (i.e., add and rekey 
symmetric cost in terms of the number o f rekey packets in a RM). In addition, we can 
observe that using the S-LKH protocol, the number o f rekey packets in a RM spans a 
wider range of values when compared to the B’̂ -LKH protocol.
-©—  add S-LKH - - -X- - - add B+-LKH
120
100 -
s  60 - S'
^  40 -
20  -
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
number o f  rekey p a ck e ts
Fig. 39. Frequency o f number o f rekey packets in add rekey message.
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Fig. 40. Frequency of number of rekey packets in remove rekey message.
Fig. 41 and Fig. 42 illustrate, for both protocols, the frequency o f the different values 
obtained for the number o f encrypted keys in a RM in add and remove rekeyings, 
respectively. We can observe the un-symmetry between the two figures. Similarly, the 
rekey cost in terms o f the number of encrypted keys spans a wider range o f values when 
used with the S-LKH protocol compared to B^-LKH. The S-LKjH wider range o f cost 
values is due to the un-balanced LKH that implies the existence of leaf nodes at different 
levels from the root node.
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Fig. 41. Frequency of number of encrypted keys in add rekey message.
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Fig. 42. Frequency of number of encrypted keys in remove rekey message.
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TABLE VI summarizes the different rekey cost metrics for S-LKH versus B'^-LKH 
protocols when d — 4,n=  8192, and gdr =0.4. TABLE VII summarizes the results when d 
= 4, smaller group size n = 512, and gdr = 0.4. TABLE VIII summarizes the results when 
LKH is having larger degree d = 8, large group size n = 8192, and gdr = 0.4.
From the previous results, we can conclude that the rekey cost maintains the same 
behavior for all group sizes and LKH degrees. The use o f B^-LKH protocol increases the 
average number o f rekey packets and the average number o f encrypted keys in a RM 
when compared to S-LKH protocol. On the other hand, the use o f B”̂ -LKH decreases the 
average LKH height, the number o f allocated nodes, and the maximum number of 
encrypted keys. The maximum number of encrypted keys (or the rekey packets) is used 
in estimating the minimum time that has to be elapsed between two consecutive 
rekeyings.
TABLE VI
S-LKH VERSUS B'^-LKH REKEY COST FOR (J  = 4; n =8192; gdr = 0.4)
S-LKH B^-LKH
Average LKH height. 11.09 9
Average LKH number o f  allocated nodes. 6485.72 5703.754
A ddM em ber average number o f  rekey packets. 8 9.028
AddM em ber maximum number o f  rekey packets. 12 12
Rem oveM em ber average number o f  rekey packets. 7.542 9.282
Rem oveM em ber maximum number o f  rekey packets. 11 10
AddM em ber average number o f  encrypted keys. 16,041 18.084
AddM em ber maximum number o f  encrypted keys. 25 27
Rem oveM em ber average number o f  encrypted keys. 26.81 25.835
Rem oveM em ber maximum number o f  encrypted keys. 40 32
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TABLE VII.
S-LKH VERSUS B+-LKH REKEY COST FOR (rf= 4; « =512; g d r ^ Q A )
S-LKH B'^-LKH
Average LKH height. l A 6.11
Average LKH number o f  allocated nodes. 404.007 353.559
A ddM em ber average number o f  rekey packets. 5.782 6.151
A ddM em ber maximum number o f  rekey packets. 9 8
Rem oveM em ber average number o f  rekey packets. 5.306 6.412
Rem oveM em ber maximum number o f  rekey packets. 8 8
A ddM em ber average number o f  encrypted keys. 11.637 12.343
A ddM em ber maximum number o f  encrypted keys. 19 18
R em oveM em ber average number o f  encrypted keys. 17.912 17.873
Rem oveM em ber maximum number o f  encrypted keys. 29 23
TABLE VIII.
S-LKH VERSUS B^-LKH REKEY COST FOR (J  = 8; « =8192; gdr  = 0.4)
S-LKH b l l k h
Average LKH height. 6.16 6
Average LKH number o f  allocated nodes. 3108.134 2168.812
A ddM em ber average number o f  rekey packets. 5.171 6.001
A ddM em ber maximum number o f  rekey packets. 7 7
Rem oveM em ber average number o f  rekey packets. 5.141 6.338
Rem oveM em ber maximum number o f  rekey packets. 7 7
A ddM em ber average number o f  encrypted keys. 10.352 12.007
A ddM em ber maximum number o f  encrypted keys. 19 19
Rem oveM em ber average number o f  encrypted keys. 32.986 30.488
Rem oveM em ber maximum number o f  encrypted keys. 45 39
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4.5.4 Effect of G roup Dynamics and LK H  Degree
If encryption-based KDT is used the optimal LKH degree is 4, and the total number 
of encrypted keys in a RM is the rekey cost metric. When XORBP KDT is used, the 
number o f rekey packets in a RM is used as a rekey cost metric. In this experiment, we 
study how the group dynamics and LKH degree affect the number of rekey packets (for 
XORBP KDT) in a RM and the number of allocated nodes in LKH (LKH storage). As we 
concluded from the previous experiment (section 4.5.3), add and remove rekey costs are 
symmetric in terms o f the number of rekey packets in a RM.
The group size n = 512, and LKH degree is increased from 4 to 32 in increments of 4 
(i.e. 4, 8, 12, ..., and 32). Fig. 43 illustrates, for S-LKH and B'^-LKH protocols, the 
average number o f rekey packets in a RM for static group {gdr = 0). Fig. 44 illustrates the 
results when gdr = 0.4. We can observe that the B^-LKH protocol introduces a slight 
increase in the average number of rekey packets in a RM over S-LKH protocol. 
Comparing Fig. 43 and Fig. 44, we can conclude that this increase is slightly affected by 
the group dynamics. Note that this increase is for individual rekeying (i.e. single add or 
remove rekey). In chapter V, we present batch rekeying for a sequence o f add and/or 











Fig. 43. Average number of rekey packets in a RM, where gdr = 0, and n = 512.
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Fig. 44. Average number of rekey packets in a RM, where gdr = 0.4, and n = 512.
S-LKH increases the number of LKH allocated nodes when compared to B^-LKH 
(section 4.5.3). If  the number o f allocated nodes for S-LKH and B^-LKH are sLKHS and 
bLKHS, respectively. The S-LKH pereentile increase in the number of allocated nodes 
can be calculated as inc -  (sLKHS -  bLKHs)x 1001 bLK H S. Fig. 45 illustrates inc for 
group size n = 512, and gdr = 0, gdr = 0.2, and gdr -  0.4. We can observe that, the 
increase inc has a non-linear relation with the LKH degree. Howerver, inc increases with 
the increase of group dynamics. Fig. 46 illustrates inc when the group size « = 8192, and 
group dynamies ratio is 0, and 0.4. Similarly, the S-LKH percentile increase (inc) in 
allocated storage over B^-LKH increases with the increase of group dynamics and attains 
80% for gdr = 0.4. We have noticed that inc peaks when the group size (n) is near an 
exact power of d. For example when « = 512 me peaks at d = 8 (8'^B = 512), and d = 2A  
(24^2 = 576), and when « = 8192 inc peaks at d  =20 (20'^3 = 8000). In this case, the B"*̂- 
LKH maintenance algorithms keeps much less number o f nodes than the S-LKH ones.
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Fig. 45. S-LKH average number o f nodes increase over B'^-LKH, where n = 512.













________ 8________17 16 2 0  24  37
LKH degree
Fig. 46. S-LKH average number of nodes increase over B’̂ -LKH, where n = 8192.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, two novel techniques for LKH maintenance and their associated rekey 
protocols are presented. The new techniques are based on the rekey manager assigning a 
unique individual identification (ID) for each group member. In both techniques, the 
LKH plays a dual role as a key tree and as an easily searchable data structure for 
individual material (ID, key, IP address, name, ...etc) using individual IDs. The proposed 
techniques detail the LKH node structure, the rekey message format, the LKH insertion 
and deletion algorithms along with the rekey message constmction for different insertion 
and deletion scenarios. Moreover, the rekey client processing to different rekey message 
types is presented. The first technique, denoted S-LKH, maintains LKH as unbalanced 
search tree using individual IDs as search values. The traditional search tree insertion and 
deletion algorithms are adapted to the constraint that individual materials are always 
entries in leaf nodes. The second technique, denoted B’̂ -LKH, maintains LKH as a 
balanced search tree that has the same stmcture as S-LKH. In addition, a search tree 
has two additional constraints. The first constraint is, all leaf nodes are always at the 
same distance from the root (i.e. balanced). The second constraint is, all non-root node 
are always at least half full. These constraints introduce complexity and extra overhead in 
the rekey message and the rekey client processing.
We performed empirical experiments to study and compare the behavior of S-LKH 
and B’̂ -LKH protocols. The first experiment concludes that the frequency of the simplest 
RM tjqies (simple insertion and deletion scenarios) increases with LKH degree increase 
for both protocols. The frequency of the simplest RM types is more than 80% for LKH 
degree greater than 8. For B'^-LKH protocol, the frequency o f the most expensive RM 
type is less than 1% for any LKH degree. Other experiments illustrate that the use of B^- 
LKH protocol increases the average number of rekey packets and the average number of 
encrypted keys (if encryption-based KDT is used) in a RM over S-LKH. On the other 
hand, the use of B^-LKH decreases LKH height, the maximum number of encrypted keys 
in a RM, and the number of LKH allocated nodes (LKH storage). The S-LKH increase 
over B^-LKH in the number o f allocated nodes increases with increased group dynamics 
and attains more than 80% for highly dynamic groups (current group size = 60% number 
of added members).
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In chapter IV, the rekey is performed for one group member addition or removal. In 
chapter V, batch rekeying for more than one group member addition and/or removal is 
introduced. For batch rekeying, B^-LKH protocol rekey cost outperforms S-LKH 
protocol.
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CHAPTER V 
BATCH PROCESSING OF GROUP REKEYING
In chapter IV, we focused on individual rekeying, i.e. rekeying after each join and 
leave request. Individual rekeying is not a practical solution. For example, if  the inter­
arrival time (time between two join requests) o f group members at the start o f a session is 
very small; the inter-rekey time (time between two consecutive rekeyings) will be 
consequently very small and a new group key might be issued by the rekey manager 
before the previous key version has reached (or has been used by) the group members. 
Periodic rekeying has been suggested to alleviate this problem [45], [59], [69]. Periodic 
rekeying suggests rekeying after a fixed period o f time that is large enough to avoid the 
above problem. Periodic rekeying requires a rekeying for a batch o f requests, i.e., for 
accumulated join and leave requests during this period. Researchers suggested that the 
expiration o f a rekey period triggers the rekeying process. Such approach does not take 
into account the batch size or the join/leave request delay during the rekey period.
This chapter introduces a generalized rekey policy definition based on three main 
parameters that determine the triggering condition for the rekeying process. The three 
main parameters are batch size, maximum join or leave request delay (time between 
receiving the request and the start of the rekeying process), and the minimum inter-rekey 
period (a minimum period of time that has to be elapsed between two consecutive 
rekeyings). The defined rekey policy provides versatile configuration options to the rekey 
triggering condition. The rekey policy can be simply used to provide periodic rekeying as 
well as other complex rekeying conditions as configured by the application. In addition, a 
simplified view of the software objects that are used to provide secure group key 
management is presented. Moreover, the batch rekey message format and construction 
are presented. When LKH key management is used, individual rekeying requires 
generating and distributing a set of keys that fall in a LKH path from an inserted/deleted 
leaf node to the root. On the other hand, batch rekeying requires generating and 
distributing a set of keys that compose a sub-tree o f the original LKH. The rekey sub-tree
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is composed o f the individual LKH paths o f the inserted and/or deleted leaf nodes to the 
root. The batch rekey sub-tree construction for the B^-LKH protocol is detailed.
For individual rekeying, the use o f B^-LKH protocol introduces major LKH storage 
(number o f allocated nodes) savings and slightly more rekey processing than the use o f S- 
LKH protocol (see section 4.5.3). In this chapter, it will be demonstrated, through 
empirical experiments that using the B'^-LKH protocol for batch rekeying substantially 
reduces rekey processing overhead when compared to the S-LKH protocol with large 
batch sizes and/or high group dynamics. In addition, our experiments show that B”̂ -LKH 
rekey performance is stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while S-LKH rekey 
performance deteriorates as the group dynamics increases. Such S-LKH instability is due 
to the fact that the minimum number o f node entries is one, while for B^-LKH nodes 
have to be at least half full.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 presents the motivation for 
introducing the rekey policy parameters. Section 5.2 details the proposed rekey policy 
definition. Section 5.3 presents a simplified view o f the secure group key management 
software objects. Section 5.4 illustrates the batch rekey message, and the general batch 
rekeying process performed by a rekey manager that maintains S-LKH or B^-LKH. 
Section 5.5 presents experimental results that compare S-LKH versus B’̂ -LKH protocols 
for batch rekeying. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section 5.6.
5.1 Motivation
Changing the group key is very expensive in terms o f processing time, and bandwidth 
consumption. According to the software model introduced in section 3.1, the rekeying 
process time has three major time components: 1) RM construction by the rekey 
manager; 2) RM transmission from the rekey manager to all group members through a 
reliable group rekey channel; 3) RM processing by a rekey client. The rekey cost (time 
and bandwidth) at the rekey manager depends mainly on the group size, the key 
management protocol, the rekey manager processing power, the network bandwidth and 
delay, and the rekey transport protocol. The existence of a central group key manager 
(and a rekey manager) allows heterogeneous members’ environments and the client 
processing is minimized. On the other hand, the group key manager is receiving the
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group members’ requests to join and leave the group, and is responsible for rekeying the 
group when it deems necessary. Periodic batch processing is introduced as a practical 
solution for frequent group rekeying [45], [59], [69]. For batch of requests, the rekey 
manager generates one RM that includes group keys’ updates due to a set o f group 
members joining and/or leaving the group. Almeroth and Ammar [1] demonstrate that for 
different group applications, the inter-arrival time and member joining duration are 
exponential in nature. Simple periodic rekeying does not take into account the possibility 
o f no join or leave requests accumulating during a rekey period. Consequently, the 
proposed batch rekey policy has three main parameters, minimum inter-rekey period, 
batch size, and maximum request delay.
The minimum time between two consecutive rekeyings, denoted inter-rekey period, 
has to be greater than the expected (maximum) time needed to rekey the group. 
Otherwise, a new group key will be issued before its previous version is ever used. The 
need for the group key manager to guarantee minimum time interval between two 
consecutive rekeyings makes it essential to process a batch of requests. Moreover, to 
avoid a group startup implosion it is required to delay the initial creation of the group key 
for a suitable time period. The initial creation o f the group (key) is processed as a batch 
processing for multiple new members addition.
LKH batch rekeying requires updating a set o f keys that compose a sub-tree of the 
original LKH. The rekey sub-tree is constmcted from all the added/removed leaf node 
paths to the root. Li et al. [45] show that, for a group o f size n and LKH of degree 4 
(optimal LKH degree for encryption-based KDT), if an all add requests batch size is 
greater than n il or an all remove requests batch size is greater than n!A the use o f LKH 
key management is worse than the use o f star key management (chapter III). In both 
cases, the number of encr)q)ted keys in a RM is equal to or greater than the group size n. 
That necessitates taking the batch size into consideration when designing a rekey policy.
The maximum request delay is defined to be the maximum time to be elapsed from 
the group key manager receiving the request and the start of the rekeying process. The 
maximum request delay is a major security concern. This delay determines the maximum 
period a group member will wait after he joins the group before being able to receive any 
group communication. Moreover, this delay determines the maximum period a group
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member will be able to keep receiving the group communication after he leaves the 
group.
We can observe that simple periodic rekeying only guarantees a fixed time interval 
between two rekeyings but doesn’t take into consideration the batch size and/or the 
maximum request delay. For some applications one o f the above parameters might be of 
more interest and easier to estimate while the others are irrelevant or hard to estimate. For 
example, a cable network application might require a maximum request delay o f 2 days 
that triggers the rekeying process, i.e. members wait at most 2 days to be added/removed 
to the network. Another example is a video conferencing application that requires a 
minimum inter-rekey period of 1 minute and a maximum request delay o f 3 minutes.
The rekey policy parameters can be estimated from the group characteristics (the 
above time components), and other resource constraints such as the allowed usage of 
processing power and/or bandwidth. For example, the rekeying process might be allowed 
only 10% of the machine processing power, and no more than 5 kbps of bandwidth 
usage.
The necessity of changing the group key because o f a new member joined the group 
(perfect backward secrecy/PBS), or a member left the group (perfect forward 
secrecy/FFS) depends on the application. For example, for a group o f students meeting in 
a virtual classroom there is no need to change the group key when a member joins the 
group late (he is allowed to join from the start). On the other hand, for members joining a 
video-on-demand provider it is essential to change the group key when a new member 
joins or leaves the group. Note that, if  the application only requires perfect backward 
secrecy, a simple non-LKH protocol can be used. The use o f an LKH protocol is essential 
when perfect forward secrecy is required, and that is our concern.
5.2 Rekey Policy Definition
The group key manager is configured by the group rekey policy as to when the group 
rekeying should be performed. The rekey policy determines the timing o f both the initial 
group key creation and the further rekeying condition. It is assumed that the rekey policy 
is static for simpler design and analysis. A dynamic adjustment to the policy parameters 
is left for future research.
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The group key manager accumulates the requests in a batch. As previously mentioned 
in chapter III, the requests are inserted in the batch as messages are received from the 
authentication manager to add, remove, or refresh group members, namely Add(M), 
Remove(M), and Refresh(M), respectively, where M is a member identification, e.g., his 
name. The member refresh request is introduced to allow an easy recovery o f a group 
member after short time o f failure (please see chapter VI for more details). Refreshing a 
group member, assumes the group member temporarily lost his set o f keys and requires 
sending him the same set of keys he was holding (as if he newly joined) without 
regenerating those keys. The accumulated requests are removed from the batch when a 
rekeying is initiated. The S-LKH and B'''-LKH protocols assume the rekey manager 
generates a unique ID for every group member that is used as a search value in 
constructing LKH. The request identification M is assumed to be different than ID (M 
might be used to generate the ID). The member identification M is required to be unique 
in the batch, while it can be replicated throughout LKH individual entries (each entry will 
have different ID).
The first policy parameter is the rekey condition (RC) that has one of four possible 
values: PBS for perfect backward secrecy, PFS for perfect forward secrecy, PBaFS for 
perfect backward and forward services, and NONE when no secrecy is required. Note 
that, if  RC equals PBS or NONE there is no need to use an LKH protocol, but we allow 
their use with an LKH protocol for dynamic policy changes (e.g., used only during part of 
a session). In addition, if  there is no change of keys due to a batch o f requests (e.g., RC is 
PFS and the batch contains only add requests), the rekey manager still needs to construct 
a rekey message RM that updates the group members o f changes about positions (due to 
the new individual entries insertions), newly created keys, and/or removed keys.
The second set of parameters determines the timing of the first group key creation, 
and has two components initASize and initMaxDelay. The third set o f parameters 
determines the timing o f the following rekeyings, and has three components 
rekeyBatchSize, rekeyMinWait, and rekeyMaxDelay.
The batchSize {initASize or rekeyBatchSize) determines the rekeying condition 
according to rekeyMinWait and maxDelay {initMaxDelay or rekeyMaxDelay) values as 
will be described in section 5.3, and its minimum value is one. We assume that a value of
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zero for minWait or maxDelay means this parameter is undetermined (not important to 
the application). The maxDelay (if greater than zero) is the maximum delay a request can 
be held in the batch before start o f rekeying. The minWait (if greater than is zero) is the 
minimum time that has to be elapsed between two consecutive rekeyings. Note that, 
maxDelay > minWait.
The batchSize parameter is compared to the current batch size, denoted BS. The batch 
size, BS, could simply be the total number o f requests inserted in the batch, or a weighted 
sum of every request type as in equation (1). Where AS, RS, and FS  are the number of 
entries in the batch (size) of Add, Remove, and Refresh requests respectively. And a, r, 
and /  are the different weights o f the different request types. The weights are policy 
parameters, e.g., if  RC equals PBS it might be o f interest to give more weight to member 
removal requests than any other requests.
BS = a x A S  + r x R S  + f x F S  (1)
In summary, the following are the rekey policy parameters;
• RC: the rekey condition that has four possible values: PBS, PFS, PBaFS, and NONE.
• a, r, &f .  weights used for batch size BS  computation.
• initASize, & initMaxDelay. initial batch size (all add requests) and initial maximum 
request delay that are used to specify the time o f the initial group key creation.
• rekeyBatchSize, rekeyMinWait, & rekeyMaxDelay: batch size, minimum inter-rekey
period, and maximum request delay that are used to specify the time o f further
rekeyings.
Where the minimum allowed value for initASize and rekeyBatchSize is one, and 
rekeyMaxDelay has to greater than or equal to rekeyMin Wait.
The application has the flexibility o f using all or some of the policy parameters as a 
deciding factor for triggering the rekey process. The type of the application determines 
what blend of parameters is taken into consideration. For example, an application that 
requires periodic rekeying every 3 minutes will have the following rekey policy:
• RC = PBaFS: backwards and forward secrecy are both required.
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• a = r  = / = l : all request types (add, remove and refresh) have the same weight.
• initASize — rekeyBatchSize -  1: there is at least one request in the batch for the group 
key creation or a rekeying to be initiated.
• initMaxDelay = 5 minutes: wait 5 minutes after the first group member joins before 
creating the group key.
• rekeyMinWait = rekeyMaxDelay = 3 minutes: guarantee minimum inter-rekey period 
of 3 minutes, and maximum request delay o f 3 minutes. In this case, if  the requests’ 
inter-arrival time is less than or equal to 3 minutes, a rekey will be periodically 
initiated every 3 minutes.
5.3 G roup Key M anagem ent Software Design
Fig. 47 illustrates a simplified view o f the software objects designed to provide secure 
group key management and their main interactions. A GroupKeyManager object is 
instantiated using instances of the RekeyPolicy (rekeyPolicy) and the RekeyManager 
(rekeyManager) as parameters. A RekeyManager object is instantiated with the rekey 
manager configuration such as use o f B'^-LKH or S-LKH rekey protocol, LKH degree, 
and use of XORRBP or encryption-based ICDT. A GroupKeyManager instantiates a 
Batch {batch). Timer {timer), and Scheduler {scheduler) objects. The different objects’ 
functionalities are as follows:
• The RekeyPolicy object provides methods for accessing (and setting) the policy 
parameters.
• The RekeyManager object maintains the group LKH and applies the rekey protocol. 
The RekeyManager provides the rekey{batch) method that takes the batch o f requests 
as a parameter and constructs the rekey message RM and sends it to all group 
members. Moreover, the rekey method sets the rekeyTime to the time when the 
rekeying is started, empties the batch, and sets minWaitFlag to false, where 
rekeyTime and min WaitFlag are variables maintained by the scheduler.
• The Batch object provides methods for adding, removing, and accessing request 
messages, in addition to methods for configuring the batch size computation and a 
method to get the current batch size size{).
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The Timer object provides a timed call to the RekeyManager'5 method rekey{batch), 
where a thread is initialized when timer's method start{TS, PRD) is called to wait for 
certain {sleepTime - T S  -  PRD  -  currentTimeQ) before calling the rekey method, 
where TS is a time stamp o f an action, and PRD  is a period that has to be elapsed 
before initiating the rekey starting from TS. In addition, timer provides a method for 
interrupting and canceling the current waiting thread (stopQ), if  such thread is 
running. Moreover, timer provides a method that gets the current time-stamp 
timeStampQ.
The Scheduler object provides checkRekeyQ method that uses the rekeyPolicy to 
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. ̂  method call
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Fig. 47. Simplified view o f the main group key management software objects.
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When a groupKeyManager receives a request message (through a method call), it 
inserts the request in the batch after it is stamped with the current time-stamp, followed 
by a call to the scheduler’s checkRekeyO method. If  the received request is Remove(M) 
and the batch contains Add(M) or Refresh(M) request, the old request is deleted and the 
new request is not inserted (e.g., when a member is removed a short time after he joined 
the group and before a rekey is initiated). If  the received request is Add(M) and the batch 
contains Remove(M) request, the Remove(M) request is deleted and a Refresh(M) is 
inserted (e.g., when a group member recovers after short time o f failure). The member 
identification M identifies a unique request in the batch. It is assumed that the group key 
manager will not receive a re-add request o f an existing group member, or a remove 
request o f a nonexistent member.
The scheduler that uses the rekeyPolicy to trigger a batch rekeying process has three 
different states as follows:
• min Wait = maxDelay = 0. In this case, the batch rekeying is initialized as soon as the 
batch size reaches the batchSize determined by the rekey policy.
• maxDelay > 0 and m inW ait = 0. In this case, if  the arrival rate o f requests 
accumulates batchSize requests in the batch before maxDelay expires for the first 
batch request (the oldest), then the batch rekeying is initiated immediately. 
Otherwise, batch rekeying is initiated as soon as maxDelay expires for the oldest 
batch entry.
• maxDelay > minW ait > 0. In this case, if  there is a slow arrival rate (accumulation) of 
requests in the batch, then maxDelay controls when the rekeying is initiated (batch 
size never reaches batchSize). On the other hand, if  there is a fast arrival rate of 
requests in the batch, then minWait controls the minimum inter-rekey period by 
holding the rekeying process for a while when the batch size quickly reaches 
batchSize.
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5.4 Rekey Sub-Tree Construction
In LKH group key management protocols, batch rekeying requires updating 
(generating and distributing) a set of LKH keys that compose a LKH sub-tree (denoted 
rekey sub-tree). The rekey sub-tree is composed of all LKH keys that fall on the paths of 
the inserted/deleted leaf nodes to the root. The rekey sub-tree size is the number o f LKH 
keys that needs to be updated and therefore it represents the rekey cost.
Assuming the batch rekeying is initiated for a batch o f requests, where the number of 
Add requests is AS, the number of Remove requests is RS, and the number of Refresh 
requests is FS. To reduce the rekey cost, the rekey sub-tree constmction should minimize 
the rekey sub-tree size. There are three batch LKH update cases for such minimization as 
follows:
• A S  = RS. Every new individual leaf entry replaces a removed individual leaf entry in 
the LKH. In this case, every new group member will be assigned the same individual 
ID o f a removed group member.
• A S  > RS. The RS  removed individual entries are replaced by RS  new individual 
entries, then the rest o f the new individual entries are inserted into LKH. In this case, 
the number o f newly added individual entries to LKH is nA, where nA = AS - R S .
• A S  <  RS. The AS  new individual entries replace A S  removed individual entries, then 
the rest o f the removed individual entries are deleted from LKH. In this case, the 
number of deleted individual entries from LKH is nR, where nR = RS -  A S .
The LKH rekey sub-tree, denoted rekeyTree, is constructed to contain the keys that 
are affected by the replacement, the insertion, or the deletion o f the updated leaf entries. 
In addition, rekeyTree contains the keys to be sent to the refreshed members {PR requests 
in the batch). An inserted, deleted or refreshed leaf entry LKH position determines the set 
of keys that are inserted in the rekey sub-tree. For example. Fig. 48 illustrates a B'^-LKH 
and batch of 4 add requests, 2 remove requests, and 2 refresh requests. The two remove 
requests positions are marked “Rplc” for replacing by 2 add requests, the other 2 add 
requests positions are marked “Add”, and the 2 refresh requests positions are marked 
“Rfrsh”. The key nodes that are inserted in the rekey sub-tree for such batch of updates 
are grayed. Note that, a new key node “ K 3 . 3 ”  is inserted to the original LKH to
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
123
accommodate the new entries. Please consult appendix C for the detailed B'^-LKH 
rekeyTree construction example.
®  S ...
t
Add
Rfrsh Rfrsh Rplc t
Add
Rplc
The gray connected key nodes compose the rekey sub-tree.
Fig. 48. An Example of a B^-LKFI, a batch of requests, and a rekey sub-tree.
There are four possible values of the rekey condition RC in a rekey policy that require 
LKH key changes as follows:
• PBS: a new member shouldn’t be able to recover previous group keys (before he 
joins).
• PFS: a removed member shouldn’t be able to recover new group keys (after he 
leaves).
• PBaFS: both above conditions should be satisfied
• NONE: no secrecy is required but LKH maintenance is necessary.
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The rekeyTree is a LKH sub-tree that contains all LKH keys that need to he updated 
(i.e., regenerated and distributed to group member) for a batch of requests and the rekey 
condition RC determined from the rekey policy should always be satisfied. According to 
RC value, a rekeyTree key node is either unlabeled or labeled by one of three labels “A”, 
“GA”, and “GR”. If  XORBP KDT is used, the rekey packet is constructed the same way 
for all labeled keys as described in section 3.4.1. If  encryption-based KDT is used, the 
key label determines how a rekey packet for distributing that key is constructed. If 
encryption-based KDT is used, the rekey packet is constructed for a rekeyTree key node, 
according to its label, as follows;
• No label: no rekey packet is constructed for that key.
• “A”: construct a rekey packet that contains the key encrypted with every child key 
inserted in the rekeyTree.
• “GA”: regenerate the key then construct a rekey packet that contains the newly 
generated key encrypted with its previous version, and with every child key inserted 
in the rekeyTree.
• “GR”: generate the key then construct a rekey packet that contains the newly
generated key encrypted with every child key in the original LKH.
Leaf key nodes inserted in the rekeyTree are always not labeled, (no packets are 
constructed for them) but they are used if their immediate parent is labeled “A” or “GA” 
as described above. When inserting a key in rekeyTree that already exists its label could 
be upgraded. The possible labels have the following precedence from lower to higher 
(“no label” < “A” < “GA” < “GR”). If the inserted key node (that already exists) is 
marked with a lower precedence label then it is upgraded, otherwise it is kept unchanged.
5.4.1 Rekey Message for a Batch of Requests
The format of the batch rekey message (RM) is illustrated in Fig. 49, where Addsize, 
RemoveSize, and RefreshSize is the number o f Add, Remove, and Refresh requests in the 
batch, respectively. Other message fields are explained next.
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SEO Add size Rem ove size Refresh size
ReplacedPositioni, ReplacedPosition2, . ..
RefreshedPositioni, RefreshedPosition2
Add/RemoveHeaderi, Add/RemoveHeader2, . ..
RekeyPacketi, RekeyPacket2,.
Fig. 49. The batch rekey message (RM) format.
The following is the general procedure for constructing the rekey sub-tree {rekeyTree)
and batch RM for batch o f requests (for both S-LKH and B"^-LKH rekey protocols).
1. The rekeyTree root is initialized to contain the group key GK with no label.
2. Find the position o f every replaced entry (added leaf entry in place of a removed leaf 
entry), replace the leaf entry in the original LKH and insert all the LKH keys in the 
path o f that position in the rekeyTree. The leaf key node has no label, while the label 
of all internal key nodes (including the root that contains GK) depends on the policy 
rekey condition, RC as follows.
if (RC equals PBS) then label = “GA”;
else if (RC equals NONE) then label =“A”; 
else label = “GR”;
In addition, an initial key message initMsg is constructed for every new member that 
contains his ID, position, LKH height, and LKH degree. Every replaced entry 
position is appended to the batch RM in the ReplacedPosition filed shown in Fig. 49.
3. Find the position o f every refreshed entry, refresh the entry in the original LKH 
(update the individual entry changed data) and insert all the keys in the path o f that 
position in the rekeyTree with the internal key node labeled “A”. In addition, an 
initial key message initMsg is constructed for every refreshed member that contains
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his ID, position, LKH height, and LKH degree. Every refreshed entry position is 
appended to batch RM in RefreshedPosition field shown in Fig. 49.
4. If  the number o f added entries nA is greater than zero (i.e., nR =0). For every added 
individual entry, add the individual leaf entry to the original LKH without any key 
generation and rekey packets construction. The S-LKH or B^-LKH AddMember 
method is called without new keys generation or rekey packets construction 
(underlined code in Fig. 24 and Fig. 29). In batch rekeying, the AddMember method 
retums the initMsg and the header of the rekeyMsg (all fields except the rekey 
packets) that is appended to RM shown in Fig. 49. Insert all keys corresponding to 
such leaf entry insertion to the rekeyTree according to the rekey condition RC, and 
position, type, and level from the header o f the rekeyMsg. Please consult appendix C 
for B^-LKH rekeyTree labeled insertion o f key nodes.
5. If the number of removed entries nR is greater than zero {nA =0). For every removed 
individual entry, remove the individual leaf entry from the original LBCH without any 
keys generation or rekey packets construction. The S-LKH or B^-LKH 
RemoveMember method is called without keys generation or rekey packets 
construction (underlined code in Fig. 25 and Fig. 34). In batch rekeying, the 
RemoveMember method retums the header of the rekeyMsg that is appended to RM 
shown in Fig. 49. Insert all keys corresponding to such leaf entry deletion to the 
rekeyTree according to the rekey condition RC, and position, type, level, and isRight 
array (only in B^-LKH) from the header o f the rekeyMsg Please consult appendix C 
for B^-LKH rekeyTree labeled insertion of key nodes.
6. Send the above constmcted initMsgs to all newly added members, and refreshed 
members. Constmct the batch RM (shown in Fig. 49) that will be sent to all group 
members. The batch RM contains the positions o f the replaced and refreshed entries, 
and the headers o f the added/removed leaf entries. In addition, a rekey packet is 
constmcted for every key node in the rekeyTree according to its label. The rekeyTree 
is parsed in post-order when constmcting the rekey packets where the children of a 
node are visited before their parent.
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5.5 Experim ental Results
The following experiments are performed to compare the performance o f S-LKH and 
B^-LKH batch rekey costs with change o f group djmamics (section 5.5.1), and change of 
LKH degree (section 5.5.2) for the same group size and hatch size. A batch rekey cost is 
represented as the number o f rekey packets in that batch rekey message (RM). If  XORBP 
KDT is used, the number o f rekey packets in a RM is a good rekey cost metric (all 
packets constructed the same way). If  encryption-based KDT is used, each rekey packet 
contains a varying number o f encrypted keys. The minimum number of encrypted keys in 
such rekey packet is 2, and the maximum is the LKH degree d.
The group dynamics is as defined in chapter IV. For a specified LKH degree d, group 
size n, and group dynamic ratio gdr, the LKH is constructed by adding aN  members then 
removing rN  members such that n = aN -  rN  and rN  / aN -  g d r . In the following 
experiments, the hatch size represents the number o f replaced and/or refreshed leaf 
entries, while we assume the number of added and removed entries are zeros. For a 
constructed LKH, a hatch rekeying is initialized with the specified batch size where the 
replaced and/or refreshed entries positions are randomly chosen. The following figures 
plot the average of 10 readings o f the number of rekey packets in a RM (very small 
variance is noticed).
5.5.1 Effect of G roup Dynamics
This experiment illustrates the effect of increasing the group dynamics on batch 
rekeying performance for both S-LKH and B'^-LKH protocols. The following figures 
show three horizontal lines n il, nid and average {nil, nid). Such lines help in analyzing 
the rekey cost for encryption-based KDT. The line n il marks the number o f rekey 
packets in the best scenario for which the performance of LKH is the same as the 
performance of a star key management {n encrypted keys) described in chapter III, where 
each rekey packet contains exactly 2 encrypted keys. The performance o f an LKH key 
management protocol with encryption-based KDT is worse than the star key management 
for all points above this line. The line nid marks the number o f rekey packets in the 
worst-case scenario (i.e., each rekey packet contains exactly d  encrypted keys). The 
average line marks the average case scenario. The performance o f an LKH key
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management with encryption-based KDT is better than a star key management for all 
points under the nid  line.
This experiment illustrates the rekey cost o f B'^-LKH versus S-LKH, where LKH 
degree is 4 and group size n = 8192, for different batch sizes and group dynamics. The 
batch sizes are 10%n, 20%n, ..., and 100%n. Fig. 50 illustrates the rekey cost for B"̂ - 
LKH (denoted B+) versus S-LKH (denoted S) when the group is static {gdr = 0). We can 
observe that for a degree 4 LKH and static group, the use of B^-LKH introduces an 
increase in the rekey cost when compared to S-LKH rekey cost. In addition, we can 
observe that the average rekey performance of a LKH with encryption-based KDT and 
large batch size (more than 30% n) is worse than the use o f star key management. Fig. 51 
illustrates the rekey cost for the same LKH degree and same group size when the group 
dynamics is increased to gdr = 0.5. We can observe that B’̂ -LKH exhibits almost the 
same rekey performance of S-LKH for small batch sizes, and outperforms S-LKH when 
the batch size increases. Moreover, we can observe that for higher group dynamics, the 
average rekey performance o f a degree 4 LKH and encryption-based KDT is better than 
star key management for smaller batch sizes (less than 20% «).
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Fig. 50. B"^-LKH versus S-LKH rekey cost for J  = 4, « = 8192, and gdr = 0.
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Fig. 51. B'^-LKH versus S-LKH rekey cost fox d = A, n = 8192, andgrfr = 0.5.
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Fig. 52 illustrates the performance of a degree 4 S-LKH rekey cost with the group 
dynamics increase, where gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.5, for different batch sizes and group 
size n = 8192. We can observe that S-LKH rekey cost increases with the group dynamics 
increase. Fig. 53 illustrates the performance of a degree 4 B^-LKH rekey cost with the 
group dynamics increase for different batch sizes. We can observe that with the group 
dynamics increases, there is a smaller increase in B'^-LKH rekey cost compared to S- 
LKH rekey cost increase.
Performing the same experiment for degree 8 S-LKH and B^-LKH. Fig. 54 illustrates 
the S-LKH rekey performance for the different group dynamics, and Fig. 55 illustrates 
the B^-LKH rekey performance for the different group dynamics. We can observe that, 
for larger LKH degrees (more than 4), B^-LKH rekey cost outperforms S-LKH rekey cost 
in all cases of batch sizes and group dynamics. In addition, from Fig. 54, we can observe 
that the average rekey cost o f a degree 8 S-LKH with encryption-based KDT outperforms 
star key management for only small group dynamics {gdr = 0, 0.2) or small batch sizes 
(less than 30% n). On the other hand, from Fig. 55, we can observe that the average rekey 
cost o f a degree 8 B"^-LKH with encryption-based KDT outperforms star key 
management for all batch sizes (up to 100% n) and all group dynamics. Moreover, we 
can observe that increasing the group dynamics for B'^-LKH protocol leads to a bounded 
increase in the rekey cost, while for S-LKH protocol the increase in the rekey cost 
steadily increases with the group dynamics.
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Fig. 53. Degree 4 B'^-LKH rekey cost {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).


























Fig. 54. Degree 8 S-LKH rekey cost {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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Fig. 55.Degree 8 B'^-LKH rekey cost {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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5.5.2 Increasing LKH degree
In the previous experiment, we eoneluded that B''^-LKH rekey cost outperforms S- 
LKH rekey cost (for all batch sizes and group dynamics) for LKH degrees greater than 4. 
In this experiment, we study the effect o f increasing LKH degree on the rekey cost 
represented as the average number of rekey packets in a RM. The LKH degree is 
increased from 4 to 32 in increments o f 4.
First, the experiment is performed for group size n = 1024 and batch size 102 (10%n). 
Fig. 56 illustrates the change o f S-LKH rekey cost with change of LKH degree for 
different group dynamics, where gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.5. We can observe that, the 
rekey cost is decreasing with LKH degree increase, while increasing with the group 
dynamics increase. Similarly, Fig. 57 illustrates the change o f B^-LKH rekey cost with 
change o f LKH degree for different group dynamics. We can observe that, the rekey cost 
increase due to increased group dynamics is more bounded compared to S-LKH rekey 
cost increase (Fig. 56).
Assuming for the same parameters {d, n, gdr, and batch size} the S-LKH rekey cost 
is cS and the B’̂ -LKH rekey cost is cB. The S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase over 
B^-LKH rekey cost (denoted rci) is calculated as rci = {cS-cB)x \QQI  c B . Fig. 58 
illustrates the rekey cost percentile increase {rci) with change o f LKH degree and 
different group dynamics. We can observe that the S-LKH rekey cost is greater than the 
B'^-LKH rekey cost for all LKH degrees greater than 4 {rci is greater than zero). The S- 
LKH rekey cost percentile increase {rci) peaks at certain LKH degrees, and usually 
increases with LKH degree increase and group dynamics increase {rci attains more than 
50% when d = \ 2  and gdr = 0.5).
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Fig. 56. A S-LKH rekey cost for different group dynamics {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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Fig. 57. A B^-LKH rekey cost for different group dynamics {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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Fig. 58. A S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase {rci) over B’̂ -LKH, where n = 1024 and 
batch size = 102.
Next, the same experiment is performed with larger group size n = 8192 and the batch 
size is 819 (10% n). Fig. 59 illustrates the S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase over B"̂ - 
LKH rekey cost {rci) with change of LKH degree for four different group dynamics. 
Similarly, we can observe that the use o f S-LKH introduces extra rekey cost over B”̂- 
LKH for all LKH degrees greater than 4. This rekey-cost increase {inc) increases with the 
group dynamics increase. In addition, we can observe that this increase peaks at certain 
LKH degrees depending on the group size and batch size (peaks at different LKH degrees 
than what is shown in Fig. 58). The LKH degree that has a peak increase o f S-LKH rekey 
cost over B^-LKH rekey cost is the same for all group dynamics (for the same group size 
and batch size).
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Fig. 59. A S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase {rci) over B'^-LKH, where « = 8192 and 
batch size = 819.
5.6 Conclusion
Researchers have suggested periodic rekeying to alleviate the problem of having very 
small inter-rekey period. A very small time between two consecutive rekeys does not 
allow a group key to be established and used by all group members. Periodic rekeying 
makes it essential to process a batch of requests. While periodic rekeying with a period 
greater than the rekey time solves the problem, it does not take into consideration the 
batch size, or the maximum request delay. In addition, simple periodic rekeying doesn’t 
take into account the possibility of no requests being accumulated during an inter-rekey 
period.
In this chapter, a general and flexible rekey policy is presented. The defined rekey 
policy takes into account three parameters: minimum inter-rekey period, batch size, and 
maximum request delay. The policy has the flexibility of triggering the batch rekeying
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process using all or a combination of these parameters. A simplified view of the software 
objects designed to provide secure group key management is presented. In addition, the 
batch rekey message (RM) and its construction in both S-LKH and B'^-LKH protocols is 
illustrated. Finally, experiments are performed to demonstrate that the B^-LKH protocol 
introduces major rekey cost savings (less number o f rekey packets) for a batch o f requests 
compared to the S-LKH protocol. The B^-LKH batch rekey savings compared to S-LKH 
increase with the increase o f batch size or the group dynamics. In addition, we concluded 
that maintaining a balanced LKH (as a B’̂ -LKH) guarantees a bounded behavior with the 
increase of the group dynamics, while the performance o f an unbalanced LKH (S-LKH) 
deteriorates with the increase o f group dynamics.
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CHAPTER VI 
DISTRIBUTED GROUP REKEYING AND RECOVERY
In chapter III, we introduced a software model for secure group key management. We 
focused on the case o f a central rekey manager that maintains the group key and performs 
group rekeying, when it deems necessary, according to a defined rekey policy. It is 
assumed that the rekey manager maintains a logical key hierarchy (LKH) for scalable 
rekeying. The existence o f one rekey manager makes it a central point for both 
congestion and failure. Deploying a distributed set of rekey agents that equally share the 
load of group rekeying provides a more reliable and scalable solution. In addition, in 
applications which exhibit short failure time or disconnection times, e.g., mobile ad-hoc 
networks, a recovery mechanism is crucial to refresh the state o f the group key 
management process. In this chapter, we discuss two enhancements to our group key 
management framework: distributed group rekeying and the recovery of a group key 
manager and a group member.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents the distributed group 
rekeying protocols. Section 6.2 presents the proposed recovery mechanism for a group 
key manager/agent and discusses a group member recovery. Finally, section 6.3 
concludes the chapter.
6.1 D istributed G roup Rekeying
In this section, we present four cooperation protocols for distributed group rekeying 
between peer rekey agents. It is assumed that each rekey agent is capable of managing a 
subset of group members, and participating in the group rekeying process. We show that 
the rekey protocol with minimal overhead is that one rekey agent at a time generates and 
distributes a new group key to all group members. In addition, we detail the logical key 
hierarchy (LKH) maintained at a rekey agent for the different cooperation scenarios. If 
any rekey agent is required to distribute a group key to all group members, a naive key 
management approach is that every rekey agent maintains (replicates) the group LKH. 
Instead, we propose the creation of agents’ LKH (denoted A-LKH) that reduces the
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replicated LKH size (compared to the naive approach), and the number o f maintained 
keys at a group member. Moreover, we discuss two different approaches for maintaining 
A-LKH namely dynamic A-LKH and static A-LKH. The dynamic A-LKH approach has 
a drawback of (sometimes) updating (some) group members for a rekey agent join or 
leave. On the other hand, the static A-LKH approach allows a transparent rekey agent 
join or leave for all group members, although the maximum number of rekey agents has 
to be known before starting a session.
The rest o f this section is organized as follows. Section 6.1.1 is an overview of the 
distributed group rekeying approach between a group o f rekey agents. Section 6.1.2 
defines four different cooperation protocols between the rekey agents. Section 6.1.3 
details the LKH maintained at a rekey gent for the different cooperation scenarios. 
Section 6.1.4 discusses the two different approaches for maintaining A-LKH.
6.1.1 Distributed Group Rekeying Overview
A distributed set of cooperating rekey agents provides a more scalable and reliable 
group rekeying than a central rekey manager. If an agent fails during a group session, 
other agents can assume its role and update the failed agent’s subgroup members about 
group key changes (if allowed). In addition, a new agent can recover the state o f a failed 
agent (recovery is discussed in section 6.2).
Consider a set o f peer rekey agents, i.e., all agents have the same authority and 
capability of accessing, generating, and distributing the group key as well as any LKH 
key. Since all rekey agents have a full group rekey authority, there is no need to rekey the 
group (change GK) when an agent joins or leaves the rekey agents’ group. A leaving 
agent is voluntarily relinquishes its responsibility (due to network discormection or 
failure), but is still allowed access to further agents’ communication. On the other hand, 
an evicted agent is not allowed any access to future agents or group communication. In 
this model, evicting a rekey agent is very expensive and would require recreating the 
group without that agent.
A rekey agent is responsible of managing a subset o f the group members. Fig. 60 
illustrates a rekey agents’ group that manages a group o f members, where every agent 
manages a different subset of the group members. At any point o f time, there is one agent
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who acts as the leader of the rekey agents’ group, denoted LA. The LA is a rekey agent 
that is responsible for coordinating many group actions, such as the initiation o f the group 
rekeying process. In addition, the group rekeying is performed for the LA’s subgroup 
membership changes (i.e., members join and/or leave). An agent that exhibits a change in 
its subgroup membership has to nominate itself to be the leader to perform a rekeying. If 
there is only one rekey agent (in the rekey agents’ group), it is assumed to be the LA until 
other agents join. Being a LA should be circulated fairly among all rekey agents. 
Choosing a leader among a group and guaranteeing there is only one leader at a time is 
the classical distributed systems mutual exclusion problem [17].
rekey agents
f (A) : (T)'\ )
s / ' I » '
□
□ □
Fig. 60. Rekey agents and group members.
□
A rekey agent can join the rekey agents’ group at any time (usually before the start of 
a group session). Initially, a rekey agent broadcasts its desire to join the agents’ group to 
an agent-group channel prompting a response from the LA. The LA provides the initial 
status and (LKH) information. In addition, the LA informs other rekey agents o f the new 
agent joining. A rekey agent is assumed to be active before any member joins its 
subgroup.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
141
When a group member joins, he is assigned one rekey agent to be under its 
supervision (each member is supervised by only one rekey agent). There are several 
approaches for a client to select one sever among a distributed set of servers as follows:
• The client contacts a directory server (could be the authentication manager) who 
directs him to his server according to a load balancing or a route optimization 
technique.
• All servers addresses are published and the client chooses the nearest to his location 
(in the network sense), at random, or any other selection criteria.
• The servers are inserted in subnets, and the clients contact their subnet server.
• A client can send his request to a servers’ channel, all servers receive the request but 
only one will respond according to a specified policy decision (for example, the 
leader or the nearest to the member’s network location).
In the following cooperation models, if  all agents are required to participate in 
generating a key (group key or other), a key agreement protocol (KAP) is needed. The 
existing technique known as group Deffie-Hellman [61] defines different protocols for 
such key agreement. The Deffie-Hellman protocol for two members requires two 
messages to be exchanged between the two parties, whereas group Deffie-Hellman 
protocols require several rounds and exchanges between all parties.
6.1.2 Rekey Agents Cooperation Protocols
The main function o f a central rekey manager is to generate the group key (GK) then 
distribute it to all group members (G). In distributed rekey management between a group 
o f m rekey agents, every agent Aj is responsible o f managing a subgroup SGi, such that 
= G . The group rekeying is performed for the elected LA’s subgroup
membership changes. Other agents’ subgroup membership changes are not incorporated 
is such rekeying. There are four group rekeying cooperation protocols between a group of 
rekey agents in terms of key generation and distribution, namely, all generate and all 
distribute; all generate and one distributes; one generates and all distributes; one 
generates and one distributes. The following are the four possible rekey agents’ 
cooperation scenarios.
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6.1.2.1 All Generate and All Distribute
All agents participate in generating a new GK through a key agreement protocol 
(KAP) and participate in distributing it to the group members. The following is the all- 
generate-and-all-distribute rekey protocol. First, the LA sends StartRekey message 
(command) to all other agents to start the KAP. Second, the KAP proceeds until all 
agents agree on the new GK. The KAP might require several rounds and message 
exchanges. Finally, every agent (including the leader) distributes the new GK to its 
subgroup members. It is essential that, a rekey agent signs the GK distribution message 
so that the group members are able to authenticate its source.
LA ^  Ai: StartRekey 
Ai -> Aj: KAP messages 
Ai ^  SG;: GK
6.1.2.2 All Generate and One Distributes
All agents participate in generating a new GK then the LA distributes it to all group 
members. The following is the all-generate-and-one-distribute rekey protocol^. The first 
two steps generate new GK through KAP. Then, the LA distributes it to all group 
members. This protocol eliminates the signature overhead performed by each rekey agent 
to GK distribution message in the all-generate-and-all-distribute rekey protocol. Only the 
LA signs the GK distribution message sent to all group members.
LA -> Ai: StartRekey 
Ai -> Aj: KAP messages 
LA -> G: GK
' X A  Y ; M, denotes X sends Y  a message M.
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6.1.2.3 One Generates and All Distribute
The LA generates a new GK, and all agents participate in distributing it. The 
following is the one-generate-and-all-distribute rekey protocol in two steps. First, the LA 
sends a StartRekey message to every agent along with the newly generated GK. Second, 
every agent (including the LA) distributes the new GK to its subgroup members. This 
protocol eliminates the KAP phase.
LA Ail StartRekey, GK
Ai SGi! GK
6.1.2.4 One Generates and One Distributes
The LA generates and distributes a new GK to all agents and to all group members. 
This is the minimal overhead rekey protocol that reduces the overhead incurred in both 
the KAP phase and the GK distribution message signature required if  all agents are 
participating in the rekeying process. Note that, the rekey agents are taking turns in being 
the LA.
LA Ai & G: GK
6.1.2.5 Comparison of Distributed Group Rekeying Protocols
We can observe that the first rekey protocol that allows all rekey agents to participate 
in generating and distributing the group key in every rekeying requires the maximum 
overhead of both the key agreement protocol phase and the signature o f GK distribution 
message performed by every rekey agent. The second rekey protocol that allows all rekey 
agents to participate in generating the group key, but the LA distributes it to all group 
members eliminates the signature of GK distribution message for all other agents. The 
third rekey protocol that allows the LA to generate a new GK, then every rekey agent 
distributes it to a subset o f group members reduces the overhead incurred in the key 
agreement protocol phase that requires exchange of several messages. The fourth rekey 
protocol that suggests the LA generates and distributes a new GK to other rekey agents 
and all group members provides a minimal overhead rekey protocol for faster rekeying
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process. The fairness in participating in the rekeying process between all rekey agents can 
be guaranteed through the leader selection mechanism.
In all cooperation scenarios, it is assumed that all rekey agents are communicating 
through an agent secure group channel (A-Chnl). In addition, all rekey agents and all 
group members are communicating through a secure rekey channel, G-Chnl, as illustrated 
in Fig. 61(a). In all-agents-distribute rekey protocols, every rekey agent instead can have 










(b) Each subgroup members join different subgroup rekey channel (SG-Chnl). 
Fig. 61. Communication channels between the rekey agents and the group members.
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6.1.3 Distributed Group LKH Maintenance
For a group of n members managed by m rekey agents, the subgroup managed by a 
rekey agent is assumed to be of size (n/m). A logical key hierarchy (LKH) is used to 
provide scalable GK distribution. The rekey agents’ cooperation model determines the 
LKH maintained at every agent. We will illustrate the LKH maintained at a rekey agent 
and the keys maintained by its subgroup members for the two different GK distribution 
cases: 1) all agents participate in distributing a new GK each to its subgroup members; 2) 
one agent at a time (the LA) distributes a new GK to all group members and to other 
rekey agents.
We will illustrate different LKHs o f degree d = 2, where the group size n = 32, 
managed by 4 rekey agents (i.e., m = 4), and a rekey agent subgroup size is 8 members.
6.1.3.1 All Agents Distribute
In all-agents-distribute rekey protocols, every rekey agent participates in distributing 
a new GK to its subgroup members. It is sufficient for an agent Aj to maintain a LKH for 
its subgroup SGi. There is no need for the rekey agents to share (replicate) any key 
information other than GK. In this case, every group member maintains his individual 
key and in the average log^(n/m ) keys, where n is the group size, m is the rekey agents’ 
group size, and d  is the LKH degree.
When n = 32 and m = 4, Fig. 62 illustrates the LKH (of height h = 3) maintained at a 
rekey agent for 8 members, where GK is the only replicated key at every rekey agent. A 
group member maintains 4 keys including his individual key and GK.
GK
6 h
Fig. 62. A subgroup LKH of degree 2 for 8 members.
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6.1.3.2 One Agent Distributes
In one-agent-at-a-time-distributes rekey protocols, the LA distributes a new GK to all 
other agents and to all group members. The naive key management solution is every 
rekey agent maintains a fully replicated LKH for all group members. In this case, a group 
member maintains his individual key and in the average log^(n) keys, where n is the
group size, and d  is the LKH degree.
When n = 32 and m = 4, Fig. 63 illustrates the group LKH (of height h = 5) for 32 
members that is replicated at every rekey agent. A group member maintains 6 keys 
including his individual key and the group key.
The naive solution requires a full replication o f the group LKH rooted at GK. 
Alternatively, we suggest a more replication conservative solution. In the new approach, 
a rekey agent Ai maintains its subgroup LKH rooted at a rekey agent individual key AKi. 
In addition, all agents replicate an agents’ LKH (denoted A-LKH) rooted at GK. The leaf 
nodes of A-LKH are the agent keys AKs. The A-LKH and the subgroup LKHs are either 
having the same degree or having different degrees. Note that, A-LKH keys are 
replicated and known to all rekey agents including the agents’ (individual) keys AKs. In 
this approach, a group member maintains an extra set o f A-LKH keys starting from his 
agent individual key to GK. A group member maintains his individual key and in the 
average log^^(n/m) subgroup LKH keys and log^2 ("^) A-LKH keys, where n is the
group size, m is the rekey agents’ group size, d l  is the subgroup LKH degree, and d2 is 
the A-LKH degree. This approach allows any rekey agent to distribute a new GK to all 
group members but reduces the replicated LKH size at a rekey agent and the number of 
keys maintained at a group member when compared to the naive solution.
When n = 32 and m = 4, Fig. 64 shows the A-LKH (of height 2) and the subgroup 
LKH (of height 3) maintained at agent Ai, where d l = d2 = 2. A  group member maintains 
6 keys: his individual key, 2 subgroup-LKH KEKs, an agent key AKi, 1 A-LKH KEK, 
and GK.
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Fig. 64. An A-LKH and subgroup LKH maintained at rekey agent Ai for 32 members.
6.1.4 Agents’ LKH (A-LKH) Maintenance
The agents’ LKH (A-LKH) is fully replicated at all rekey agents. There are two 
approaches for A-LBCH maintenance: dynamic or static. In the dynamic approach, the A-
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LKH is dynamically built up as the rekey agents join the agents group. In the static 
approach, the A-LKH is initiated to be of fixed static size that could accommodate the 
maximum number of rekey agents as they join. A newly joined agent contacts the LA to 
get the latest version of A-LKH. The A-LKH replica should be consistently updated at all 
agents through the agents’ group communication channel. In the following sections, the 
two A-LKH maintenance approaches will be presented in detail, in addition to how an A- 
LKH key can be generated.
6.1.4.1 Dynamic A-LKH
In the dynamic A-LKH maintenance approach, the first rekey agent to start creates 
GK and its subgroup LKH. The A-LKH contains only GK, and it is considered the first 
agent individual key. The A-LKH dynamically grows as other rekey agents join the 
agents’ group. There is no need to regenerate an existing A-LKH key (including GK) as 
agents join (the whole A-LKH is known to all agents). When an agent joins the agents’ 
group, A-LKH keys are created to accommodate the new agent individual key (leaf A- 
LKH node). The LA notifies other rekey agents to update their replicated A-LKH. The 
new agent creates and maintains its subgroup LKH rooted at its newly created agent key.
In the dynamic A-LKH approach, creating a new A-LKH key requires updating 
(some) group members. As previously mentioned, evicting an agent is not valid (section 
6.1.1). When an agent leaves, its individual key is deleted from A-LKH (that might lead 
to the deletion of other A-LKH keys). Similarly, when a rekey agent leaves, there is no 
need to regenerate an existing A-LKH key. The deletion o f an A-LKH key requires 
updating (some) group members. This model has the drawback o f sometimes affecting 
some group members as A-LKH keys are created or deleted.
Fig. 65 is an example that demonstrates the sequence of A - L K H  key creation for 4 
rekey agents, where A - L K H  degree is 2 .  In Fig. 65(a), the first agent A i  creates A - L K H  
that contains GK. In Fig. 65(b), the second agent A 2  joins, A K ]  and A K 2  are created. In 
this case, A K ]  should be sent to the subgroup members managed by A] (assuming no 
members have joined A 2  yet). In Fig. 65(c), the third agent A 3  joins, and K], K 2 ,  and A K 3  
are created. In this case, K] should be sent to the subgroup members managed by A] and
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A 2 . In Fig. 65(d), the fourth agent A4  joins, and AK 4  is created. In this case, none o f the 











Fig. 65. Sequence o f a dynamic A-LKH, key creation for 4 rekey agents.
6.1.4.2 Static A-LKH
The static A-LKH maintenance approach provides a transparent rekey agent join and 
leave for all group members, i.e., no members are updated for an agent join or leave. The 
first agent to start creates an empty (no keys) A-LKH that can accommodate a specified 
maximum number of agents (leaf nodes). It generates its own agent key AK (in a A-LKH 
leaf node), GK (A-LKH root node), and all the keys in the path between its AK and GK. 
When other agent joins, a newly generated AK is inserted into an empty A-LKH leaf 
node, and other A-LKH keys are generated as needed. When an agent leaves, only its AK 
is deleted (A-LKH leaf node is marked empty) allowing other agent keys to be inserted.
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There is no need to regenerate an existing A-LKH keys as agents join or leave. The static 
A-LKH maintenance approach has a drawback that the maximum number o f rekey agents 
has to be known before starting a session.
Fig. 66 is an example that shows the sequence o f A-LKH key generation for 4 agents, 
where A-LKH degree is 2 and the maximum number of rekey agents is 4. In Fig. 66(a), 
the first agent to join generates AKi, Ki, and GK. In Fig. 66(b), the second agent joins 
and A K 2  is generated. In Fig. 66(c), the third agent joins, and A K 3  and K 2  are generated. 













Fig. 66. Sequence of a static A-LKH key generation for 4 rekey agents.
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6.1.4.3 A-LKH Key Generation
An A-LKH key to be used the first time by an agent is created by one of the following 
methods;
1) Creation hy the leader agent (LA)
2) Creation by the new agent (NA) itself
3) Creation by both the LA and the NA through KAP
4) Creation hy all agents through KAP
The following are the protocols for the four aforementioned cases.
Creation by the LA
The LA sends the NA the updated A-LKH after creating/generating the required keys. 
At the same time, the LA sends an update A-LKH message to all other agents.
LA ^  NA: A-LKH; LA ^  Ai: Update A-LKH 
Creation by the NA
The LA sends the NA the A-LKH before the creation o f any new key. The NA
updates A-LKH and sends the update to all agents including the LA. This protocol
requires two messages to be sent in sequence.
LA ^  NA: A-LKH 
NA ^ A i: Update A-LKH 
Creation by both the LA and the NA
The LA sends the NA the A-LKH along with its share in the newly generated keys. 
Then, the NA sends back its share in the newly generated keys to the LA. Both the LA 
and the NA update A-LKH with the new keys. Then, the LA sends an update A-LKH to 
all other agents. This protocol requires three messages to be sent in sequence.
LA NA: A-LKH, new-keys-share 
NA LA : new-keys-share 
LA -> A i: Update A-LKH
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Creation by all agents
The LA sends the NA the A-LKH, and sends to all other agents a StartRekey message 
for the required A-LKH keys (at least one). All agents (including the LA and the NA) 
exchange messages for the new keys generation. After the KAP proceeds all agents will 
be able to establish the same updates to A-LKH.
LA NA; A-LKH; LA ^  A: StartRekey
Ai ^  Aj: KAP messages
We can observe that the first protocol is the simplest (fastest) since updating an A- 
LKH requires the LA to send two messages at the same time, one to the NA and one to 
the other rekey agents. However, choosing a protocol for A-LKH key creation/generation 
can be a group policy decided by the application.
6.2 Group Key Manager Recovery
In this section, the recovery o f a group key manager and a rekey manager after short 
failure time is discussed. It is assumed that, the rekey manager is a software entity 
maintained by the group key manager, i.e., the rekey manager fails and recovers as a 
component of the group key manager. Such recovery process is concerned with the 
recovery of the last state o f the rekey policy, the rekey scheduler, and the LKH. One 
approach to recover the state a failed group key manager is to have an independent full 
replica(s) of its state that assumes responsibility upon its failure. The drawback o f this 
approach is the extra overhead needed to keep all replicas consistent all the time. Instead, 
we assume that the group key manager state is not replicated. We are concerned with the 
state recovery of a central group key manager that maintains group LKH as well as a 
group key agent that maintains a subgroup LKH and possibly an agents’ LKH (A-LKH) 
after a short failure time, e.g., due to a server restart. Although the recovery o f a LKH 
could be performed using the state stored at group members, we introduce the use o f a 
log file that facilitates such recovery in case of members’ failure or inconsistencies. The 
proposed logging and recovery mechanism is secure and easy to implement. The logging 
system avoids writing any key or revealing random number generator information. Group
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members participate in the recovery of their key manager/agent by sending at least one 
encrypted recovery message. The recovery message sent by a group member contains his 
maintained list o f keys. We introduce a key selection technique for a group member to 
reduce the number of keys sent in the recovery message while allowing the group key 
manager to retrieve all LKH keys. To the best o f our knowledge, this topic has not been 
previously investigated in the research community.
The rest o f this section is organized as follows. Section 6.2.1 is an overview o f the 
proposed recovery system. Section 6.2.2 illustrates the proposed group key manager 
logging system. Section 6.2.3 introduces the recovery key used by the group members in 
the recovery of their manager. Section 6.2.4 details the group key manager recovery 
procedure. Section 6.2.5 demonstrates the group member recovery message and 
introduces a key selection technique that reduces the overhead in constmcting the 
recovery message.
6.2.1 Recovery Overview
The authentication manager that maintains the group policy is assumed to be 
implementing an independent fault tolerance mechanism. In addition, the authentication 
manager is assumed to store the group requests (add, remove, and refresh) sent to the 
group key manager until a rekeying is successfully ended (i.e., committed). Moreover, 
the authentication manger either keeps the group requests or denies all or some types of 
those requests during the group key manager failure.
The recovery of a group member after failure could be treated as him leaving the 
group and joining at a later time. If  the group member failure is for a very short time and 
the leave request is not processed (waiting in a batch of requests), when the join request 
is received, the group member state is refreshed instead. As previously mentioned in 
chapter IV, refreshing a group member state assumes the member lost his maintained set 
of keys, and requires sending him the same keys as if  he newly joined. However, the 
rekey manager doesn’t change LKH keys for refreshing a group member. Such refreshing 
optimizes the rekeying process by reducing the number of the newly generated LKH 
keys. The mobile computing paradigm is an example where frequent short disconnection 
times may occur, due to frequent handoffs.
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In distributed group rekeying, if the distributed agents’ cooperation protocol allows 
any agent to distribute a new GK to all group members, the failed agent subgroup 
members will be notified by the changes o f GK during their agent failure period. On the 
other hand, if  the distributed agents’ eooperation protocol allows every agent to distribute 
a new GK to its subgroup members only, the failed agent subgroup members could store 
the un-interpreted group messages (due to lack of GK updates) during their agent failure 
and proceed interactively after its recovery. In this case, if  the agent failure is for a very 
short time, its subgroup members might be able restore communication appropriately. 
Otherwise, a failed agent subgroup members might loose interactivity with the session.
As previously mentioned in chapter III, the group rekey channel provides a reliable 
group communication (multicast) protocol that assures a group member has received the 
rekey message (RM). A RM send method call (through the rekey channel) is assumed to 
return successfully even if  RM didn’t reach some (or all) group members due to their 
failures. The new GK is guaranteed to reach the group member by the rekey channel.
The rekey scheduler and the leader selection mechanism guarantee that there are no 
nested rekeyings (i.e., no start-rekey is issued before the previous rekeying is committed).
6.2.2 Group Key Manager Logging
The group key manager is configured through the rekey policy to schedule the group 
rekeying events while reeeiving requests (from the authentication manager) to add, 
remove, and refresh group members. When group rekeying deems necessary, the rekey 
manager is notified to issue a rekey message (RM) and send it to the group members. The 
proposed recovery mechanism assumes the group key manager is maintaining a log file. 
The log file is written to permanent storage (disk) periodically and forcefully at certain 
checkpoints, so that any type o f failure does not affect it. Note that, we are not 
considering disk or catastrophie failures.
Writing a LKH key to the log file is crucial and requires encryption that is time (and 
processing) consuming. In addition, the keys are subject to change in a rekeying process, 
and the most recent version of a key is the only needed version after the recovery. The 
recovery meehanism avoids writing keys to the log file. Moreover, the randomly 
generated numbers (such as keys, IDs, or byte patterns (BPs); see chapter IV) could be
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
155
regenerated if the used pseudo random number generator and its initialization are 
revealed to an intruder. It is crucial to store the initial pseudo random generator state 
(e.g., its seed) that would allow the generation o f the exact sequence o f random numbers. 
The recovery mechanism avoids storing such random number generators state 
information.
In summary, a group key manager/agent writes a time stamped entry to the log file in 
the following cases;
• Initialization entry that is used to restore the employed protocols, implementations, 
and policies,
• Receiving a message to add, remove, or refresh a group member,
• Before initiating a rekeying process (i.e., the leader agent (LA) in a distributed group 
rekeying model) a Start-Rekey entry is written,
• After committing an initiated (by itself) rekeying process, a Commit-Rekey entry is 
written,
• When committing a rekying process (i.e., not the LA in a distributed group rekeying 
model), a Rekey entry is written,
• Change of rekey policy, and
• A LKH signature at specified checkpoints.
The log file is forcefully written to the permanent storage in the following cases:
• Initialization,
• Committing an initiated rekeying process, and
• A LKH signature written at specified checkpoints.
A checkpoint is introduced to facilitate the recovery process. The checkpoint could be 
scheduled periodically or after certain number o f committed rekeyings. At a checkpoint, 
the rekey manager (governed by the group key manager) writes the LKH signature to the 
log file, and forcefully writes the log file to the permanent storage. The LKH should be 
checked to have updates since the previous checkpoint. In a distributed group rekeying, 
the agents’ LKH (A-LKH) is not written to the log file since it is fully replicated at all 
agents and could be easily recovered. In the group key manager recovery, the LKH
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signature determines the shape o f the LKH, the number o f entries at each node, and the 
guiding IDs. The following is the LKH signature of the LKH illustrated in Fig. 67. The 
LKH is parsed in pre-order and the IDs are written in order with the symbol “(“ used to 
group a single node’s entries.
T: LKH-Signature [((120, 205), 400, (900)), 900, ((1120, 1205))]
K.,;
K,, K,.2 K2 .1
K i .1.2 K,,




120 205 900 1120 1205
(b) The S-LKH search view. 
Fig. 67. A group LKH at a checkpoint time.
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6.2.3 Recovery Key
A group member participates in the group key manager/agent recovery by sending 
some of his maintained keys as will be explained in section 6.2.5. For privacy purpose, a 
group member sends to the group key manager the recovery messages encrypted by a 
recovery key. The group key manager should be able to decrypt such messages, while no 
other group member should possess such capability. Using the group key, GK, as a 
recovery key, is not suitable, since the group members are aware o f it. Instead, a group 
member either uses his individual key or a group key manager public key.
If  the authentication manager stores the group members’ individual keys, the group 
key manager contacts it at the beginning o f a recovery process to obtain such keys 
(among other information). The group key manager recovers the group members’ 
individual keys before receiving any recovery message from them. In this case, every 
group member uses his individual keys as a recovery key (to encrypt the recovery 
messages).
On the other hand, if  the authentication manager doesn’t store the group members’ 
individual keys, a recovery key is needed. The recovery key has to be in the form of 
private key and public key pair. The recovery key could be a long-term key or a session 
recovery key. The private key is kept securely at the authentication manager or at the 
group key manager system. The public key is handed to every group member right after 
he joins the group to use as a recovery key.
6.2.4 Group Key Manager Recovery
The recovery of a group key manager/agent implies the restoration o f the latest 
group/subgroup LKH, policy, scheduler state, and agents’ LKH (if applicable). It is 
assumed that contact information to the authentication manager and other group key 
agents are recoverable (one could be through the other). The group key manager recovery 
process proceeds as follows:
1. Inspect the following log file entries: Initialization entry to reinitialize itself and the 
rekey manager; last Rekey-Policy entry to restore the rekey policy and adjust the 
scheduler; last LKH-Signarure entry to reestablish the group LKH structure.
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2. Apply all committed rekeyings’ changes to the LKH, i.e., insert and delete LKH 
nodes that took effect after last signature. Note that, without writing LKH-Signature 
the LKH could be restored by redoing all insertions and deletions form the beginning 
of the log file.
3. Contact the authentication manager for changes in the rekey policy (if allowed). In 
addition, the group key manager retrieves the stored requests at the authentication 
manager. If  the last Start-Rekey entry in the log file is not followed by a Commit- 
Rekey, it is implied that the group key manager crashed during a rekeying. Although 
the exact scheduler state can’t  be recovered, the group key manager schedules a 
rekeying as soon as possible after LKH full recovery.
4. Contact the agents’ group for latest agents’ LKH (A-LKH), and the committed 
rekeyings during the failure period to adjust the sequential number SEQ. If  all agents 
are not available during this recovery (e.g., all failed) and some rekeyings have been 
performed, the recovering agent subgroup members will provide partial construction 
of A-LKH and that will allow the recovering agent to proceed normally.
5. Send a recovery request to group members to send back their maintained list of keys 
to fully restore LKH keys (see section 6.2.5).
6.2.5 Group Member Recovery Message
A group member sends to his group key manager/agent one recovery message upon 
receiving a recovery request. The recovery message contains his individual LKH leaf 
entry position, his individual ID, last SEQ, and the maintained list o f keys. In addition, 
the recovery message is encrypted using the recovery key as explained in section 6.2.3.
As previously illustrated for LKH keys, an individual key is maintained by one group 
member, GK is maintained by all group member, a KEK is maintained by a subset o f the 
group members. I f  every group member sends all his maintained list of keys in the 
recovery message to the group key manager, GK and KEKs will be sent several times 
(e.g., GK will be sent by all group member). Instead, we propose an enhancement to the 
above protocol that allows group members to send a partial list o f their maintained keys. 
Allowing only one group member only to send a recovered key is crucial if that member
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fails. On the other hand, if  all the members that maintain a key have failed, the group key 
manager will not be able to recover such key but will be able to proceed without it.
The proposed LKH keys recovery protocol provides a fair group member key 
selection that allows a group member to choose a partial list o f his maintained keys to 
send to a recovering group key manager. In addition, it allows the group key manager to 
retrieve all keys in one round if no member fails. If  some members fail during their group 
key manger recovery, LKiH keys recovery might take two rounds as follows: 
round
• The group key manager sends a recovery request to all group members.
• A group member sends an encrypted recovery message that contains his individual 
key (if not recovered from the authentication manager), his individual ID, and his 
LKH leaf entry position. Note that, if a group member didn’t send a recovery message 
in the first recovery round, he is detected as failed by the group key manager.
• If the group member’s individual entry falls on the path of the first child o f a key 
node (determined from his LKH leaf entry position that equals to I), send that key in 
the first round recovery message. The maximum number o f keys a group member can 
send in a recovery message is half the LKH height, starting from the key on the 2"*̂  
LKH level (i.e., without his individual key).
2“'' round
• If  the group key manager didn’t recover a LKH key (KEK) at the first round due to 
members’ failure, a recovery request message is sent specifying the missing set of 
keys and the next existing neighbors (to the failed members) to send it.
• The specified group members send the specified keys.
We suggest that the above key selection algorithm is fair since an individual entry 
LKH position is determined from his randomly assigned individual ID. The probability of 
a group member sending a certain key is independent from any other key, and is equal to 
the probability o f holding a key that exists in a first entry of a node that is equal to ltd, 
where d  is the LKH degree.
For example, in the group key manager recovery process of the LKH of height 3 
illustrated in Fig. 67, a group member will send a first round recovery message that
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includes his ID, LKH leaf entry position, and at most 3 keys (assuming half 3 is 2) 
including his individual key. The five recovery messages sent by the five group members 
to the group key manager in the format (ID, LKH position, keys) are as follows: (120,
1.1.1, K i .m , K u , K i), (205, 1.1.2, Ki.1 .2 , Ki, GK), (900, 1.2.1, Ki.2 .1 , K 1 .2 , GK), (1120,
2.1.1, K2 .1 .1 , K 2 .1 , K2 ), and (900, 2.1.2, K 2 .1 .2 , K2 ).
6.3 Conclusion
Distributed group rekeying between a set o f peer rekey agents provides a more 
scalable and reliable secure group key management compared to the central rekey 
manager approach. In this chapter, four group rekeying cooperation protocols between a 
distributed set of rekey agents, in terms o f group key generation and distribution 
mechanism, are proposed. It is demonstrated that, the minimal overhead rekey protocol is 
when one rekey agent at a time generates and distributes a new group key to all agents 
and group members. In addition, the LKH maintained at a rekey agent in the two cases of 
new group key distribution are discussed. The first case is that each agent distributes the 
new group key to its subgroup members. The second case is that one rekey agent at a 
time distributes a new group key to all group members. The naiVe solution in the latter 
case is that every rekey agent fully replicates the group LKH. Altematively, we proposed 
the construction and replication o f smaller size agents’ LKH (A-LKH). The proposed 
approach reduces the replicated LKH size at each rekey agent and the number of keys 
maintained by a group member. Furthermore, we identified two approaches o f such 
agents’ LKH maintenance namely dynamic A-LKH and static A-LKH. The dynamic A- 
LKH approach has the drawback of affecting group members (by inserting or deleting 
keys) as agents join or leave the agents’ group. The static A-LKH approach guarantees a 
transparent rekey agent join and leave but requires the specification o f the maximum 
number o f rekey agents before starting a session.
Moreover, a logging mechanism for the recovery of a group key manager/agent state 
after short failure time is presented. The logging includes all events that change the group 
key manager state but avoid writing any security revealing information such as keys. 
Group members participate in the recovery o f their manager by sending an encrypted 
recovery message that includes a sub-list of their maintained keys. A fair group member
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key selection technique is proposed to reduce the number of sent keys in a recovery 
message.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
In this chapter, we conclude the dissertation by summarizing our motivation, 
objectives, contributions, and the performance of our proposed framework for secure 
group key management. Furthermore, we discuss a list o f possible future extensions to 
our work in the context of secure group communication, and secure group key 
management.
7.1 Conclusion
Secure group communication is quickly becoming the adopted standard in many 
applications spanning diverse areas. Throughout the dissertation, we focused on secure 
group key management, which deals with group key {GK) issues such as establishing, 
distributing, and maintaining that key over the period of the group existence. To provide 
perfect secrecy, group rekeying (change o f GK) has to be performed for every group 
member joining or leaving the group. Group rekeying is a challenging problem especially 
for large group sizes or highly dynamic groups.
The simplest group rekeying protocol is performed with the help of a trusted and 
secure group key manager. The group key manager maintains GK, and performs a group 
rekeying when it deems necessary according to a defined rekey policy. In a group 
rekeying process, a new GK  is generated and distributed to group members such that a 
joining (leaving) member is not allowed access to previous (future) group 
communication. A very fast rekeying is crucial to the performance o f an application that 
has large group size, experiences frequent joins and leaves, or the group key management 
is hosted by a group member because o f the required computation effort. Traditionally, 
newly generated keys are encrypted for secure distribution to group members. Such 
technique is denoted encryption-based key distribution technique (KDT). There are two 
approaches for group key management, the star key management and the logical key 
hierarchy (LKH) approach. In the star key management, the group key manager performs 
2 keys encryptions for join rekeying and n keys encryptions for leave rekeying, where n
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is the group size. This approach is not scalable since leave rekeying scales linearly with 
the group size. In the LKH approach, if  the LKH degree is d, the group key manager 
performs on the average 2xlog^ n keys encryptions for join rekeying, and d  xlog^ n
keys encryptions for leave rekeying. The LKH provids a scalable group rekeying, and is 
becoming the standard approach for group key management. However, when encryption- 
based KDT is used with LKH, there are two un-symmetric rekey protocols for join and 
leave rekeying. Such unsymmetric property makes increasing the LKH degree result in a 
deerease of the join rekey cost and an increase o f the leave rekey cost. In this case, the 
optimal LKH degree is estimated to be 4.
Traditionally, group rekeying is performed periodically for the accumulated join and 
leave requests (i.e., batch o f updates) during an inter-rekey period. In the star key 
management approach, the group key manager is required to regenerate one key and to 
perform 0{n) key encryptions for a rekeying, where n is the group size. If  the group key 
manager maintains a LKH of degree d and height h, such that n<  d ’’, and the bateh size 
is R requests, a rekeying requires the group key manager to regenerate O ( R x h )  keys and 
to perform 0 ( d x R x h )  keys encryptions. The encryption-based LKH approach provided 
a rekeying cost that scales to the logarithm o f the group size, however, the number of 
encryptions performed by a GKM increases with increased LKH degree, LKH height, or 
the batch size, and can be more than the star approach’s number of eneryptions.
The objective of our work is to provide a framework for secure group key 
management that outperforms the original encryption-based LKH for all application 
scenarios. The framework has to be secure, efficient, scalable, reliable, and independent 
of the application. The group key management framework addresses the following issues: 
secure group communication software model, key distribution technique, rekey protocols, 
batch rekeying, distributed group rekeying, and recovery. We briefly present our 
approach to resolve the aforementioned issues highlighting our contributions.
Secure group communication software model. We presented a generic software 
model for providing secure group communication. The model identifies five main 
components as follows: authentication manager, group key manager, rekey manager and 
the corresponding rekey client, rekey channel, and cryptographic utility manager. The 
model is designed to isolate the group key management components and illustrate the
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functionalities and interactions of other components. We have extended Java‘̂“ security 
with an application-programming interface (API) that can be used to provide group key 
manager, rekey manager, and rekey client functionalities as designed in our model.
Key distribution technique. We focused on the rekey manager that uses a LKH for 
scalable rekeying. We proposed a novel XOR-based KDT, namely XORBF. The 
proposed approach performs an XOR operation between keys to reduce the computation 
effort, and uses a random byte patterns (BP) to distribute the key material in a fixed size 
rekey packet (for every new key). The use o f LKH and XOKBP KDT provides 
symmetric rekey protocols in both cases of join and leave rekeyings.
We derived analytical cost estimates of XORBP and performed empirical 
experiments to compare its performance with the encryption-based KDT for the same 
degree LKH. The use o f XORBP doubles the required LKH storage, the required member 
storage, and the number of randomly generated bits per a rekeying. The XORBP rekey 
message size is comparable to the eneryption-based leave rekeying message size. On the 
other hand, the use o f XORBP substantially reduces the rekey message construction time. 
Our experiments have shown that XORBP achieves up to 90% reduction in the rekey 
message construction time. In addition, contrary to the encryption-based KDT, increasing 
the LKH degree, when XORBP is used, reduces both join and leave rekeying cost. Such 
property allows the use o f a larger degree LKH, which reduces the LKH storage, the 
member storage, and the rekey message size when compared to a smaller LKH degree. 
The anal34ical cost estimates assume that the LKH is balaneed, while the experiments are 
performed using an un-balanced LKH. Such experiments show that there is a slight 
increase in the measured member storage and the rekey message size over the analytical 
values, but the measured LKH storage has a 60% increase over the analytical value.
Rekey Protocols. As group members join or leave the group, LKH nodes (keys) will 
be inserted or deleted. While, many researchers assume a balanced LKH when estimating 
the group rekeying cost, the literature lacks practical LKH protocols that maintain a 
balanced LKH of any degree all the time. We proposed two novel protocols for 
establishing and maintaining a LKH of any degree. One protocol adopts an unbalanced 
LKH while the other adopts a balaneed LKH. The protocols assume that the rekey 
manager assigns a unique individual identification (ID) to every group member. For both
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
165
protocols, we detailed the LKH structure, the rekey message format, and the rekey 
processing at a rekey manager and at a rekey client for different scenarios o f LKH keys 
insertion and deletions.
The first protocol, denoted S-LKH, maintains LKH as a search tree using the 
individual IDs. The second protocol, denoted B'^-LKH, maintains LKH as a balanced 
search tree that has the same structure as S-LKH. B^ search tree insertion and deletion 
algorithms guarantee that the LKH is balanced after each node (key) insertion or deletion. 
In addition, B"̂  search trees have an extra constraint that all allocated nodes have to be at 
least half full to reduce the allocated LKH storage (memory). On the other hand, B”̂ -LKH 
maintenance introduces complexity and extra overhead to the rekey process.
We have performed empirical experiments to compare the performance o f S-LKH 
and B^-LKH rekey protocols. The experiments show that, for both protocols, the 
frequency o f the simple insertion and deletion scenarios increases with LKH degree 
increase. In addition, for B^-LKH the frequency o f the most expensive operation is less 
than 1% for any LKH degree. For individual rekeying (i.e., a rekeying after one group 
member joins or leaves), the use of B^-LKH results in an increase in the average number 
of rekey packets (i.e., newly generated keys) and the average number o f encrypted keys 
(measured when encryption-based KDT is used) when compared to S-LKH. On the other 
hand, a B^-LKH has a smaller height and introduces a decrease in the expected maximum 
rekey time. The expected maximum rekey time identifies a minimum time period that has 
to be elapsed between two consecutive rekeyings. Furthermore, a B'^-LKH requires much 
less allocated nodes. The reduction o f the number o f allocated nodes using B^-LKH 
reaches 50% of the same degree S-LKH for a highly dynamic group.
Batch Rekeying. Individual rekeying for a single join or leave request is not a 
practical solution. Instead, researchers suggested periodic rekeying to be performed for a 
batch o f requests accumulated during an elapsed period. We have extended S-LKH and 
B'^-LKH protocols to support batch rekeying.
We introduced a generalized rekey policy definition that has three main parameters: 
minimum inter-rekey period, maximum request delay, and batch size. The defined policy 
can be used to provide simple periodic rekeying as well as other complex rekeying 
conditions as configured by the application. A simplified design o f the software objects
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
166
used to provide secure group key management is presented. For batch rekeying, the 
newly generated keys compose a sub-tree o f the original LBCH. We illustrated how the 
rekey manager constructs the rekey sub-tree in both rekeying protocols and how the 
rekey tree is used in constructing the rekey message sent to group members for such keys 
updates.
We performed experiments to compare the batch rekeying performance of S-LKH 
and B^-LKH protocols. Our experiments show that, the batch rekeying performance of a 
rekey protocol that uses LKH of degree 4 and encryption-based KDT is better than star 
key management only for small batch sizes (less than 20% n). In addition, our 
experiments show that using B^-LKH for large batch sizes or highly dynamic groups 
substantially reduces the rekey cost when compared to S-LKH. In addition, B^-LKH 
performance is shown to be stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while S-LKH 
performance deteriorates as the group dynamics increase.
Distributed group rekeying. To extend the scalability and the reliability of our 
model, we introduced four cooperation group rekeying protocols between a group o f peer 
rekey agents. We illustrated that the protocol with the minimal overhead is that one rekey 
agent, at a time, generates and distributes a new group key to all group members. 
Detailed LKH maintenance in the different cooperation protocols are presented. In 
addition, the use o f an agents’ LKH (denoted A-LKH) is introduced to facilitate a new 
GK distribution by a rekey agent to all group members. The use o f A-LKH minimizes the 
replicated LKH size at every rekey agent as well as the number o f maintained keys at a 
group member. Finally, two approaches for A-LKH establishment are presented. The first 
is the dynamic A-LKH approach that is flexible but (some) group members might be 
updated for a rekey agent joining or leaving the agents’ group. The second is the static A- 
LKH approach that requires the specification of the maximum number o f rekey agents 
before starting a group session but provides transparent agents join and leave for group 
members.
Recovery. Finally, we proposed a logging and recovery mechanism for the group key 
manager/agent and the rekey manager/agent. The logging system is secure and easy to 
implement. Group members participate in the recovery o f their manager by sending an 
encrypted recovery message when requested. The group member recovery message
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contains his individual material and his maintained set of keys. We proposed a key 
selection technique to reduce the number of keys sent in the recovery message. In 
addition, we discussed the recovery o f a group member after a short failure time.
In conclusion, the designed software model provides group key management 
components that are independent of the application, the security mechanism, and the 
communication protocol. The proposed XORBP KDT if used with the LKH approach 
achieves further reduction to the group rekeying computation cost and provides a more 
efficient and scalable solution than the encryption-based KDT. The proposed unbalanced 
LKH rekey protocol (S-LKH) can be used for any LKH degree. While, the proposed 
balanced LKH rekey protocol (B^-LKH) is practical for a LKH of degree greater than 3. 
A B"^-LKH requires much less storage than S-LKH. In addition, the use o f a B^-LKH 
when compared to a S-LKH substantially reduces the batch rekeying cost for large batch 
sizes or highly dynamic groups and exhibits a bounded performance with increased group 
dynamics. Moreover, the proposed rekey policy offers versatile triggering conditions for 
the batch rekeying process including simple periodic batch rekeying. Furthermore, 
distributed group rekeying enhanees the scalability o f the group key management 
framework. Finally, the group key manager and the group member’s recovery mechanism 
add reliability to the framework.
7.2 Future Extensions
The secure group key management framework can be extended as follows:
1) Adapting the proposed LKH rekey protocols to constrained LKH key generation 
mechanisms such as the use o f a hash function. In our work, it is always assumed 
LKH keys are freshly randomly generated. Such constrained key regeneration 
techniques are used to reduce the group rekeying cost (i.e., number o f randomly 
generated bits, rekey message size, etc...). Unfortunately, constrained key generation 
could be less secure.
2) Providing a dynamic rekey policy. Such dynamic rekey policy would require 
investigating the possibility of having conflicting policy decisions applied to the 
(short) time, interval between two consecutive rekey policies.
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3) Investigating distributed group rekeying where more than one rekey agent is 
experiencing a change in its subgroup membership. In this case, performing a group 
rekeying is similar to performing a distributed nested transaction that requires 
distributed concurrency control.
4) Experimenting with batch group rekeying for real application scenarios and different 
group sizes. The experiments would compare the batch group rekeying performance 
of S-LKH and B^-LKH rekey protocols. Group applications have two benchmark 
scenarios. First, one sender and large group of receivers such as video broadcasting. 
Second, small group o f peer group members such as a conferencing application where 
any member can be a sender.
5) Experimenting with the distributed group rekeying protocols for real application 
scenarios. The experiments would compare the different protocols overhead, and 
compare the proposed distributed architecture with other distributed secure group 
management architectures such as lolus [49].
6) Implementing the proposed group key manager recovery technique and performing 
experiments to study its charaeteristics. The experiments will compare the time and 
overhead required for a group key manager recovery using the proposed selective 
logging technique and a full logging technique. A full logging technique would allow 
logging the LKH keys.
7) Experimenting with group member recovery in applications exhibiting short failure 
time such as mobile clients.
8) Perform an analytical study o f the proposed key selection technique used by a group 
member in the construction of his group key manager recovery message.
9) Refining the implementation of the group key manager/agent, the rekey manager, and 
the rekey client as designed in the proposed framework. The finished product is a set 
o f packages that extend Java' '̂  ̂ security and can be used by secure group 
communication applications. The packages design will revolve around two Java''''^ 
security design principles: implementation independence and interoperability, and 
independenee and extensibility.
10) Integrating the proposed XORBP key distribution technique and the S-LKH and B”̂- 
LKH rekey protocols with the work of the IETF secure multicast group.
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11) Investigating other secure group communication issues such as a group policy 
definition and implementation for the authentication manager, and a reliable group 
rekeying transport protocol for implementing the rekey channel.
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APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLES OF S-LKH AND B^-LKH REKEY PROTOCOLS
This appendix contains two examples for S-LKH and B^-LKH rekey protocols. The 
examples illustrate the rekey message sent in different group member addition and 
removal scenarios. The initial key message (initMsg) format is {ID, position, height, 
degree}. The rekey message (rekeyMsg) format for S-LKH rekey protocol is {SEQ, type, 
position, level, ID, RekeyPacketi, RekeyPacket2  , ...}. The rekey message format 
(rekeyMsg) for B'^-LKH rekey protocol is {SEQ, type, position, level, (IDi, ID 2 , ...), 
(isRighti, isRight2 , ...), RekeyPacketi, RekeyPacket2 , ...} where isRight values are T for 
true and F for false. Note that maintaining SEQ is not shown in the algorithms (trivial). 
Note also that, the rekey message level filed is not assigned in all cases.
A LKH key is identified by its LKH position and that position is changing due to 
insertion/deletion of node entries. An addRekey packet is identified by a key and the 
directly/indirectly inserted entry number in the associated child node. If  encryption-based 
KJDT is used, such addRekey packet contains the new version o f the key encrypted by its 
previous version and by that specified child node key entry. For example addRekey(K.2.u 
2) packet is [{-Kj J K j [ ,{ ^ 2 1 ) ^ 2 1 2 ]• A rmvRekey packet is identified by a key. If
encryption-based KDT is used, such rmvRekey packet contains the new key encrypted by 
every key in the associated child nod. For example rmvRekey(K2 .\) packet is 
[ {K\ 1 }K,, K. e node(P2 1 )], where node(P2 1 ) is the node pointed to by the pointer P2 ,1 .
S-LKH Examples
Fig. 68(a) illustrates the initial nodes o f a S-LKH of degree 4 that is used to 
demonstrate the three member addition and the two member removal scenarios. The S- 
LKH is constructed using S-LKH AddMember (Fig. 24) and RemoveMember (Fig. 25) 
algorithms. The S-LKH height h > 3 (part o f the tree is not expanded). For all other 
figures the S-LKH search view is used to illustrate the changes to the initial S-LKH.
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Fig. 68(b) is the S-LKH search view after AddMember(240, ) is performed. The 
returned initMsg is {240, 2.1.2, h, 4} and the returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, ADD, 2.1.2, 2, 
240, addRekey(K2A, 2), addRekey(K.2, 1), addRekey(GK, 2)}.
Fig. 68(c) is the S-LKH search view after AddMember(420, K y)  is performed. The 
returned initMsg is {420, 2.2.4, h, 4} and the returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, SPLIT, 2.2.4, 
2, 420, rmvRekey{K2.2), rmvRekey(K2.z), addRekey(K2 , 3), addRekey{GK, 2)}.
Fig. 68(d) is the S-LKH search view after AddMember(609, K ^)  is performed. The 
returned iniMsg is {609, 3.3, h, 4} and the returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, INCREASE, 3.3, 
1, 609, rmvRekey{K-i.\), rmvRekeyiK^ i), addRekeyQL^, 1), addRekey{GK, 3)}.
Fig. 68(e) is the S-LKH search view after RemoveMember(666) is performed. The 
returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, REMOVE, 3.2.1, 2, 666, rmvRekey{)L-i.2), rmvRekeyiK^), 
rmvRekey{GK)}.
Fig. 68(f) The following figure is the S-LKH after RemoveMember(790) is 




(Ki, P,), 170, (Kj, P2), 490, (K3, P3), 900, (K4, P4) I
N, N2 N3
(K 2 ,,P2 ,) ,2 5 5 ,(K 2 .2 ,P 2 .2 )  1
N4
(K3,„ 575), (K.3.2, 589), (K.3.3, 666), (K,3,4, 790)
N2 N2
(K2.1.,, 230), (K2.,.2, 255) (K2.2.,, 290), (K,2.2.2, 300)), (K2.2.3, 388), (K.2,2.4, 490)
(a) The S-LKH initial nodes.
Fig. 68. A S-LKH member addition and removal examples.
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(b) The S-LKH search view after AddMember(240, ) is performed.
170 490 900
255 388
290 300 388 420 490
(c) The S-LKH search view after AddMember(420, Ky ) is performed.
170 490 900
609
575 589 609 666 790
(d) The S-LKH search view after AddMember(609, ) is performed.
170 490 900
609
575 589 609 790
(e) The S-LKH search view after RemoveMember(666) is performed. 
Fig. 68. (Continued)




(f) The S-LKH search view after RemoveMember(790) is performed. 
Fig. 68. (Continued)
B^-LKH Example
Fig. 69(a) illustrates a B'^-LKH of degree d = A and height A = 3 constructed using the 
B’̂ -LKH AddMember (Fig. 29) and RemoveMember (Fig. 34) algorithms. Note that, 
parts of the tree are not expanded but the maintenance algorithms guarantees that all 
nodes are at the same level, so the height h of that B^-LKH is 3. The B^-LICH is used in 
demonstrating the different B'^-LKH member addition and removal scenarios.
Fig. 69(b) is the B^-LKH search view after performing AddMember(600, ) 
followed by AddMembr (790, Ky) .  The first returned initMsg is {600, 3.1.2, 3, 4} and 
the first retumed rekeyMsg is (SEQ, ADD, 3.1.2, -, (600), -, addRekey{K3,i, 2), 
addRekey(K-i, 1), addRekey{GK, 3)}. Then the second retumed initMsg is (790, 3.2.3, 3, 
4} and the second retumed rekeyMsg is (SEQ, ADD, 3.2.3, -, (790), -, addRekey(K3 2 , 3), 
addRekey(KT„ 2), addRekey{GK, 3)}.
Fig. 69(c) is the B'^-LKH search view after AddMember(770, K ^)  is performed. The 
retumed intiMsg is {770, 3.2.2, 3, 4} and the retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, SPLIT, 3.2.2, 
1, (770, 786), -, rmvRekey(K3 2 ), rmvRekeyQLz^), addRekey(K.3 , 2), addRekey{GK, 3)}.
Fig. 69(d) is the B"^-LKH search view after AddMember(590, ) is performed. The 
retumed initMsg is {590, 3.1.2, 3, 4} and the retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, INCREASE,
3.1.2, -, (590, 600, 786, 786), -, rmvRekey{K\2 ,\), rmvRekeyOLi^.i), rmvRekey{K\3 ),
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rmvRekeyQL.2.\), rmvRekeyQLx), rmvRekeyQL.7), addRekey{GK, 1)}. The B"^-LKH height h 
becomes 4.
Fig. 69(e) is the B'^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(990) is performed (an 
expansion o f extra part o f the tree is shown). The retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, REMOVE, 
2.1.2.3, (990), rmvRekey{]L2 .\.2), rmvRekey{K2.\), rmvRekeyiJLj), rmvRekey{GK)}.
Fig. 69(f) is the B^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(817) is performed. The 
retumed rekeyMsg is (SEQ, SHIFT, 2.1.2.1, 0, (817, 810, 990), (F, T, F), 
mrgRekey(lL2 2 .\, F), mrgRekey(K2 .2 , T), rmvRekey{K.2), rmvRekey(K\), rmvRekey{GK}}.
Fig. 69(g) illustrates an expansion o f Pi sub-tree. Fig. 69(h) is the B^-LKH search 
view after RemoveMember(380) is performed. The retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, 
MERGE, 1.2.3.1, 2, (380, 230), (F), mrgRekey(]L\2 .2 , F), rmvekey{K\2 ), rmvRekey(Ki), 
rmvRekey{GK)}.
Fig. 69(i) is is the B'^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(lOO) is called. The 
retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, DECREASE, 1.1.1.2, -, (100, 100, 170, 490), (T, T, T), 
mrgRekey(}L\,\, T), mrgRekeyQLu T), mrgRekey(GK, T)}.
GK
root
\ (K,, P,), 170, (K2, P2), 490, (K3, P3), 990, (K4, P4)
N, N2 N3 
■ ■
N s.i





(Kj.,,, 530), (K3.,.2, 655), (Kj.z.,., 675) (K 3.2.2, 749), (K.3.2.3,786), (K.3.2.4, 810)
(a) The B^-LKH initial nodes.
Fig. 69. A B'^-LKH member addition and removal examples.
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(d) The B"^-LKH search view after AddMember(590, ) is performed. 
Fig. 69. (Continued)









(e) The B'*'-LKH search view after RemoveMember(990) is performed.
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(f) The B^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(817) is performed.
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(g) The B’̂ -LKH expansion o f P] sub-tree.
Fig. 69. (Continued)
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(i) The B”̂ -LKH search view after RemoveMember(lOO) is performed. 
Fig. 69. (Continued)
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Method Rekey(rekeyMsg)
Globals: h, d, Min d, ID, position, keyList, KDT,
rekeyPos, level, match, isRight, isRNghbr, isLNghbr, S;
{ rekeyPos = rekeyMsg.position; level = rekeyMsg.level; match = -1; 
for (I = 0 to (b-1)) if (position[I] equals rekeyPos[I]) then match = I; else breakFor; 
match = h -  match; if (match equals 1) then match = 2;
X = h + 1-match; isRght = rekeyMsg.isRght[match-3]; 
isRNghbr = isRght and (position[X] equals (rekeyPos[X]+l)); 
isLNgbr = (not isRght) and (position[X] equals (rekeyPos [X]-l)); 
if (match < (h-level+2)) then S = h-level; else S = match-1;
IF (rekeyMsg.type)
{ equals ADD or REMOVE: Simple();
equals SPLIT: Split();equals INCREASE: Increase();
equals MERGE: MergeQ; equals SHIFT: Shift(); equals DECREASE: Decrease();} 
Method Loopl(startI, endl, adjust)
{ for (I = starti to endl) keyList.update(I + adjust, rekeyMsg.packet[I]);
^j'k-k'kj
Method Loop2(startI, endl, adjust)
{ for (I = starti to endl)
{ if (ID > rekeyMsg.ID[I]) then increment position[h-l-I]; 
packetNo = 2* I; 
if (position[h-l-I] > Min_d)
then { increment position[h-l-I] by (Min_d+1); packetNo = packetNo+l; } 
keyList.update(I + adjust, rekeyMsg.packet[packetNo]);}
Method Loop3 (starti, endl, adjust)
{ for (I = starti to endl)
{ if (ID > rekeyMsg.ID[I]) then decrement position[h-l-I]; 
if (KDT equals XORBP)
then keyList.updateBP(I, rekeyMsg.xoredBP[I, position[h -l-I]]); 
if (not rekeyMsg.isRght[I]) then increment position[h-l-I] by Min_d; 
keyList.update(I -f- adjust, rekeyMsg.packet[I]);}
}
Fig. 70. The B^-LKH rekey client Rekey(), Loopl(), Loop2(), and Loop3() methods.
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Method SimpleQ
{ if ((match equals 2) and (ID > rekeyMsg.ID[0]))
then if (rekeyMsg.type equals ADD) then increment position[h-l]; 
else decrement position[h-l];
Loop 1 (match-2, h-1, 1);
j/***/
Method Split()
{ Y = h-leveI-2;
Loop2(match-2, Y, 1);





{ increment h; Loop2(match-2, h-1, 1);
y-k-k-kj
Method Decrease()
{ if ( match > 3)
then { if (isRNghbr) then increment position[X+l] by (Min_d -1); 
if (isRNgbr or isLNghbr) then Loop 1 (match-3, match-3, 1);} 
Loop3(match-2, h-2, 1);
decrement h ; free position[0]; keyList.free(h+l);
}
Fig. 71. The B’̂ -LKN rekey client Simple(), Split(), Increase(), and Decrease() methods.
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Method MergeQ 
{ if ( 3 < match < (h-level+2)) 
then { if  (isRNghbr ) then increment position[X+l] by (Min_d-1);
if (isRNghbr or isLNghbr ) then Loop 1 (match-3, match-3, 1);}
Loop3(match-2, h-L-2, 1);




{ if ( 3 < match < (h-level+1))
then { if (isRNghbr) then increment position[X+l] by (Min_d-1); 
if (isRNghbr or isLNghbr) then Loop 1 (match-3, match-3, 1);} 
if (match equals (h-level+1)) 
then if ( isRNghbr or isLNghbr) 
then { if (isRght and (position[level] equals (rekeyPos [Ievel]+1))) 
then decrement position[level+l]; 
if ((isRght and (position[level+l]<l)) or
(not isRght and (ID > rekepMsg.ID[match-2]))) 
then { if (isRght)
then { decrement position[level];
increment position[level+l] by Min_d; } 
else { increment position[level]; position[level+l]==l;} 
if (KDT equals XORBP) 
then keyList.updateBP(match-3, rekeyMsg.xoredBP(match-3, 1)); 
Loop 1 (match-3, match-3, 1);
} else Loop 1 (match-2, match-2, 0);
}
Loop3(match-2, h-level-3, 1); 
if (match < (h-level-1))





Fig. 72. The B"^-LKH rekey client MergeQ, and ShiftQ methods.
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Example
This example illustrates B"^-LKH rekey client processing for the retumed rekeyMsg 
{SEQ, DECREASE, 1.1.1.2, -, (100, 100, 170, 490), (T, T, T), mrgRekey{K^A, T), 
mrgRekey{K\, T), mrgRekey(GK, T)} in the last step in the B'* -̂LKH example in appendix 
A. Initially, all rekey clients maintains h = 4, and when rekeyMsg is received they will 
execute the Decrease() method. All rekey clients will adjust h to be equal to 3 and keyList 
size will be 4 after the method is executed.
Note that keyList.update{key_number, rekeyMsg.packet[packet_number]) will be 
shortened to KLU{key_number, packe_ number). We will trace the rekey client position 
and the updated keys for four members with match = 2, 3, 4, and 5.
The group member whose ID = 50 has match = 2 and position = l . I . l . l .  The rekey 
client executes Loop3(0, 2, 1) {(KLU(1, 0); KLU(2, 1), KLU(3, 2)} and position 
becomes 1.1.1.
The group member whose ID = 166 has match = 3 and position = 1.1.2.1. The rekey 
client executes the condition with X =  2 and isRight = T {position =1.1.2.2, KLU(1, 0)} 
and then executes Loop3(l, 2, \){position  =1.1.1.2, KLU(2, 1); KLU(3, 2)} and position 
becomes 1.1.2.
The group member whose ID = 198 has match = 4 and position =1.2.1.1. The rekey 
client executes the condition w ith X =  1 and isRight =T {position =1.2.2.1, KLU(2, 1)}, 
then executes Loop3(2, 2, 1) {position =1.1.2.1, KUL(3, 1)}, finally position becomes 
1.2 .1.
The group member whose ID = 530 has match = 5 and position = 2.1.1.1. The rekey 
client executes the condition with X =  0 and isRght =T {position = 2.2.1.1, KLU(3, 2)} 
and position becomes 2.1.1.
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APPENDIX C
B^-LKH REKEY SUB TREE LABELED INSERTION
This appendix details the B^-LKH rekey sub-tree (rekeyTree) labeled insertion of key 
nodes. A key node is inserted into rekeyTree in one of four ways namely, insert, 
insertSplit, insertMerge, and insertShift. The simple insertion insert(H, RC, type) inserts 
the key node N labeled according to the policy determined rekey condition RC and the 
rekey message type that is either ADD or REMOVE as shown in TABLE IX. Another 
form of simple insertion is insertQsi, label) that inserts the key node N with the specified 
label, and InsertQtT) that inserts the key node N with no label.
TABLE IX
LABEL OF KEY NODE N FOR SIMPLE RM TYPES: ADD & REMOVE
RC\type ADD REMOVE
NO N E “A ” -
PBS “GA” -
PFS “A ” “GR”
PBaFS “GA” “GR”
The insertSplit(H, RC) o f a key node N inserts two key nodes N1 and N2 to the 
rekeyTree for two nodes that result o f node N spliting. Every internal key, GK or KEK, 
has an LKH internal entry that contains a pointer to its child node, where the child node 
for GK is root node. A split key node N means the child node pointed to by that key 
internal entry is split. Let N be the node specified to be split to two nodes N1 and N2, 
where N1 is chosen from the two nodes such that it contains the newly inserted entry and 
N2 is its neighbor that share entries previously inserted in N. Initially, the key for both
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nodes N1 and N2 entries will contain the key that was in N and at least N1 key will be 
regenerated. The label of the two key nodes when inserted in the rekeyTree is specified 
according to RC as shown in TABLE X. Note that if  N exists in the rekeyTree, N1 and 
N2 both will start with N label that could be upgraded. Also note that if RC is NONE, N1 
will be labeled “GA” to guarantee the generation (creation) of that key (which initially 
contained the same key as N2) although “A” would be suitable otherwise.
TABLE X
LABELS OF KEY NODES N1 AND N2 FOR A SPLIT KEY NODE





The insertMerge(N, isRight, RC) of key node N inserts the key node N1 in the 
rekeyTree that is merged with N. The key node N1 is determined from isRight value 
(right or left neighbor). If  N already exists in the rekeyTree, it is deleted first then N1 is 
inserted. Inserting N I implies inserting all merged children entries with no label or with 
their label if  any existed in the rekeyTree. The key node N l will be labeled according to 
RC as shown in TABLE XI.
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TABLE XI






The insertShiftQ^, isRight, RC) of key node N inserts two key nodes N and N l in the 
rekeyTree. The node N l is the N neighbor determined from isRight value where an entry 
is shifted from N l to N. Both N and N l nodes are labeled according to RC as shown in 
TABLE XII.
TABLE XII
LABEL OF SHIFTED KEY NODES FROM N l TO N





A leaf entry position in a B^-LKH is represented by an array o f size LKH height h, 
where each array entry specifies a child position in the path that leads to the leaf entry. 
There are (h + I) keys specified from the position PiP2 ---Ph follows; the group key 
GK, {h-l) KEKsK^_, ..., andX^_^^ ^, and a leaf (individual) key
Assuming the keys specified by certain position are the keys of key array of size {h + 1).
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The rekeyTree insertion o f such key array depends on the parameters RC, type, level, and 
isRight array. Fig. 73 illustrates the insertion of the key array to rekeyTree, for all possible 
rekey message types and policy-determined rekey condition (RC).
if  ((type equals ADD) or (type equals REMOVE)) 
then { for (I = 1 to h) rekeyTree.insert(key [I], RC, type);
if (type equals ADD) then rekeyTree.insert(key[h+l]); }
if (type equals SPLIT) 
then { for (I = 1 to (level +1)) rekeyTree.insert(key[I], RC, ADD); 
for (I = (level+2) to h) rekeyTree.insertSplit(key[I], RC); 
rekeyTree.insert(key[h+l ]);}
if (type equals INCREASE) 
then { rekeyTree.insert(key[l], RC, ADD); 
rekeyTree.insert(K], “GR”); 
rekeyTree.insert(K 2 , “GR”); 
for (I =2 to h) rekeyTree.insertSplit(key[I], RC); 
rekeyTree.insert(key[h+l]);}
if (type equals MERGE) 
then { for (I = 1 to (level+1)) rekeyTree.insert(key[I], RC, REMOVE); 
for (I = (level+2) to h)
rekeyTree.insertMerge(key[I], isRight[h+l-I], R C );}
if (type equals SHIFT)
then { for (I = 1 to (level+1)) rekeyTree.insert(key[I], RC, REMOVE); 
rekeyTree.insertShift(key[level+2], isRight[h-level-l], RC); 
for (I = (level+3) to h)
rekeyTree.insertMerge(key[I], isRight[h+l-I], R C );}
if (type equals DECREASE) 
then { rekeyTree.delete(GK);
for (I = 1 to (h -1)) rekeyTree.insertMerge(key[I], isRight[h-I], RC); }
Fig. 73. Labeled insertion o f key array to a B^-LKH rekey sub-tree.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
192
Example
For the B''^-LKH key view shown in Fig. 74, where degree <i = 4, height h = 3, and 
group size n = 29. I f  RC is PBaFS, and a rekeying has been initiated for batch o f requests 
that contains 4 Add requests, 2 Remove requests, and 2 Refresh requests as shown in the 
figure. The 2 removed entries’ positions are marked “Rplc” for replacement by 2 added 
entries, the other 2 added entries’ positions are marked “Add”, and the 2 refreshed 





Fig. 74. A B'^-LKH key view and a batch of requests.
A LKH leaf entry position is determined by a path that starts from the root node and 
specifies the child node number in all nodes in the path that leads to that leaf node. The 
positions of the two refreshed individuals’ entries are 1.2.3, and 2.2.1 (Rfrsh marked 
nodes). The two removed individuals’ leaf entries will be replaced by two new 
individuals’ leaf entries (i.e., a new member will be assigned the same ID of a removed 
member). The two replaced entries are at positions 2.3.3 and 4.2.2 (Rplc marked nodes).
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The other two new individuals’ leaf entries are assigned two newly generated IDs and 
inserted into the original LKH. From a new individual ID the position o f his individual 
leaf entry is determined (Add marked positions). The rekeyTree, shown in Fig. 75, is 
constructed for the replaced, refreshed, and added entries as follows:
1. Replacing the leaf entry at position 2.3.3 leads to rekeyTree insertion o f the key 
nodes GK, K 2 ,  and K 2 . 3  labeled “GR”, and the leaf key K 2 . 3 . 3  with no label.
2. Replacing the leaf entry at position 4.2.2 leads to rekeyTree insertion of the key 
nodes GK, K 4 ,  and K 4 . 2  labeled “GR”, and the leaf key node K 4 , 2 , 2  with no label. Note 
that GK is inserted before with the same label.
3. Refreshing the entry at position 1.2.3 leads to rekeyTree insertion o f the key nodes 
GK, Ki, and Ki , 2  labeled “A”, and the leaf key node Ki.2 . 3  with no label. Note that GK 
is inserted before with higher ranked label.
4. Refreshing the entry at position 2.2.1 leads to rekeyTree insertion of the key nodes 
GK, K 2 , and K2 . 2  labeled “A”, and the leaf key node K2 ,2 .i with no label. Note that 
GK, and K 2  are inserted before with higher ranked labels.
5. The randomly generated IDa for the first added individual positions his entry at
1.1.2, where RM type for such insertion is ADD. Inserting that leaf entry leads to 
rekeyTree insertion of the key nodes GK, Ki, and Kj i labeled “GA” and the leaf key 
node K i , ] . 2  with no label. Note that GK is already inserted before with higher ranked 
label and Ki is already inserted before with “A” label that is upgraded to “GA”.
6. The randomly generated IDb for the second added individual positions his entry at
3.2.2, where RM type of such insertion is SPLIT and level is 1. Inserting that leaf 
node leads to rekeyTree insertion of the key nodes GK, and K 3  labeled “GA”. For the 
split node K 3 . 2  where N l (that has the new entry) is K 3 . 2  and N 2  is Ksj^ both N l and 
N2 will be inserted labeled “GR”. The leaf key node 1C3 .2 . 2  is inserted with no label.
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i “ G A
1 i K2 1 ! K3 1 1 K4 1
I I “GR” ! 1 “G A ” i i “GR” i
f Ki.i 1 K1.2 1 i K2.2 1 I  K2.3 i K3.2 i 1 K3.3 1 K4.2
1 “G A ” i “A ” 1 I “A ” I i “G R” i “GR” i i “GR” I “G R” i
K,.,.2 K i .2.3 K 2.2.I K 2.3.3 K 3.2.2 K 4 .2.2
Fig. 75.The B^-LKH rekey sub-tree constructed for batch of 8 requests.
The batch RM for such batch o f requests contains: 
o Two replaced positions 2.2.3, and 4.2.2
o Two refreshed positions 1.2.3, and 2.2.1
o Two individual RM headers {type = ADD, position = 1.1.2, IDa} and (type = SPLIT,
position = 3.2.2, level = 1, (IDb, IDc)} 
o The rekey packets constructed for all labeled keys in the rekeyTree each according to 
its label. The rekeyTree is parsed in post-order generating the rekey packets for the 
keys in the following order: K u , K 1 . 2 ,  K], K 2 . 2 ,  K 2 . 3 ,  K 2 ,  K 3 . 2 ,  K 3 . 3 ,  K 3 ,  K 4 , 2 ,  K 4 ,  GK.
If encryption-based KDT is used, the rekey packets are as follows: 
o For the two “A” labeled keys are: [{Ki.2 }Ki.2 .3 ] and [{K2 .2 }K2 .2 .i]
o For the three “GA” labeled keys are: [{K,', }Ki.i, {Kj j }Ki.i,2 ], [{K,' }Ki, {K[ }Ki.j,
(K;}K,.2Land[{K;}K3, {K',}K,.2, {K',}K,.,]
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o For the “GR” labeled key K 2 . 3  is [{ <̂̂2 , 3  }K-2 .3 ,i, {-^2 . 3  } ^ 2 .3 ,2 , {-̂ 2̂ . 3  } ^ 2 .3 .3 ]- All other 
“GR” labeled key (K2 , K 3 .2 , K jj, K4 .2 , K4 , GK) are constructed the same way: a new 
key version is generated and encrypted with all its children keys (at the original 
LKH).





DBS Data Encryption Standard
GK Group Key
GKM Group Key Manager
KAP Key Agreement Protocol
KDT Key Distribution Technique
KEK Key Encrypting Key
LKH Logical Key Hierarchy
PBS Perfect Backward Secrecy
PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy
PBaFS Perfect Backward and Forward Secrecy
RM Rekey Message
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